fix: address provider routing review feedback

docs/tool-catalog.md

@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ Run a JavaScript workflow script that orchestrates subagents at scale. Use this
 The workflow's identity rides the `meta` parameter as JSON: required `name` (short kebab-case) and `description` strings, optional `whenToUse` string and `phases` array (`{title, detail?, provider?, model?}`). The `script` parameter is the plain JavaScript body ONLY (NOT TypeScript, and NO `export const meta` statement — meta is a parameter, not code), running with top-level await; end with `return <value>` — the value must be JSON-serializable and is this tool's result.
 
 Script-body hooks:
-- `agent(prompt, opts?): Promise<any>` — run one subagent to completion. Without `opts.schema` it resolves to the child's final text; with `opts.schema` (an object-rooted JSON Schema using ONLY type/properties/required/additionalProperties/items/enum/const — no oneOf/pattern/format/numeric bounds) it resolves to the validated object. Resolves `null` when the child fails (filter with `.filter(Boolean)`). Other opts: `label` (display), `phase` (progress group), `provider` and `model` (paired LLM target overrides). Anything else (`effort`/`isolation`/`agentType`) is rejected loudly.
+- `agent(prompt, opts?): Promise<any>` — run one subagent to completion. Without `opts.schema` it resolves to the child's final text; with `opts.schema` (an object-rooted JSON Schema using ONLY type/properties/required/additionalProperties/items/enum/const — no oneOf/pattern/format/numeric bounds) it resolves to the validated object. Resolves `null` when the child fails (filter with `.filter(Boolean)`). Other opts: `label` (display), `phase` (progress group), and independent `provider`/`model` LLM target overrides (either may be provided alone). Anything else (`effort`/`isolation`/`agentType`) is rejected loudly.
 - `pipeline(items, ...stages): Promise<any[]>` — run each item through the stages independently with NO barrier between stages (prefer this for multi-stage work). Each stage receives `(prev, item, index)`. An ordinary stage throw drops that ITEM to `null` and skips its remaining stages.
 - `parallel(thunks): Promise<any[]>` — run zero-argument functions concurrently and await ALL of them (a barrier; use only when a stage genuinely needs every prior result together). A throwing thunk resolves to `null`.
 - `phase(title)` — start a progress phase; `log(message)` — narrate progress; `args` — the tool call's `args` input, verbatim.

examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-approved/session.jsonl

@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@
 {"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":129,"time":1783962245385,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"finish","reason":{"kind":"tool-calls"}}}}
 {"type":"assistant/message","seq":130,"time":1783962245385,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"content":[{"type":"reasoning","text":"The user wants me to run a command with sandbox_permissions set to danger-full-access, no prior run needed, justified as instructed."},{"type":"tool-call","id":"call_00_d0sAHpJ9mYOJi0z7KNy30441","name":"bash","arguments":"{\"command\": \"printf 'escalated\\\\n' > /tmp/dsh-escalated.txt && cat /tmp/dsh-escalated.txt && rm /tmp/dsh-escalated.txt\", \"description\": \"Write file outside workspace and verify\", \"sandbox_permissions\": \"danger-full-access\", \"justification\": \"the user asked to write a file outside the workspace\"}"}],"provenance":{"provider":"deepseek","model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"usage":{"inputTokens":1501,"outputTokens":174,"cacheReadTokens":0,"reasoningTokens":28}},"sourceEventSeqs":[7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,127,128,129],"surfaceOp":"append"}
 {"type":"tool/call","seq":131,"time":1783962245385,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"callId":"call_00_d0sAHpJ9mYOJi0z7KNy30441","name":"bash","arguments":"{\"command\": \"printf 'escalated\\\\n' > /tmp/dsh-escalated.txt && cat /tmp/dsh-escalated.txt && rm /tmp/dsh-escalated.txt\", \"description\": \"Write file outside workspace and verify\", \"sandbox_permissions\": \"danger-full-access\", \"justification\": \"the user asked to write a file outside the workspace\"}"}}
-{"type":"approval/asked","seq":132,"time":1783962245386,"data":{"id":"ed807292-6499-4c75-adc4-a344e6fda38b","toolName":"bash","callId":"call_00_d0sAHpJ9mYOJi0z7KNy30441","reason":"escalate sandbox to danger-full-access: the user asked to write a file outside the workspace"}}
-{"type":"approval/decided","seq":133,"time":1783962245387,"data":{"id":"ed807292-6499-4c75-adc4-a344e6fda38b","outcome":"allowed-once"}}
+{"type":"approval/asked","seq":132,"time":1783962245386,"data":{"id":"5d298f92-ced6-4fa0-ae01-cd0660b29f58","toolName":"bash","callId":"call_00_d0sAHpJ9mYOJi0z7KNy30441","reason":"escalate sandbox to danger-full-access: the user asked to write a file outside the workspace"}}
+{"type":"approval/decided","seq":133,"time":1783962245387,"data":{"id":"5d298f92-ced6-4fa0-ae01-cd0660b29f58","outcome":"allowed-once"}}
 {"type":"tool/result","seq":134,"time":1783962245399,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"callId":"call_00_d0sAHpJ9mYOJi0z7KNy30441","content":[{"type":"text","text":"escalated\n"}],"isError":false},"sourceEventSeqs":[131],"surfaceOp":"append"}
 {"type":"step/end","seq":135,"time":1783962245400,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1}}
 {"type":"step/start","seq":136,"time":1783962245400,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2}}

examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-rejected/session.jsonl

@@ -155,8 +155,8 @@
 {"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":153,"time":1783962246274,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"finish","reason":{"kind":"tool-calls"}}}}
 {"type":"assistant/message","seq":154,"time":1783962246274,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"content":[{"type":"reasoning","text":"The user wants me to run a specific command with `sandbox_permissions` set to `danger-full-access` and a specific justification. They explicitly said NOT to run it without sandbox_permissions first. Let me do exactly that."},{"type":"tool-call","id":"call_00_WB1vnPomi8yr6MlcFKTj7912","name":"bash","arguments":"{\"command\": \"printf 'escalated\\\\n' > /tmp/dsh-escalated.txt && cat /tmp/dsh-escalated.txt && rm /tmp/dsh-escalated.txt\", \"description\": \"Write to /tmp and verify, then clean up\", \"sandbox_permissions\": \"danger-full-access\", \"justification\": \"the user asked to write a file outside the workspace\"}"}],"provenance":{"provider":"deepseek","model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"usage":{"inputTokens":1509,"outputTokens":198,"cacheReadTokens":0,"reasoningTokens":48}},"sourceEventSeqs":[7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,127,128,129,130,131,132,133,134,135,136,137,138,139,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,149,150,151,152,153],"surfaceOp":"append"}
 {"type":"tool/call","seq":155,"time":1783962246274,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"callId":"call_00_WB1vnPomi8yr6MlcFKTj7912","name":"bash","arguments":"{\"command\": \"printf 'escalated\\\\n' > /tmp/dsh-escalated.txt && cat /tmp/dsh-escalated.txt && rm /tmp/dsh-escalated.txt\", \"description\": \"Write to /tmp and verify, then clean up\", \"sandbox_permissions\": \"danger-full-access\", \"justification\": \"the user asked to write a file outside the workspace\"}"}}
-{"type":"approval/asked","seq":156,"time":1783962246275,"data":{"id":"0014f39a-22b4-4089-b90b-f42b1619e9b8","toolName":"bash","callId":"call_00_WB1vnPomi8yr6MlcFKTj7912","reason":"escalate sandbox to danger-full-access: the user asked to write a file outside the workspace"}}
-{"type":"approval/decided","seq":157,"time":1783962246275,"data":{"id":"0014f39a-22b4-4089-b90b-f42b1619e9b8","outcome":"rejected"}}
+{"type":"approval/asked","seq":156,"time":1783962246275,"data":{"id":"12cac992-89a6-4bbe-9d33-3254f4f13c7a","toolName":"bash","callId":"call_00_WB1vnPomi8yr6MlcFKTj7912","reason":"escalate sandbox to danger-full-access: the user asked to write a file outside the workspace"}}
+{"type":"approval/decided","seq":157,"time":1783962246275,"data":{"id":"12cac992-89a6-4bbe-9d33-3254f4f13c7a","outcome":"rejected"}}
 {"type":"tool/result","seq":158,"time":1783962246275,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"callId":"call_00_WB1vnPomi8yr6MlcFKTj7912","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Error: the user rejected escalating this command to \"danger-full-access\""}],"isError":true},"sourceEventSeqs":[155],"surfaceOp":"append"}
 {"type":"step/end","seq":159,"time":1783962246276,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1}}
 {"type":"step/start","seq":160,"time":1783962246276,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2}}

examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/hook-cc-pretool-ask/session.jsonl

@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@
 {"type":"tool/call","seq":53,"time":1783352172557,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"callId":"call_00_6k0oGSliVHxGSgqBmMEO4311","name":"bash","arguments":"{\"command\": \"echo HELLO\", \"description\": \"Echo HELLO\"}"}}
 {"type":"hook/invoked","seq":54,"time":1783352172558,"data":{"turn":1,"point":"PreToolUse","dialect":"claude","handlerId":"claude:PreToolUse:1","matcher":"bash"}}
 {"type":"hook/result","seq":55,"time":1783352172573,"data":{"turn":1,"point":"PreToolUse","handlerId":"claude:PreToolUse:1","decision":"ask","exitCode":0,"durationMs":14.113374999999905}}
-{"type":"approval/asked","seq":56,"time":1783962235813,"data":{"id":"efe463b8-0601-4607-a431-8eecfeb1b5f0","toolName":"bash","callId":"call_00_6k0oGSliVHxGSgqBmMEO4311","reason":"bash requires manual approval in this session"}}
-{"type":"approval/decided","seq":57,"time":1783962235813,"data":{"id":"efe463b8-0601-4607-a431-8eecfeb1b5f0","outcome":"rejected"}}
+{"type":"approval/asked","seq":56,"time":1783962235813,"data":{"id":"5ab08815-cec4-4615-88d4-2d5b519762e8","toolName":"bash","callId":"call_00_6k0oGSliVHxGSgqBmMEO4311","reason":"bash requires manual approval in this session"}}
+{"type":"approval/decided","seq":57,"time":1783962235813,"data":{"id":"5ab08815-cec4-4615-88d4-2d5b519762e8","outcome":"rejected"}}
 {"type":"tool/result","seq":58,"time":1783962235814,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"callId":"call_00_6k0oGSliVHxGSgqBmMEO4311","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Error: the user rejected tool \"bash\""}],"isError":true},"sourceEventSeqs":[53],"surfaceOp":"append"}
 {"type":"step/end","seq":59,"time":1783962235814,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1}}
 {"type":"step/start","seq":60,"time":1783962235814,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2}}

packages/llm/llm/src/assembler.ts

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ export class BlockAssembler {
   private order: number[] = []
   private _usage: TokenUsage | undefined
   private _finish: FinishReason | undefined
-  private _replayState: unknown
+  private _replayState: unknown = undefined
 
   /**
    * Feed one chunk. Returns the completed block when the chunk closes one

packages/workflow/tool-workflow/src/index.ts

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ const DESCRIPTION = `Run a JavaScript workflow script that orchestrates subagent
 The workflow's identity rides the \`meta\` parameter as JSON: required \`name\` (short kebab-case) and \`description\` strings, optional \`whenToUse\` string and \`phases\` array (\`{title, detail?, provider?, model?}\`). The \`script\` parameter is the plain JavaScript body ONLY (NOT TypeScript, and NO \`export const meta\` statement — meta is a parameter, not code), running with top-level await; end with \`return <value>\` — the value must be JSON-serializable and is this tool's result.
 
 Script-body hooks:
-- \`agent(prompt, opts?): Promise<any>\` — run one subagent to completion. Without \`opts.schema\` it resolves to the child's final text; with \`opts.schema\` (an object-rooted JSON Schema using ONLY type/properties/required/additionalProperties/items/enum/const — no oneOf/pattern/format/numeric bounds) it resolves to the validated object. Resolves \`null\` when the child fails (filter with \`.filter(Boolean)\`). Other opts: \`label\` (display), \`phase\` (progress group), \`provider\` and \`model\` (paired LLM target overrides). Anything else (\`effort\`/\`isolation\`/\`agentType\`) is rejected loudly.
+- \`agent(prompt, opts?): Promise<any>\` — run one subagent to completion. Without \`opts.schema\` it resolves to the child's final text; with \`opts.schema\` (an object-rooted JSON Schema using ONLY type/properties/required/additionalProperties/items/enum/const — no oneOf/pattern/format/numeric bounds) it resolves to the validated object. Resolves \`null\` when the child fails (filter with \`.filter(Boolean)\`). Other opts: \`label\` (display), \`phase\` (progress group), and independent \`provider\`/\`model\` LLM target overrides (either may be provided alone). Anything else (\`effort\`/\`isolation\`/\`agentType\`) is rejected loudly.
 - \`pipeline(items, ...stages): Promise<any[]>\` — run each item through the stages independently with NO barrier between stages (prefer this for multi-stage work). Each stage receives \`(prev, item, index)\`. An ordinary stage throw drops that ITEM to \`null\` and skips its remaining stages.
 - \`parallel(thunks): Promise<any[]>\` — run zero-argument functions concurrently and await ALL of them (a barrier; use only when a stage genuinely needs every prior result together). A throwing thunk resolves to \`null\`.
 - \`phase(title)\` — start a progress phase; \`log(message)\` — narrate progress; \`args\` — the tool call's \`args\` input, verbatim.

packages/workflow/workflow-workerthread/src/runtime.ts

@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ export class WorkflowExecution {
     for (const key of Object.keys(record)) {
       if (SUPPORTED_AGENT_OPTIONS.has(key)) continue
       if (DEFERRED_AGENT_OPTIONS.has(key)) {
-        throw new WorkflowError(`agent() option "${key}" is deferred and not supported by this engine (supported: label, phase, schema, model)`, 'UNSUPPORTED_OPTION')
+        throw new WorkflowError(`agent() option "${key}" is deferred and not supported by this engine (supported: label, phase, schema, provider, model)`, 'UNSUPPORTED_OPTION')
       }
       throw new WorkflowError(`agent() option "${key}" is not recognized (supported: label, phase, schema, provider, model)`, 'UNSUPPORTED_OPTION')
     }

packages/workflow/workflow-workerthread/tests/session.spec.ts

@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ describe('runWorkerSession over an in-process MessageChannel', () => {
       ["return await agent('p', { label: 3 })", '"label" must be a string'],
       ["return await agent('p', { get label() { throw new Error('read failed') } })", 'options must be plain JSON data'],
       ["return await agent('p', { bogus: true })", '"bogus" is not recognized'],
-      ["return await agent('p', { effort: 'high' })", '"effort" is deferred'],
+      ["return await agent('p', { effort: 'high' })", '"effort" is deferred and not supported by this engine (supported: label, phase, schema, provider, model)'],
       ["return await agent('p', { schema: { type: 'object', oneOf: [] } })", 'outside the supported subset'],
       ['return await parallel([() => 1, () => 2, () => 3])', 'over the per-call cap (2)'],
       ['return await pipeline([1, 2, 3], (x) => x)', 'maxItemsPerCall'],