security.test.ts 22 KB

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  1. /**
  2. * Security Tests
  3. *
  4. * Tests for P0/P1 security fixes:
  5. * - FileLock (cross-process locking)
  6. * - Path traversal prevention
  7. * - MCP input validation
  8. * - Atomic writes
  9. */
  10. import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
  11. import * as fs from 'fs';
  12. import * as path from 'path';
  13. import * as os from 'os';
  14. import { FileLock, validateProjectPath, validatePathWithinRoot } from '../src/utils';
  15. import CodeGraph from '../src/index';
  16. import { ToolHandler, tools } from '../src/mcp/tools';
  17. import { scanDirectory, isSourceFile } from '../src/extraction';
  18. import { DatabaseConnection, getDatabasePath } from '../src/db';
  19. import { QueryBuilder } from '../src/db/queries';
  20. function createTempDir(): string {
  21. return fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'codegraph-security-test-'));
  22. }
  23. function cleanupTempDir(dir: string): void {
  24. if (fs.existsSync(dir)) {
  25. fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
  26. }
  27. }
  28. describe('FileLock', () => {
  29. let tempDir: string;
  30. let lockPath: string;
  31. beforeEach(() => {
  32. tempDir = createTempDir();
  33. lockPath = path.join(tempDir, 'test.lock');
  34. });
  35. afterEach(() => {
  36. cleanupTempDir(tempDir);
  37. });
  38. it('should acquire and release a lock', () => {
  39. const lock = new FileLock(lockPath);
  40. lock.acquire();
  41. expect(fs.existsSync(lockPath)).toBe(true);
  42. const content = fs.readFileSync(lockPath, 'utf-8').trim();
  43. expect(parseInt(content, 10)).toBe(process.pid);
  44. lock.release();
  45. expect(fs.existsSync(lockPath)).toBe(false);
  46. });
  47. it('should prevent double acquisition within same process', () => {
  48. const lock1 = new FileLock(lockPath);
  49. const lock2 = new FileLock(lockPath);
  50. lock1.acquire();
  51. // Second lock should fail because our PID is alive
  52. expect(() => lock2.acquire()).toThrow(/locked by another process/);
  53. lock1.release();
  54. });
  55. it('should detect and remove stale locks from dead processes', () => {
  56. // Write a lock file with a PID that doesn't exist
  57. // PID 99999999 is extremely unlikely to be a real process
  58. fs.writeFileSync(lockPath, '99999999');
  59. const lock = new FileLock(lockPath);
  60. // Should succeed because the PID is dead
  61. expect(() => lock.acquire()).not.toThrow();
  62. lock.release();
  63. });
  64. it('should execute function with withLock', () => {
  65. const lock = new FileLock(lockPath);
  66. const result = lock.withLock(() => {
  67. expect(fs.existsSync(lockPath)).toBe(true);
  68. return 42;
  69. });
  70. expect(result).toBe(42);
  71. expect(fs.existsSync(lockPath)).toBe(false);
  72. });
  73. it('should release lock even if function throws', () => {
  74. const lock = new FileLock(lockPath);
  75. expect(() => {
  76. lock.withLock(() => {
  77. throw new Error('test error');
  78. });
  79. }).toThrow('test error');
  80. expect(fs.existsSync(lockPath)).toBe(false);
  81. });
  82. it('should execute async function with withLockAsync', async () => {
  83. const lock = new FileLock(lockPath);
  84. const result = await lock.withLockAsync(async () => {
  85. expect(fs.existsSync(lockPath)).toBe(true);
  86. return 'async-result';
  87. });
  88. expect(result).toBe('async-result');
  89. expect(fs.existsSync(lockPath)).toBe(false);
  90. });
  91. it('should release lock even if async function throws', async () => {
  92. const lock = new FileLock(lockPath);
  93. await expect(
  94. lock.withLockAsync(async () => {
  95. throw new Error('async error');
  96. })
  97. ).rejects.toThrow('async error');
  98. expect(fs.existsSync(lockPath)).toBe(false);
  99. });
  100. it('release should be idempotent', () => {
  101. const lock = new FileLock(lockPath);
  102. lock.acquire();
  103. lock.release();
  104. // Second release should not throw
  105. expect(() => lock.release()).not.toThrow();
  106. });
  107. });
  108. describe('Path Traversal Prevention', () => {
  109. let testDir: string;
  110. let cg: CodeGraph;
  111. beforeEach(async () => {
  112. testDir = createTempDir();
  113. const srcDir = path.join(testDir, 'src');
  114. fs.mkdirSync(srcDir);
  115. fs.writeFileSync(
  116. path.join(srcDir, 'hello.ts'),
  117. `export function hello(): string { return "hi"; }\n`
  118. );
  119. cg = CodeGraph.initSync(testDir, {
  120. config: { include: ['**/*.ts'], exclude: [] },
  121. });
  122. await cg.indexAll();
  123. });
  124. afterEach(() => {
  125. if (cg) cg.close();
  126. cleanupTempDir(testDir);
  127. });
  128. it('should read code for valid nodes within project', async () => {
  129. const nodes = cg.getNodesByKind('function');
  130. const hello = nodes.find((n) => n.name === 'hello');
  131. expect(hello).toBeDefined();
  132. const code = await cg.getCode(hello!.id);
  133. expect(code).toContain('hello');
  134. });
  135. it('should return null for non-existent node', async () => {
  136. const code = await cg.getCode('does-not-exist');
  137. expect(code).toBeNull();
  138. });
  139. });
  140. describe('Symlink escape prevention (#527)', () => {
  141. // An in-repo symlink whose logical path is inside the project root but whose
  142. // REAL target escapes the root must never be served. validatePathWithinRoot
  143. // is the chokepoint both content-serving read sinks go through (codegraph_node
  144. // includeCode + codegraph_explore source rendering), so it must resolve
  145. // symlinks, not just compare strings. realpathSync the roots so the test's own
  146. // expectations don't trip over /tmp -> /private/tmp on macOS.
  147. let root: string;
  148. let outside: string;
  149. beforeEach(() => {
  150. root = fs.realpathSync(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'cg-root-')));
  151. outside = fs.realpathSync(fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'cg-outside-')));
  152. fs.mkdirSync(path.join(root, 'src'));
  153. fs.writeFileSync(path.join(root, 'src', 'in.ts'), 'export const x = 1;\n');
  154. fs.mkdirSync(path.join(outside, 'pkg'));
  155. fs.writeFileSync(path.join(outside, 'pkg', 'secret.txt'), 'TOP-SECRET\n');
  156. });
  157. afterEach(() => {
  158. fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
  159. fs.rmSync(outside, { recursive: true, force: true });
  160. });
  161. // Symlink creation needs privileges on Windows; skip gracefully if it fails.
  162. const link = (linkPath: string, target: string): boolean => {
  163. try { fs.symlinkSync(target, linkPath); return true; } catch { return false; }
  164. };
  165. it('allows a real file inside the root (and realpaths consistently)', () => {
  166. expect(validatePathWithinRoot(root, 'src/in.ts')).not.toBeNull();
  167. });
  168. it('allows a not-yet-existing path inside the root (ENOENT — files about to be written)', () => {
  169. expect(validatePathWithinRoot(root, 'src/will-write.ts')).not.toBeNull();
  170. });
  171. it('rejects a lexical ../ traversal out of the root', () => {
  172. expect(validatePathWithinRoot(root, `../${path.basename(outside)}/pkg/secret.txt`)).toBeNull();
  173. });
  174. it('rejects an in-repo symlink to an out-of-root FILE', () => {
  175. if (!link(path.join(root, 'escape'), path.join(outside, 'pkg', 'secret.txt'))) return;
  176. expect(validatePathWithinRoot(root, 'escape')).toBeNull();
  177. });
  178. it('rejects a path that escapes through an in-repo symlink to an out-of-root DIR', () => {
  179. if (!link(path.join(root, 'escapedir'), path.join(outside, 'pkg'))) return;
  180. expect(validatePathWithinRoot(root, 'escapedir/secret.txt')).toBeNull();
  181. });
  182. it('still allows an in-repo symlink that stays WITHIN the root (no over-blocking)', () => {
  183. if (!link(path.join(root, 'src', 'inlink.ts'), path.join(root, 'src', 'in.ts'))) return;
  184. expect(validatePathWithinRoot(root, 'src/inlink.ts')).not.toBeNull();
  185. });
  186. it('end-to-end: getCode never serves an out-of-root file reached via a dir symlink', async () => {
  187. fs.writeFileSync(path.join(outside, 'pkg', 'leak.ts'),
  188. 'export function leaked() { return "LEAKED-ZZZ-9"; }\n');
  189. if (!link(path.join(root, 'vendored'), path.join(outside, 'pkg'))) return;
  190. const cg = CodeGraph.initSync(root, { config: { include: ['**/*.ts'], exclude: [] } });
  191. try {
  192. await cg.indexAll();
  193. // Whether or not extraction followed the dir symlink, NO node may ever
  194. // yield the out-of-root content through getCode.
  195. for (const n of cg.getNodesByKind('function')) {
  196. const code = await cg.getCode(n.id);
  197. expect(code ?? '').not.toContain('LEAKED-ZZZ-9');
  198. }
  199. } finally {
  200. cg.close();
  201. }
  202. });
  203. });
  204. describe('validateProjectPath — sensitive directory blocking', () => {
  205. // POSIX-only: on Windows '/etc' resolves to C:\etc (non-existent), not a
  206. // sensitive dir — the Windows case is covered by the win32-gated test below.
  207. it.runIf(process.platform !== 'win32')('blocks POSIX system directories (exact match)', () => {
  208. expect(validateProjectPath('/')).toMatch(/sensitive system directory/i);
  209. expect(validateProjectPath('/etc')).toMatch(/sensitive system directory/i);
  210. });
  211. it('allows a normal, existing directory', () => {
  212. const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'cg-validate-'));
  213. try {
  214. expect(validateProjectPath(dir)).toBeNull();
  215. } finally {
  216. fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
  217. }
  218. });
  219. // SENSITIVE_PATHS stores the Windows entries lowercase and validateProjectPath
  220. // matches via resolved.toLowerCase(), so 'C:\\Windows' and 'c:\\windows' are
  221. // both blocked. path.resolve is platform-specific, so this only runs on Windows.
  222. it.runIf(process.platform === 'win32')(
  223. 'blocks Windows system directories regardless of case',
  224. () => {
  225. expect(validateProjectPath('C:\\Windows')).toMatch(/sensitive system directory/i);
  226. expect(validateProjectPath('c:\\windows')).toMatch(/sensitive system directory/i);
  227. expect(validateProjectPath('C:\\WINDOWS\\System32')).toMatch(/sensitive system directory/i);
  228. }
  229. );
  230. });
  231. describe('MCP Input Validation', () => {
  232. let testDir: string;
  233. let cg: CodeGraph;
  234. let handler: ToolHandler;
  235. beforeEach(async () => {
  236. testDir = createTempDir();
  237. const srcDir = path.join(testDir, 'src');
  238. fs.mkdirSync(srcDir);
  239. fs.writeFileSync(
  240. path.join(srcDir, 'example.ts'),
  241. `export function exampleFunc(): void {}\nexport class ExampleClass {}\n`
  242. );
  243. cg = CodeGraph.initSync(testDir, {
  244. config: { include: ['**/*.ts'], exclude: [] },
  245. });
  246. await cg.indexAll();
  247. handler = new ToolHandler(cg);
  248. });
  249. afterEach(() => {
  250. if (cg) cg.close();
  251. cleanupTempDir(testDir);
  252. });
  253. it('should reject non-string query in codegraph_search', async () => {
  254. const result = await handler.execute('codegraph_search', { query: null });
  255. expect(result.isError).toBe(true);
  256. expect(result.content[0].text).toContain('non-empty string');
  257. });
  258. it('should reject empty string query in codegraph_search', async () => {
  259. const result = await handler.execute('codegraph_search', { query: '' });
  260. expect(result.isError).toBe(true);
  261. expect(result.content[0].text).toContain('non-empty string');
  262. });
  263. it('should accept valid query in codegraph_search', async () => {
  264. const result = await handler.execute('codegraph_search', { query: 'example' });
  265. expect(result.isError).toBeFalsy();
  266. });
  267. it('should clamp limit to valid range in codegraph_search', async () => {
  268. // Extremely large limit should still work (clamped to 100)
  269. const result = await handler.execute('codegraph_search', { query: 'example', limit: 999999 });
  270. expect(result.isError).toBeFalsy();
  271. });
  272. it('should reject non-string symbol in codegraph_callers', async () => {
  273. const result = await handler.execute('codegraph_callers', { symbol: 123 });
  274. expect(result.isError).toBe(true);
  275. expect(result.content[0].text).toContain('non-empty string');
  276. });
  277. it('should reject non-string query in codegraph_explore', async () => {
  278. const result = await handler.execute('codegraph_explore', { query: undefined });
  279. expect(result.isError).toBe(true);
  280. expect(result.content[0].text).toContain('non-empty string');
  281. });
  282. it('should truncate oversized tool output', async () => {
  283. // Force a huge result set through codegraph_search; the response must be
  284. // truncated with the sentinel rather than flooding the agent's context.
  285. const many = Array.from({ length: 3000 }, (_, i) => ({
  286. node: {
  287. id: `n${i}`,
  288. name: `symbol_${i}_${'x'.repeat(40)}`,
  289. kind: 'function',
  290. filePath: `src/very/deep/path/file_${i}.ts`,
  291. startLine: 1,
  292. endLine: 2,
  293. language: 'typescript',
  294. },
  295. score: 1,
  296. }));
  297. const fakeCg = {
  298. searchNodes: () => many,
  299. };
  300. const fakeHandler = new ToolHandler(fakeCg as unknown as CodeGraph);
  301. const result = await fakeHandler.execute('codegraph_search', { query: 'x' });
  302. expect(result.isError).toBeFalsy();
  303. expect(result.content[0].text).toContain('... (output truncated)');
  304. });
  305. it('should reject non-string symbol in codegraph_impact', async () => {
  306. const result = await handler.execute('codegraph_impact', { symbol: [] });
  307. expect(result.isError).toBe(true);
  308. });
  309. it('should reject non-string symbol in codegraph_node', async () => {
  310. const result = await handler.execute('codegraph_node', { symbol: false });
  311. expect(result.isError).toBe(true);
  312. });
  313. it('should reject non-string symbol in codegraph_callees', async () => {
  314. const result = await handler.execute('codegraph_callees', { symbol: {} });
  315. expect(result.isError).toBe(true);
  316. });
  317. it('should handle NaN limit gracefully', async () => {
  318. const result = await handler.execute('codegraph_search', { query: 'example', limit: 'abc' });
  319. expect(result.isError).toBeFalsy();
  320. });
  321. it('should handle negative limit gracefully', async () => {
  322. const result = await handler.execute('codegraph_search', { query: 'example', limit: -5 });
  323. expect(result.isError).toBeFalsy();
  324. });
  325. // #230: getCodeGraph must reject a sensitive system directory passed as
  326. // projectPath before opening it. The error surfaces through execute()'s
  327. // catch as an isError result. /etc is sensitive on POSIX; C:\Windows on
  328. // Windows (path.resolve is platform-specific, so each case is gated).
  329. it.runIf(process.platform !== 'win32')(
  330. 'rejects a sensitive POSIX projectPath (/etc) via the MCP handler',
  331. async () => {
  332. const result = await handler.execute('codegraph_search', {
  333. query: 'example',
  334. projectPath: '/etc',
  335. });
  336. expect(result.isError).toBe(true);
  337. expect(result.content[0].text).toMatch(/sensitive system directory/i);
  338. }
  339. );
  340. it.runIf(process.platform === 'win32')(
  341. 'rejects a sensitive Windows projectPath (C:\\Windows) via the MCP handler',
  342. async () => {
  343. const result = await handler.execute('codegraph_search', {
  344. query: 'example',
  345. projectPath: 'C:\\Windows',
  346. });
  347. expect(result.isError).toBe(true);
  348. expect(result.content[0].text).toMatch(/sensitive system directory/i);
  349. }
  350. );
  351. });
  352. describe('Atomic Writes', () => {
  353. let tempDir: string;
  354. beforeEach(() => {
  355. tempDir = createTempDir();
  356. });
  357. afterEach(() => {
  358. cleanupTempDir(tempDir);
  359. });
  360. it('should not leave temp files on success', () => {
  361. // We test this indirectly through the config-writer module
  362. // by checking that no .tmp files remain after writing
  363. const configDir = path.join(tempDir, '.claude');
  364. fs.mkdirSync(configDir, { recursive: true });
  365. const testFile = path.join(configDir, 'test.json');
  366. // Simulate what atomicWriteFileSync does
  367. const tmpPath = testFile + '.tmp.' + process.pid;
  368. fs.writeFileSync(tmpPath, '{"test": true}');
  369. fs.renameSync(tmpPath, testFile);
  370. expect(fs.existsSync(testFile)).toBe(true);
  371. expect(fs.existsSync(tmpPath)).toBe(false);
  372. const content = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(testFile, 'utf-8'));
  373. expect(content.test).toBe(true);
  374. });
  375. });
  376. describe('Source file detection (isSourceFile)', () => {
  377. it('selects files by supported extension', () => {
  378. expect(isSourceFile('src/index.ts')).toBe(true);
  379. expect(isSourceFile('src/deep/nested/file.ts')).toBe(true);
  380. expect(isSourceFile('src/component.tsx')).toBe(true);
  381. expect(isSourceFile('lib/util.js')).toBe(true);
  382. expect(isSourceFile('src/main.py')).toBe(true);
  383. });
  384. it('rejects unsupported extensions and extensionless files', () => {
  385. expect(isSourceFile('src/component.css')).toBe(false);
  386. expect(isSourceFile('README.md')).toBe(false);
  387. expect(isSourceFile('Makefile')).toBe(false);
  388. expect(isSourceFile('.gitignore')).toBe(false);
  389. });
  390. it('matches regardless of leading dot directories', () => {
  391. expect(isSourceFile('.hidden/index.ts')).toBe(true);
  392. });
  393. });
  394. describe('JSON.parse Error Boundaries in DB', () => {
  395. let tempDir: string;
  396. beforeEach(() => {
  397. tempDir = createTempDir();
  398. });
  399. afterEach(() => {
  400. cleanupTempDir(tempDir);
  401. });
  402. it('should not crash when node has malformed JSON in decorators column', () => {
  403. const dbPath = path.join(tempDir, 'test.db');
  404. const db = DatabaseConnection.initialize(dbPath);
  405. const queries = new QueryBuilder(db.getDb());
  406. // Insert a node with malformed JSON in the decorators column
  407. db.getDb().prepare(`
  408. INSERT INTO nodes (id, kind, name, qualified_name, file_path, language, start_line, end_line, start_column, end_column, decorators, is_exported, is_async, is_static, is_abstract, updated_at)
  409. VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
  410. `).run(
  411. 'test-node-1', 'function', 'myFunc', 'myFunc', 'test.ts', 'typescript',
  412. 1, 5, 0, 0,
  413. '{not valid json!!!}', // malformed decorators
  414. 0, 0, 0, 0, Date.now()
  415. );
  416. // Should not throw - should return node with undefined decorators
  417. const node = queries.getNodeById('test-node-1');
  418. expect(node).not.toBeNull();
  419. expect(node!.name).toBe('myFunc');
  420. expect(node!.decorators).toBeUndefined();
  421. db.close();
  422. });
  423. it('should not crash when edge has malformed JSON in metadata column', () => {
  424. const dbPath = path.join(tempDir, 'test.db');
  425. const db = DatabaseConnection.initialize(dbPath);
  426. const queries = new QueryBuilder(db.getDb());
  427. // Insert two nodes first
  428. const insertNode = db.getDb().prepare(`
  429. INSERT INTO nodes (id, kind, name, qualified_name, file_path, language, start_line, end_line, start_column, end_column, is_exported, is_async, is_static, is_abstract, updated_at)
  430. VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
  431. `);
  432. insertNode.run('node-a', 'function', 'funcA', 'funcA', 'a.ts', 'typescript', 1, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, Date.now());
  433. insertNode.run('node-b', 'function', 'funcB', 'funcB', 'b.ts', 'typescript', 1, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, Date.now());
  434. // Insert edge with malformed metadata
  435. db.getDb().prepare(`
  436. INSERT INTO edges (source, target, kind, metadata)
  437. VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)
  438. `).run('node-a', 'node-b', 'calls', 'broken json {{{');
  439. // Should not throw - should return edge with undefined metadata
  440. const edges = queries.getOutgoingEdges('node-a');
  441. expect(edges.length).toBe(1);
  442. expect(edges[0].source).toBe('node-a');
  443. expect(edges[0].target).toBe('node-b');
  444. expect(edges[0].metadata).toBeUndefined();
  445. db.close();
  446. });
  447. it('should not crash when file record has malformed JSON in errors column', () => {
  448. const dbPath = path.join(tempDir, 'test.db');
  449. const db = DatabaseConnection.initialize(dbPath);
  450. const queries = new QueryBuilder(db.getDb());
  451. // Insert a file with malformed errors JSON
  452. db.getDb().prepare(`
  453. INSERT INTO files (path, content_hash, language, size, modified_at, indexed_at, node_count, errors)
  454. VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
  455. `).run('test.ts', 'abc123', 'typescript', 100, Date.now(), Date.now(), 5, 'not-an-array');
  456. // Should not throw - should return file with undefined errors
  457. const file = queries.getFileByPath('test.ts');
  458. expect(file).not.toBeNull();
  459. expect(file!.path).toBe('test.ts');
  460. expect(file!.errors).toBeUndefined();
  461. db.close();
  462. });
  463. });
  464. describe('Symlink Cycle Detection', () => {
  465. let tempDir: string;
  466. beforeEach(() => {
  467. tempDir = createTempDir();
  468. });
  469. afterEach(() => {
  470. cleanupTempDir(tempDir);
  471. });
  472. it('should handle symlink cycle without infinite loop', () => {
  473. // Create directory structure with a symlink cycle
  474. const srcDir = path.join(tempDir, 'src');
  475. fs.mkdirSync(srcDir);
  476. fs.writeFileSync(path.join(srcDir, 'index.ts'), 'export const x = 1;\n');
  477. // Create a symlink from src/loop -> tempDir (parent directory)
  478. try {
  479. fs.symlinkSync(tempDir, path.join(srcDir, 'loop'), 'dir');
  480. } catch {
  481. // Skip test if symlinks not supported (e.g., Windows without admin)
  482. return;
  483. }
  484. // This should complete without hanging
  485. const files = scanDirectory(tempDir);
  486. // Should find the real file but not loop infinitely
  487. expect(files).toContain('src/index.ts');
  488. // Should not find duplicates via the symlink path
  489. const indexFiles = files.filter(f => f.endsWith('index.ts'));
  490. expect(indexFiles.length).toBe(1);
  491. });
  492. it('should follow valid symlinks to directories', () => {
  493. // Create source directory with a file
  494. const realDir = path.join(tempDir, 'real');
  495. fs.mkdirSync(realDir);
  496. fs.writeFileSync(path.join(realDir, 'hello.ts'), 'export function hello() {}\n');
  497. // Create a symlink to realDir
  498. const srcDir = path.join(tempDir, 'src');
  499. fs.mkdirSync(srcDir);
  500. try {
  501. fs.symlinkSync(realDir, path.join(srcDir, 'linked'), 'dir');
  502. } catch {
  503. return;
  504. }
  505. const files = scanDirectory(tempDir);
  506. // Should find files from both the real dir and via the symlink
  507. // But deduplicate since they resolve to the same real path
  508. expect(files.some(f => f.includes('hello.ts'))).toBe(true);
  509. });
  510. it('should skip broken symlinks gracefully', () => {
  511. const srcDir = path.join(tempDir, 'src');
  512. fs.mkdirSync(srcDir);
  513. fs.writeFileSync(path.join(srcDir, 'valid.ts'), 'export const y = 2;\n');
  514. try {
  515. fs.symlinkSync('/nonexistent/path', path.join(srcDir, 'broken'), 'dir');
  516. } catch {
  517. return;
  518. }
  519. // Should not throw
  520. const files = scanDirectory(tempDir);
  521. expect(files).toContain('src/valid.ts');
  522. });
  523. });