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@@ -18,11 +18,11 @@ A parent page cannot inspect or drive a cross-origin iframe's internal history.
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The address parser accepts `http:` and `https:`, including loopback targets; a host name without a scheme becomes HTTPS. It rejects embedded credentials, the application's own origin, malformed addresses, `file:` URLs, and every other scheme. Document Preview remains the local-file surface.
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-The current carrier is an iframe in both Web and Desktop. Its default Web policy is `sandbox="allow-scripts allow-forms allow-same-origin allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox"`, without download or top-navigation capability; popups escape the sandbox. Same-origin lets the visited origin use its own cookies and Web storage; it does not make a cross-origin target same-origin with DSH. The iframe sends no referrer and adds no package-owned Permissions Policy, so browser defaults and user grants apply. A rightmost toolbar toggle removes the sandbox attribute for that tab occurrence; the mode is not persisted and renders a warning while active. An unsandboxed page that reaches the DSH origin can access that origin's Web data. The package performs no Host-side URL probe or proxy.
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+The current carrier is an iframe in both Web and Desktop. Its default Web policy is `sandbox="allow-scripts allow-forms allow-same-origin allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox"`; the frame has no direct download or top-navigation flag. Popups escape the sandbox, and a Web popup retains its opener and can use that chain to navigate the top-level application. Same-origin lets the visited origin use its own cookies and Web storage; it does not make a cross-origin target same-origin with DSH. The iframe sends no referrer and adds no package-owned Permissions Policy, so browser defaults and user grants apply. A rightmost toolbar toggle removes the sandbox attribute for that tab occurrence; the mode is not persisted and renders a warning while active. An unsandboxed page can navigate the top-level application under browser activation rules and use downloads, modal dialogs, and input locks. The package performs no Host-side URL probe or proxy.
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Each tab receives one `BrowserController` class. Its command interface contains only `loadUrl`, `goBack`, `goForward`, and `reload`; it owns address validation and the `BrowserNavigation` state machine. The `BrowserFrame` interface owns transient sandbox and document state plus carrier operations, and `IframeImpl` implements it for the current iframe carrier. Slot injection exposes keyed frame state through `useBrowserFrame` and supplies plain callbacks, so the React body receives neither the controller nor an observable source; it owns only the editable draft and iframe DOM. A future `ElectronWebViewImpl` can implement the same interface without putting URL or carrier state in the component.
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-`BrowserNavigation` keeps the canonical current URL, controlled-load revision, navigation state, and a bounded sequence with its index. A new address drops the forward branch; Back and Forward move the index; Reload recreates the last application-known URL without adding history. A remounted body reloads the latest application-known URL and consults its optional initial URL only before the first controlled target. The Session-scoped store only persists immutable snapshots from that class for title rendering and application reload, and removes the tab bucket when that occurrence ends.
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+`BrowserNavigation` keeps the canonical current URL, controlled-load revision, navigation state, and a bounded sequence with its index. A new address drops the forward branch; Back and Forward move the index; Reload recreates the last application-known URL without adding history. A remounted body reloads the latest application-known URL and consults its optional initial URL only before the first controlled target. The Session-scoped store only persists immutable snapshots from that class for title rendering and application reload. An occurrence abort removes its bucket; `TabDomain` uses that same abort for both tab removal and `ui-sidebar-right` unload, so unloading or hot-reloading the Sidebar clears Browser history even when DockKit later restores the tab record.
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Browser state is presentation state. It does not enter the Session log, model request, resource model, or DockKit layout operations. The existing [right Sidebar infrastructure](2026-09-04-right-sidebar-docking-infrastructure.md), [tab type contract](../architecture/2026-09-05-sidebar-tab-types-and-navigation.md), [resource model](../architecture/2026-09-05-client-resource-model.md), and [Document Preview operations](../architecture/2026-09-08-document-preview-operations.md) retain their existing responsibilities.
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@@ -69,6 +69,6 @@ Unit tests cover protocol parsing, delegated Markdown links, controller commands
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## Consequences
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-The Browser adds no Electron privilege and behaves identically in current Web and Desktop builds. Many sites refuse iframe embedding or require downloads or top-level navigation withheld by the default sandbox. An HTTPS application can block public HTTP pages as mixed content or restrict private-network requests, and disabling the sandbox does not bypass those browser policies. Disabling the sandbox otherwise trades its protections for compatibility, but it does not add Electron or Node APIs. The URL gate cannot prevent an embedded page from choosing its own destination. A later iframe load exposes that navigation occurred but not its cross-origin URL; History API and fragment changes can remain completely invisible. The deferred Electron carrier requires real packaged-app verification before it can become current behavior.
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+The Browser adds no Electron privilege and behaves identically in current Web and Desktop builds. Many sites refuse iframe embedding or require downloads or top-level navigation withheld from the frame by the default sandbox. An HTTPS application can block public HTTP pages as mixed content or restrict private-network requests, and disabling the sandbox does not bypass those browser policies. Disabling the sandbox otherwise trades its protections for compatibility: the frame can navigate the top-level application under browser activation rules and use downloads, modal dialogs, and input locks. A Web popup that escapes the sandbox retains its opener and can navigate the top-level application through that chain. Neither path adds Electron or Node APIs. The URL gate cannot prevent an embedded page from choosing its own destination. A later iframe load exposes that navigation occurred but not its cross-origin URL; History API and fragment changes can remain completely invisible. The deferred Electron carrier requires real packaged-app verification before it can become current behavior.
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Site-cookie behavior follows the user's browser and is not isolated per Browser tab. Local files are rejected and remain owned by Document Preview. Persisted URLs can contain sensitive query or fragment values, so users must not enter credentials they do not want retained in application-local browser storage.
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