description: Security vulnerability scan with a reviewable remediation patch — OWASP, CWE, CVE, secrets, injection
Run a security hardening pass on legacy/$1: find vulnerabilities, rank
them, and produce a reviewable patch for the critical ones.
This command never edits legacy/ — it writes findings and a proposed patch
to analysis/$1/. The user reviews and applies (or not).
Findings files get shared, committed, and pasted into decks — discovered credential values must never land in them. Before any scanning:
analysis/.gitignore exists and contains the line
SECRETS.local.md. Create the file or append the line if missing.git check-ignore -q analysis/$1/SECRETS.local.md — if that exits
non-zero, fix the ignore rule before proceeding. Do not write any
findings until this check passes (skip the check only if there is no
git repo).All secret values in every artifact this command produces are masked
(AKIA****, password=****) and cited by file:line. The one exception:
if the user passed --show-secrets, raw values may appear in
analysis/$1/SECRETS.local.md (gitignored above) and nowhere else —
never in SECURITY_FINDINGS.md or the patch commentary.
Spawn the security-auditor subagent:
"Adversarially audit legacy/$1 for security vulnerabilities. Cover what's relevant to the stack: injection (SQL/NoSQL/OS command/template), broken auth, sensitive data exposure, access control gaps, insecure deserialization, hardcoded secrets, vulnerable dependency versions, missing input validation, path traversal. For each finding return: CWE ID, severity (Critical/High/Med/Low), file:line, one-sentence exploit scenario, and recommended fix. Run any available SAST tooling (npm audit, pip-audit, OWASP dependency-check) and include its raw output. Mask every discovered credential value per your secret-handling rules — file:line plus a 2–4 character masked preview, never the value itself."
Write analysis/$1/SECURITY_FINDINGS.md:
If any hardcoded credentials were found, also write
analysis/$1/SECRETS.local.md (the gitignored quarantine file from Step 0):
one row per credential — masked preview, file:line, credential type, what
it appears to grant access to, production/test guess, and a rotation
recommendation. With --show-secrets, append the raw value column here —
this file only. SECURITY_FINDINGS.md gets a one-line pointer:
"N hardcoded credentials found — inventory in SECRETS.local.md (gitignored;
not for sharing)."
For each Critical and High finding, draft a minimal, targeted fix.
Do not edit legacy/ — write all fixes as a single unified diff to
analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch, with a comment line above each
hunk citing the finding ID it addresses (# SEC-001: parameterize the query).
Add a Remediation Log section to SECURITY_FINDINGS.md mapping each finding ID → one-line summary of the proposed fix and the patch hunk that implements it.
Spawn the security-auditor again to review the patch against the original code:
"Review analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch against legacy/$1. For each hunk: does it fully remediate the cited finding? Does it introduce new vulnerabilities or change behavior beyond the fix? Return one verdict per hunk: RESOLVES / PARTIAL / INTRODUCES-RISK, with a one-line reason."
Add a Patch Review section to SECURITY_FINDINGS.md with the verdicts. If any hunk is PARTIAL or INTRODUCES-RISK, revise the patch and re-review.
Tell the user the artifacts are ready:
analysis/$1/SECURITY_FINDINGS.md — findings, remediation log, patch reviewanalysis/$1/security_remediation.patch — review, then apply if appropriate
with git -C legacy/$1 apply ../../analysis/$1/security_remediation.patch/modernize-harden $1 after applying to confirm resolutionSuggest: glow -p analysis/$1/SECURITY_FINDINGS.md