diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
index ddd768e6..f151ab6f 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
@@ -220,6 +220,10 @@ jobs:
         run: node scripts/ci/check-unicode-safety.js
         continue-on-error: false
 
+      - name: Validate no personal paths
+        run: node scripts/ci/validate-no-personal-paths.js
+        continue-on-error: false
+
   security:
     name: Security Scan
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
diff --git a/.github/workflows/reusable-validate.yml b/.github/workflows/reusable-validate.yml
index a606404b..ff57dd8e 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/reusable-validate.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/reusable-validate.yml
@@ -50,3 +50,6 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Check unicode safety
         run: node scripts/ci/check-unicode-safety.js
+
+      - name: Validate no personal paths
+        run: node scripts/ci/validate-no-personal-paths.js
diff --git a/scripts/ci/validate-no-personal-paths.js b/scripts/ci/validate-no-personal-paths.js
index fee859db..9427b6f9 100755
--- a/scripts/ci/validate-no-personal-paths.js
+++ b/scripts/ci/validate-no-personal-paths.js
@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 /**
  * Prevent shipping user-specific absolute paths in public docs/skills/commands.
+ *
+ * Catches generic `/Users/<name>` (macOS) and `C:\Users\<name>` (Windows) paths,
+ * while allowing obvious placeholder usernames used in templates/examples.
+ * Forensic incident reports under `docs/fixes/` are exempt because they may
+ * legitimately document a reporter's local machine path.
  */
 
 'use strict';
@@ -18,11 +23,50 @@ const TARGETS = [
   '.opencode/commands',
 ];
 
-const BLOCK_PATTERNS = [
-  /\/Users\/affoon\b/g,
-  /C:\\Users\\affoon\b/gi,
+const EXEMPT_PREFIXES = [
+  'docs/fixes/',
 ];
 
+const PLACEHOLDER_USERNAMES = new Set([
+  'example',
+  'me',
+  'user',
+  'username',
+  'you',
+  'yourname',
+  'yourusername',
+  'your-username',
+]);
+
+const POSIX_USER_RE = /\/Users\/([a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9._-]*)/g;
+const WIN_USER_RE = /C:\\Users\\([a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9._-]*)/gi;
+
+function repoRelative(file) {
+  return path.relative(ROOT, file).split(path.sep).join('/');
+}
+
+function isExempt(file) {
+  const rel = repoRelative(file);
+  return EXEMPT_PREFIXES.some(prefix => rel.startsWith(prefix));
+}
+
+function findLeaks(content) {
+  const leaks = [];
+
+  for (const pattern of [POSIX_USER_RE, WIN_USER_RE]) {
+    pattern.lastIndex = 0;
+    let match;
+
+    while ((match = pattern.exec(content)) !== null) {
+      if (!PLACEHOLDER_USERNAMES.has(match[1].toLowerCase())) {
+        leaks.push(match[0]);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return leaks;
+}
+
 function collectFiles(targetPath, out) {
   if (!fs.existsSync(targetPath)) return;
   const stat = fs.statSync(targetPath);
@@ -45,14 +89,14 @@ for (const target of TARGETS) {
 let failures = 0;
 for (const file of files) {
   if (!/\.(md|json|js|ts|sh|toml|yml|yaml)$/i.test(file)) continue;
+  if (isExempt(file)) continue;
+
   const content = fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8');
-  for (const pattern of BLOCK_PATTERNS) {
-    const match = content.match(pattern);
-    if (match) {
-      console.error(`ERROR: personal path detected in ${path.relative(ROOT, file)}`);
-      failures += match.length;
-      break;
-    }
+  const leaks = findLeaks(content);
+
+  for (const leak of leaks) {
+    console.error(`ERROR: personal path "${leak}" detected in ${repoRelative(file)}`);
+    failures += 1;
   }
 }
 
diff --git a/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js b/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
index 7f6183ba..03936136 100644
--- a/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
+++ b/scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ function extractCheckoutSteps(source) {
       startLine: block.startLine,
       text: block.lines.join('\n'),
     }))
-    .filter(block => /uses:\s*actions\/checkout@/m.test(block.text));
+    .filter(block => /uses:\s*['"]?actions\/checkout@/m.test(block.text));
 }
 
 function findViolations(filePath, source) {
diff --git a/tests/ci/no-personal-paths.test.js b/tests/ci/no-personal-paths.test.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..188f1928
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/ci/no-personal-paths.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/**
+ * Tests for scripts/ci/validate-no-personal-paths.js.
+ *
+ * Run with: node tests/ci/no-personal-paths.test.js
+ */
+
+'use strict';
+
+const assert = require('assert');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
+
+const repoRoot = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..');
+const validatorPath = path.join(repoRoot, 'scripts', 'ci', 'validate-no-personal-paths.js');
+
+function test(name, fn) {
+  try {
+    fn();
+    console.log(`  \u2713 ${name}`);
+    return true;
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.log(`  \u2717 ${name}`);
+    console.log(`    Error: ${err.message}`);
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+function createTestDir() {
+  return fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'no-personal-paths-test-'));
+}
+
+function cleanupTestDir(testDir) {
+  fs.rmSync(testDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+}
+
+function writeFile(filePath, content) {
+  fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true });
+  fs.writeFileSync(filePath, content);
+}
+
+function stripShebang(source) {
+  let result = source;
+  if (result.charCodeAt(0) === 0xFEFF) result = result.slice(1);
+  if (result.startsWith('#!')) {
+    const newline = result.indexOf('\n');
+    result = newline === -1 ? '' : result.slice(newline + 1);
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+
+function runValidatorAgainst(testDir) {
+  let source = fs.readFileSync(validatorPath, 'utf8');
+  source = stripShebang(source);
+  source = source.replace(
+    /const ROOT = .*?;/,
+    `const ROOT = ${JSON.stringify(testDir)};`,
+  );
+
+  const tmpFile = path.join(
+    os.tmpdir(),
+    `no-personal-paths-${Date.now()}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2)}.js`,
+  );
+
+  try {
+    fs.writeFileSync(tmpFile, source, 'utf8');
+    const stdout = execFileSync('node', [tmpFile], {
+      encoding: 'utf8',
+      stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+      timeout: 10000,
+      cwd: repoRoot,
+    });
+    return { code: 0, stdout, stderr: '' };
+  } catch (err) {
+    return {
+      code: err.status || 1,
+      stdout: err.stdout || '',
+      stderr: err.stderr || '',
+    };
+  } finally {
+    try { fs.unlinkSync(tmpFile); } catch (_) { /* ignore cleanup errors */ }
+  }
+}
+
+function runValidatorAgainstRealRepo() {
+  try {
+    const stdout = execFileSync('node', [validatorPath], {
+      encoding: 'utf8',
+      stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+      timeout: 10000,
+      cwd: repoRoot,
+    });
+    return { code: 0, stdout, stderr: '' };
+  } catch (err) {
+    return {
+      code: err.status || 1,
+      stdout: err.stdout || '',
+      stderr: err.stderr || '',
+    };
+  }
+}
+
+console.log('\n=== Testing validate-no-personal-paths.js ===\n');
+
+let passed = 0;
+let failed = 0;
+
+function record(ok) {
+  if (ok) passed += 1;
+  else failed += 1;
+}
+
+record(test('passes against the real repository', () => {
+  const result = runValidatorAgainstRealRepo();
+  assert.strictEqual(result.code, 0, `expected exit 0; stderr: ${result.stderr}`);
+  assert.ok(result.stdout.includes('Validated:'), 'expected success line in stdout');
+}));
+
+record(test('flags a leaked /Users/<name> path', () => {
+  const testDir = createTestDir();
+  try {
+    writeFile(path.join(testDir, 'skills', 'leaky', 'SKILL.md'), 'See /Users/sugig/.claude/settings.json\n');
+    const result = runValidatorAgainst(testDir);
+    assert.strictEqual(result.code, 1, 'expected non-zero exit on leak');
+    assert.ok(result.stderr.includes('/Users/sugig'), `expected stderr to mention leaked path; got: ${result.stderr}`);
+    assert.ok(result.stderr.includes('skills/leaky/SKILL.md'), `expected normalized file path; got: ${result.stderr}`);
+  } finally {
+    cleanupTestDir(testDir);
+  }
+}));
+
+record(test('flags a leaked C:\\Users\\<name> path case-insensitively', () => {
+  const testDir = createTestDir();
+  try {
+    writeFile(path.join(testDir, 'docs', 'guide.md'), 'See C:\\Users\\Affaan\\projects\\thing\n');
+    const result = runValidatorAgainst(testDir);
+    assert.strictEqual(result.code, 1, 'expected non-zero exit on leak');
+    assert.ok(result.stderr.includes('C:\\Users\\Affaan'), `expected stderr to mention leaked path; got: ${result.stderr}`);
+  } finally {
+    cleanupTestDir(testDir);
+  }
+}));
+
+record(test('allows /Users/<placeholder> templates', () => {
+  const testDir = createTestDir();
+  try {
+    writeFile(path.join(testDir, 'commands', 'demo.md'), [
+      '/Users/you/.claude/session.json',
+      '/Users/example/.claude/rules/foo.md',
+      '/Users/yourname/projects/app',
+      '/Users/your-username/.claude/settings.json',
+      'C:\\Users\\USER\\.claude\\settings.json',
+    ].join('\n'));
+    const result = runValidatorAgainst(testDir);
+    assert.strictEqual(result.code, 0, `expected exit 0 for placeholders; stderr: ${result.stderr}`);
+  } finally {
+    cleanupTestDir(testDir);
+  }
+}));
+
+record(test('exempts docs/fixes forensic reports', () => {
+  const testDir = createTestDir();
+  try {
+    writeFile(
+      path.join(testDir, 'docs', 'fixes', 'HOOK-FIX-EXAMPLE.md'),
+      'Reporter ran: C:\\Users\\sugig\\.claude\\settings.local.json\n',
+    );
+    const result = runValidatorAgainst(testDir);
+    assert.strictEqual(result.code, 0, `expected exit 0 for docs/fixes; stderr: ${result.stderr}`);
+  } finally {
+    cleanupTestDir(testDir);
+  }
+}));
+
+record(test('only scans configured file extensions', () => {
+  const testDir = createTestDir();
+  try {
+    writeFile(path.join(testDir, 'skills', 'demo', 'image.png'), 'binary /Users/sugig/secret');
+    const result = runValidatorAgainst(testDir);
+    assert.strictEqual(result.code, 0, `expected non-text extensions to be skipped; stderr: ${result.stderr}`);
+  } finally {
+    cleanupTestDir(testDir);
+  }
+}));
+
+record(test('reports every leak on a single offending file', () => {
+  const testDir = createTestDir();
+  try {
+    writeFile(path.join(testDir, 'skills', 'multi', 'SKILL.md'), [
+      '/Users/sugig/.claude/a.json',
+      '/Users/sugig/.claude/b.json',
+      'C:\\Users\\foo\\bar',
+    ].join('\n'));
+    const result = runValidatorAgainst(testDir);
+    assert.strictEqual(result.code, 1, 'expected non-zero exit on leak');
+    const sugigCount = (result.stderr.match(/\/Users\/sugig/g) || []).length;
+    const fooCount = (result.stderr.match(/C:\\Users\\foo/g) || []).length;
+    assert.strictEqual(sugigCount, 2, `expected both /Users/sugig occurrences reported; got: ${result.stderr}`);
+    assert.strictEqual(fooCount, 1, `expected C:\\Users\\foo reported once; got: ${result.stderr}`);
+  } finally {
+    cleanupTestDir(testDir);
+  }
+}));
+
+console.log(`\nPassed: ${passed}`);
+console.log(`Failed: ${failed}\n`);
+
+if (failed > 0) {
+  process.exit(1);
+}
diff --git a/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js b/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js
index b1e69a39..9d58c6f6 100644
--- a/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js
+++ b/tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js
@@ -81,6 +81,24 @@ function run() {
     assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request\.head\.sha/);
   })) passed++; else failed++;
 
+  // Quoted action names are valid YAML. The checkout-step filter must still
+  // inspect their `with.ref` values in privileged workflows.
+  if (test('rejects pull_request_target checkout when uses is double-quoted', () => {
+    const result = runValidator({
+      'unsafe-double-quoted.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n  pull_request_target:\n    branches: [main]\njobs:\n  inspect:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: "actions/checkout@v4"\n        with:\n          ref: \${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}\n`,
+    });
+    assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on double-quoted uses:');
+    assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request\.head\.sha/);
+  })) passed++; else failed++;
+
+  if (test('rejects pull_request_target checkout when uses is single-quoted', () => {
+    const result = runValidator({
+      'unsafe-single-quoted.yml': `name: Unsafe\non:\n  pull_request_target:\n    branches: [main]\njobs:\n  inspect:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: 'actions/checkout@v4'\n        with:\n          ref: \${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}\n`,
+    });
+    assert.notStrictEqual(result.status, 0, 'Expected validator to fail on single-quoted uses:');
+    assert.match(result.stderr, /pull_request\.head\.sha/);
+  })) passed++; else failed++;
+
   console.log(`\nPassed: ${passed}`);
   console.log(`Failed: ${failed}`);