codegraph/telemetry-dashboard/wrangler.jsonc

// codegraph telemetry dashboard — see README.md.
// Secrets are NOT configured here: ADMIN_PASSWORD and SESSION_SECRET are set
// via `wrangler secret put`.
{
  "$schema": "node_modules/wrangler/config-schema.json",
  "name": "codegraph-telemetry-dashboard",
  "main": "src/index.ts",
  "compatibility_date": "2026-07-28",

  // Private admin surface. Same pattern as the ingest worker: a custom domain
  // that auto-provisions DNS + cert from the getcodegraph.com zone, with
  // workers.dev off so there is no second, undocumented way in.
  "routes": [{ "pattern": "stats.getcodegraph.com", "custom_domain": true }],
  "workers_dev": false,

  "observability": { "enabled": true, "head_sampling_rate": 1 },

  // `run_worker_first: true` is load-bearing. Without it Cloudflare serves a
  // matching static asset BEFORE the worker runs, which would hand out the
  // dashboard — and its data — to anyone who guesses a filename. With it, every
  // request goes through src/index.ts and only an authenticated one is proxied
  // on to ASSETS.
  "assets": {
    "directory": "./public",
    "binding": "ASSETS",
    "run_worker_first": true,
    "html_handling": "auto-trailing-slash",
    "not_found_handling": "none"
  },

  // The ingest worker's database, read-only from here. Migrations live with the
  // writer: telemetry-worker/migrations/.
  "d1_databases": [
    {
      "binding": "DB",
      "database_name": "codegraph-telemetry",
      "database_id": "5ed36dfb-d2d7-4e35-9e63-a1b99d0b1ed3"
    }
  ],

  // Brute-force cap on the shared password, keyed by client IP. Two humans sign
  // in roughly once a year each; 5/min is generous for a typo and useless for a
  // guessing attack.
  "ratelimits": [
    {
      "name": "LOGIN_RATE_LIMITER",
      "namespace_id": "2001",
      "simple": { "limit": 5, "period": 60 }
    }
  ]
}