feat(sandbox-policy): describe enforced file families

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md
-2026-07-06-sandbox.md: ff79d2e1e4dc1501502cfeb2518ddf1065750f1a
-2026-07-06-sandbox.zh.md: 1d2ab5ad556f4e1c72a124183b91b951b0ded6dd
+2026-07-06-sandbox.md: f29bdf840db8b0f4cbcba9958c20cd0255097f38
+2026-07-06-sandbox.zh.md: 91b3a0acf42585b2e47af2158e03fe7eee198d7d

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md

@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ Each phase gets its full design when picked up, validated against the code at th
 - **Hard-match the retry to a prior denial** — rejected: command-string identity is fragile (quoting, `workdir`, env prefixes, a pipeline retried as its failing stage) — false-rejects honest retries or is trivially satisfied; the real boundary is the human seeing command + justification. Revisit only if `allow_always` grant storage ever needs machine-checkable scopes.
 - **A generic `env/state` facts map with an owner service** — rejected: approval and sandbox compose independently, so neither's state may drag in a third package; single-key folds are one `findLast` each, dissolving the owner service; no invariant spans the knobs, so atomic multi-key patches bought nothing.
 - **Narrate via `agent/user-message` + a bus event** — rejected: it presupposes a turn-entry seam that does not exist (the real seam is `agent/prompt-submit`), and pre-step's position serves both the coalesced turn-entry notice and the mid-turn immediacy bound with one listener.
-- **A bash-only mode label plus a switch narrator** — rejected: `Bash commands run under the "read-only" file sandbox.` caused preemptive refusal while leaving the filesystem-tool consequence and workspace scope ambiguous. The current owner-derived section is a different contract: later Web evidence showed that total absence caused false capability claims before a first tool call, and cross-family enforcement now supplies one complete file-effect policy. [The current-policy decision](2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.md) records why concise current state supersedes the absence choice without duplicating tool guidance.
+- **A standing prompt statement of the sandbox mode (+ a switch narrator)** — shipped first, then removed on live evidence: with `Bash commands run under the "read-only" file sandbox.` in every request, the model refused to ATTEMPT denied-then-escalatable work (five of twelve turns in the first manual session ended with zero tool calls), turning the sandbox into a soft lockout. The denial marker names the mode at the moment it matters and the escalation fields carry the recovery; the approval knob keeps its statement because an auto-rejection is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human "no". The absence decision is superseded by [the current-policy decision](2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.md); this measurement and causal observation remain the evidence that any replacement must counter-test.
 - **Track "last told" with its own bookkeeping events** — rejected: the `request/header` fold already records the exact prompt the model saw; parsing the closed candidate sentences back replaces a second bookkeeping stream — events are needed only where they ARE the store.
 - **Independent sandbox and approval selectors** — rejected: one deployment-defined permission preset keeps the two policy knobs coherent for UI clients that expose runtime switching.
 
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ Costs and accepted limits:
 - **A granted escalation is not a working sandbox.** An unavailable backend still fails closed even for a granted escalation to a confining mode — at `confine()` when the platform has no chain or every probe fails, at execution when an unprobed sole runner refuses (classified as a sandbox failure, not a command failure) — while a granted `danger-full-access` run never touches the provider at all: there the grant, not the probe, is the authority.
 - **The approval narrator's restart baseline parses prompt prose.** The closed candidate sentence is owned by the writing module itself, so a wording change is a coordinated writer+parser edit in one file; a session whose headers predate the section silently adopts the current policy without a notice.
 - **The approval and sandbox sections are dynamic prompt surfaces.** A policy switch breaks provider prompt-prefix caching for that session; unchanged state remains byte-stable, and a model acting on stale authority is worse than the bounded invalidation.
+- **The model may hold a stale belief about the sandbox mode** (nothing announces a switch). Accepted deliberately in the original design: the next attempt's marker or success corrects it, and the observed failure mode of announcing — preemptive refusal — is worse than one wasted retry. [The current-policy decision](2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.md) supersedes this accepted limit with a family-aware request section while retaining the preemptive-refusal evidence as its counter-test.
 
 ## FAQ
 

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.zh.md

@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ fs/web/todo 在进程内执行，因此它们的沙箱语义是各自 seam 层
 - **将重试硬匹配到先前的拒绝**：否决。命令字符串同一性脆弱（引号、`workdir`、env 前缀、作为失败阶段重试的管道）——要么误拒诚实的重试，要么被轻易满足；真正的边界是人看到命令 + 理由。仅在 `allow_always` 授权存储需要机器可检查的范围时才重新考虑。
 - **通用 `env/state` facts map 加拥有者服务**：否决。approval 和沙箱独立组合，因此任何一方的状态都不应拖入第三个包；单键 fold 各自是一个 `findLast`，拥有者服务自然消解；没有跨旋钮的不变式，因此原子多键补丁无收益。
 - **通过 `agent/user-message` + 总线事件叙述**：否决。它预设了一个不存在的轮次入口 seam（真正的 seam 是 `agent/prompt-submit`），而步骤前检查点的位置使一个监听器能够同时服务合并的轮次入口通知和轮中即时性约束。
-- **仅限 bash 的模式标签加切换叙述器**：否决。`Bash commands run under the "read-only" file sandbox.` 会引发预防性拒绝，同时没有明确文件系统工具的后果与工作区范围。当前由归属方派生的段落采用不同契约：后续 Web 证据表明，完全缺失策略会导致模型在首次工具调用前错误声称自身能力，而跨工具族强制现在能够提供一项完整的文件操作策略。[当前策略决策](2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.md)记录了为何用简洁的当前状态取代缺失策略的选择，同时不重复工具引导。
+- **在提示词中常驻声明沙箱模式（并加切换叙述器）**：先行交付，随后根据线上证据移除：每次请求都带有 `Bash commands run under the "read-only" file sandbox.` 时，模型会拒绝尝试本可在被拒后升级的工作（首次人工会话的十二个轮次中有五个以零工具调用结束），使沙箱变成软锁死。拒绝标记会在相关时刻指出模式，升级字段则承载恢复路径；批准旋钮之所以保留声明，是因为自动拒绝在行为上与人类回答「否」无法区分。[当前策略决策](2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.md)取代了省略策略的决策；这项测量和因果观察仍是任何替代方案必须进行反证测试的依据。
 - **用专门的簿记事件追踪「上次告知」**：否决。`request/header` fold 已记录模型看到的确切提示词；将封闭的候选句子解析回来替代了第二条簿记流——事件仅在它们本身即为存储时才需要。
 - **相互独立的沙箱与批准选择器**：否决。一个部署定义的权限 preset 让两个策略旋钮对暴露运行时切换的 UI 客户端保持一致。
 
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ fs/web/todo 在进程内执行，因此它们的沙箱语义是各自 seam 层
 - **授权的升级不等于可工作的沙箱。** 不可用的后端即使对授权升级到约束模式也仍然失败关闭——在平台没有链或所有探测失败时于 `confine()` 阶段，在未探测的唯一 runner 拒绝时于执行阶段（归类为沙箱失败而非命令失败）——而授权的 `danger-full-access` 运行根本不触及提供方：此时授权（而非探测）是权威。
 - **批准叙述器的重启基线解析提示词文本。** 封闭的候选句子由写入模块本身拥有，因此措辞变更是同一文件中写入器+解析器的协调编辑；header 早于该段落的会话静默采用当前策略而不发通知。
 - **批准段落与沙箱段落都是动态提示词表面。** 策略切换会破坏该会话的提供方提示词前缀缓存；状态不变时仍保持字节稳定，且模型基于过时权限行动的风险高于这种有限的缓存失效。
+- **模型可能持有过时的沙箱模式认知**（没有任何内容会宣布切换）。原始设计有意接受这一点：下一次尝试的标记或成功结果会纠正认知，而观察到的宣布失败模式——预防性拒绝——比一次浪费的重试更糟。[当前策略决策](2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.md)通过感知家族的请求段落取代了这项已接受限制，同时保留预防性拒绝证据作为其反证测试。
 
 ## FAQ
 

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.md
-2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.md: 2854f527c62dedfcb2fa86ab684d162e892db35c
-2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.zh.md: 0560251afc450136fd1c4a2e28aba3f1f16f2937
+2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.md: 93353272a599e8a3a984e8e10039d400e236e9ff
+2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.zh.md: 4fb9ad4ef035c3515f17acb541afc5ab23510db7

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.md

@@ -12,11 +12,13 @@ The sandbox policy already enforced and logged each session's file-effect mode,
 
 `dsh-sandbox-policy`, the owner of mode and workspace-root resolution, registers one `sandbox:policy` system-prompt section. Every agent request resolves the active session directly through `ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve({ session })`; there is no denial-history scan, delta narrator, or in-memory “last told” state.
 
-The section states the current file-effect mode and only its owned consequences. `read-only` says ordinary writes, edits, and file-mutating shell effects are denied while required sinks may remain writable. `workspace-write` lists the canonical writable roots returned by the shared `writableRoots()` policy: the immutable session workspace root, `/tmp`, and the platform temporary directory, deduplicated after canonicalization. `danger-full-access` says the DSH file sandbox adds no file restriction. Every form says host permissions or backend availability may restrict more and that network and process access are outside this policy.
+Enforcing backends register independently disposable `filesystem`, `bash`, or `terminal` family contributions with the policy owner. The section names only registered families in canonical order, and is empty without one. This is current need, not a future extension: the shipped headless inheritance composition combines sandboxed filesystem tools with unfenced one-shot bash, while the persistent-tools composition combines sandboxed filesystem tools and terminal commands without a sandboxed one-shot bash executor. A blanket statement would be false in both.
+
+The section states only facts shared by every enforcement dialect for each registered family. `read-only` says those operations cannot modify files. `workspace-write` states the canonical session workspace with non-exclusive wording and summarizes, without enumerating, that some platform temporary areas may also be writable. `danger-full-access` says the DSH file sandbox does not restrict those operations. Backend-selected temporary paths, `/dev/null`, runner readiness, and other policy domains are absent because `resolve()` cannot establish them at request assembly.
 
 The provider runs during normal request assembly, after a `/permission` switch has committed its existing `sandbox/mode` event and before `request/header` is logged. The rendered system text is therefore the durable reconstruction of the exact model-visible fact. Repeated assemblies over unchanged session state produce identical bytes; resume and replay fold the same durable mode event and immutable `SessionHeader.cwd` without catch-up state.
 
-Ownership stays narrow. Approval policy remains the separate `approval:policy` section, plan mode remains `plan:policy`, and tool plugins continue to own schemas and operation guidance. The prompt states policy; bash and filesystem backends remain the enforcement boundaries.
+Ownership stays narrow. Approval policy remains the separate `approval:policy` section, plan mode remains `plan:policy`, and tool plugins continue to own schemas plus attempt, denial, and escalation guidance. The prompt states standing policy; filesystem, one-shot bash, and terminal backends remain the enforcement boundaries.
 
 ## Alternatives considered
 
@@ -28,10 +30,14 @@ Ownership stays narrow. Approval policy remains the separate `approval:policy` s
 
 **Repeat tool schemas or approval and plan guidance in the section.** Rejected because those surfaces already have owners and independent lifecycles. Duplicating them would create contradictory request prefixes and broaden invalidation.
 
-**Keep sandbox mode absent because a standing mode label once caused preemptive refusal.** Rejected by the later Web evidence and the completed cross-family policy. The earlier sentence named only a bash sandbox and did not explain the actual write/edit boundary, so it could conflict with visible tools and escalation guidance. The owner-derived section states the complete current file-effect consequence, canonical workspace scope, and explicit non-guarantees without duplicating tool instructions. This supersedes only the absence decision in the [sandbox Agent Note](2026-07-06-sandbox.md); its enforcement and escalation boundaries remain current.
+**Keep sandbox mode absent because a standing mode label once caused preemptive refusal.** Rejected because a fresh Web request otherwise exposes mutation tools while withholding their standing policy, producing false capability claims before the first operation. The earlier live measurement remains a required counter-test: five of twelve turns ended without a tool call under `Bash commands run under the "read-only" file sandbox.` The committed tool-owned attempt guidance postdates that measurement, so the replacement is selected through a new positive-control experiment under the current tool contract rather than assuming the old and current conditions match.
+
+**A separate model-context package.** Rejected because Cordis services can observe current runtime contributions directly, while approval and plan policy sections already live with their owners. A new package would add a shallow composition seam and documentation/gate surface for one internal adapter.
+
+**Enumerate writable temporary roots.** Rejected because the backend is selected later at `confine()`: bwrap, Landlock, Seatbelt, and the in-process filesystem fence do not grant one common temporary-path set. Host-specific paths in a standing request would be both unstable and overclaimed.
 
 ## Consequences
 
-A model can answer what file effects are currently possible before probing a tool, and the next request after `/permission` reflects the committed mode. This adds a small dynamic system section and intentionally invalidates the request prefix when policy changes; unchanged state remains cache-stable. The statement is guidance, not an enforcement guard: runtime safety still comes from `dsh-bash-sandbox` and `dsh-fs-sandbox` consuming the same resolved policy.
+A model can answer what registered file operations the standing mode governs before probing a tool, and the next request after `/permission` reflects the committed mode. This adds a small dynamic system section and intentionally invalidates the request prefix when policy or enforcing-family composition changes; unchanged state remains cache-stable. The statement is guidance, not an enforcement guard: runtime safety still comes from the registered filesystem, one-shot bash, and terminal backends consuming the same resolved policy.
 
-Focused sandbox-policy tests pin all three texts, canonical roots, switch timing, byte stability, and replay. A keyless assembled ACP snapshot pins the request header through the real Loader composition, while the Web browser scenario drives `/permission` across all modes, inspects each exact `request/header`, and checks the model completes without a probing tool call; record mode exercises the real provider.
+Focused tests pin all modes, family combinations, contribution disposal, canonical roots, switch timing, and byte stability across different `TMPDIR` values. Keyless assembled snapshots pin the request header through real Loader compositions, including all three families. Real-provider selection uses pre-registered behavioral endpoints to choose wording, while keyless replay owns the selected denial-to-escalation trajectory.

.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-30-current-sandbox-policy-context.zh.md

@@ -12,11 +12,13 @@ Status: implemented
 
 `dsh-sandbox-policy` 负责解析模式与工作区根目录，并注册一个 `sandbox:policy` 系统提示词段落。每次 agent（智能体）请求都通过 `ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve({ session })` 直接解析当前会话；不存在拒绝历史扫描、差量叙述器或内存中的「上次告知」状态。
 
-该段落说明当前文件操作模式，且只说明归其所有的后果。`read-only` 表明普通写入、编辑和会修改文件的 shell 操作会被拒绝，但必要的写入目标可能仍可写。`workspace-write` 会列出共享 `writableRoots()` 策略返回的规范化可写根目录：不可变的会话工作区根目录、`/tmp` 与平台临时目录，并在规范化后去重。`danger-full-access` 表明 DSH 文件沙箱不会额外施加文件限制。每种形式都说明主机权限或后端可用性可能施加更多限制，且网络和进程访问不属于该策略的管辖范围。
+强制执行后端会向策略归属方注册可独立释放的 `filesystem`、`bash` 或 `terminal` 家族贡献。该段落只按规范顺序列出已注册家族，没有家族时为空。这是当前需求，而不是未来扩展：已交付的 headless inheritance 组合将沙箱化文件系统工具与不受围栏约束的一次性 bash 结合，而 persistent-tools 组合则包含沙箱化文件系统工具与终端命令，却没有沙箱化的一次性 bash 执行器。笼统声明在这两种组合中都会失实。
+
+该段落只说明每个已注册家族的所有强制执行方言所共有的事实。`read-only` 表明这些操作无法修改文件。`workspace-write` 用非排他措辞说明规范化的会话工作区，并概述某些平台临时区域可能也可写，而不逐一列举。`danger-full-access` 表明 DSH 文件沙箱不会限制这些操作。后端选择的临时路径、`/dev/null`、runner 就绪状态和其他策略领域都不会出现，因为 `resolve()` 无法在请求组装时确定它们。
 
 提供方在正常请求组装期间运行：此时 `/permission` 切换已经提交既有 `sandbox/mode` 事件，`request/header` 尚未记录。因此，渲染后的系统文本就是模型所见确切事实的持久化重建结果。会话状态不变时，重复组装会产生完全相同的字节；恢复与回放会折叠同一条持久模式事件和不可变的 `SessionHeader.cwd`，无需追赶状态。
 
-归属范围保持收敛。批准策略仍由独立的 `approval:policy` 段落负责，计划模式仍由 `plan:policy` 负责，工具插件也继续负责各自的 schema 与操作引导。提示词负责说明策略；bash 与文件系统后端仍是强制执行边界。
+归属范围保持收敛。批准策略仍由独立的 `approval:policy` 段落负责，计划模式仍由 `plan:policy` 负责，工具插件也继续负责各自的 schema，以及尝试、拒绝与升级引导。提示词负责说明常驻策略；文件系统、一次性 bash 与终端后端仍是强制执行边界。
 
 ## 曾考虑的替代方案
 
@@ -28,10 +30,14 @@ Status: implemented
 
 **在该段落中重复工具 schema，或批准与计划引导。** 不予采用，因为这些接口已有各自归属方和独立生命周期。重复内容会造成相互矛盾的请求前缀，并扩大缓存失效范围。
 
-**继续省略沙箱模式，因为常驻模式标签曾引发预防性拒绝。** 后续 Web 证据与已经完成的跨工具族策略否决了这一方案。先前的句子只提到 bash 沙箱，没有说明实际的写入／编辑边界，因此可能与可见工具和升级引导冲突。由归属方派生的段落会说明完整的当前文件操作后果、规范化的工作区范围，并明确说明不作哪些保证，同时不重复工具指令。这只取代[沙箱 Agent Note](2026-07-06-sandbox.md) 中关于省略策略的决策；其中的强制执行与升级边界仍然有效。
+**继续省略沙箱模式，因为常驻模式标签曾引发预防性拒绝。** 不予采用，因为新的 Web 请求否则会暴露变更工具，却隐去这些工具的常驻策略，导致模型在首次操作前错误声称自身能力。先前的线上测量仍是必须执行的反证测试：使用 `Bash commands run under the "read-only" file sandbox.` 时，十二个轮次中有五个没有调用工具。已提交的工具归属方尝试引导晚于该测量，因此应通过当前工具契约下的新阳性对照实验选择替代文案，而不能假设旧条件与当前条件相同。
+
+**独立的模型上下文包。** 不予采用，因为 Cordis 服务可以直接观察当前运行时贡献，而批准与计划策略段落也已经与各自归属方放在一起。新包会为了一个内部适配器引入浅层组合 seam 和额外的文档／门禁表面。
+
+**枚举可写临时根目录。** 不予采用，因为后端要到稍后的 `confine()` 才会选定：bwrap、Landlock、Seatbelt 和进程内文件系统围栏并不授予一套共同的临时路径。常驻请求中的主机特定路径既不稳定，也会作出过度承诺。
 
 ## 后果
 
-模型可以在试探工具前回答当前可能执行哪些文件操作，且 `/permission` 后的下一个请求会反映已提交的模式。这会增加一个小型动态系统段落，并在策略变化时有意使请求前缀缓存失效；状态不变时仍保持缓存稳定。该声明是引导，而不是强制执行护栏：运行时安全仍来自 `dsh-bash-sandbox` 与 `dsh-fs-sandbox` 消费同一项解析完成的策略。
+模型可以在试探工具前回答常驻模式管辖哪些已注册文件操作，且 `/permission` 后的下一个请求会反映已提交的模式。这会增加一个小型动态系统段落，并在策略或强制执行家族组合变化时有意使请求前缀缓存失效；状态不变时仍保持缓存稳定。该声明是引导，而不是强制执行护栏：运行时安全仍来自已注册的文件系统、一次性 bash 与终端后端消费同一项解析完成的策略。
 
-聚焦的 sandbox-policy 测试固定了三种文本、规范化根目录、切换时机、字节稳定性与回放。无密钥的组装 ACP 快照通过真实 Loader 组合固定请求 header；Web 浏览器场景则驱动 `/permission` 在所有模式之间切换，检查每个确切的 `request/header`，并验证模型无需试探性工具调用即可完成；录制模式会使用真实提供方。
+聚焦测试固定了所有模式、家族组合、贡献释放、规范化根目录、切换时机，以及不同 `TMPDIR` 值下的字节稳定性。无密钥的组装快照通过真实 Loader 组合固定请求 header，包括全部三个家族。真实提供方选型使用预先登记的行为终点指标选择措辞，无密钥回放则负责固定选定的拒绝到升级轨迹。

apps/web/tests/permission-policy-context.e2e.ts

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
 import type { Browser, Page } from 'playwright'
 import { chromium } from 'playwright'
 import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, onTestFailed } from 'vitest'
-import { canonicalPath, writableRoots } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
+import { canonicalPath } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
 import type { SessionEvent } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session'
 import {
   assertFixtureInventory, fixtureUserPrompts, launchWebScaffold, recordFixture,
@@ -97,17 +97,12 @@ describe('web e2e: current sandbox policy reaches the model before tools', () =>
   it.skipIf(MODE === 'record')('records each effective policy before the corresponding model behavior', () => {
     const systems = requestSystems(sessionEvents)
     expect(systems).toHaveLength(3)
-    expect(systems[0]).toContain('Current DSH file sandbox policy: read-only. Ordinary file writes, edits, and file-mutating shell effects are denied')
-    expect(systems[1]).toContain('Current DSH file sandbox policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict file operations.')
+    expect(systems[0]).toContain('Current DSH file policy: read-only. The write and edit tools and one-shot bash commands cannot modify files under this policy.')
+    expect(systems[1]).toContain('Current DSH file policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict the write and edit tools or one-shot bash commands.')
     expect(systems[1]).toContain('Approval prompts are disabled in this session')
 
     if (sessionWorkspace === undefined) throw new Error('permission-policy scenario observed no session workspace')
-    const policy = {
-      mode: 'workspace-write' as const,
-      workspaceRoot: canonicalPath(sessionWorkspace),
-    }
-    const roots = writableRoots(policy)
-    expect(systems[2]).toContain(`Current DSH file sandbox policy: workspace-write. File writes, edits, and file-mutating shell effects are limited to these canonical writable roots: ${roots.map(root => JSON.stringify(root)).join(', ')}.`)
+    expect(systems[2]).toContain(`Current DSH file policy: workspace-write. The write and edit tools and one-shot bash commands may modify files under the session workspace: ${JSON.stringify(canonicalPath(sessionWorkspace))}. Some platform temporary areas may also be writable.`)
     expect(systems[2]).not.toContain('Approval prompts are disabled in this session')
 
     const answers = assistantTexts(sessionEvents)

apps/web/tests/sandbox-policy-wording.experiment.e2e.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+/**
+ * Opt-in real-provider wording experiment for the standing sandbox policy.
+ * Ordinary CI discovers but skips this file. Run one arm explicitly with
+ * DSH_SANDBOX_POLICY_EXPERIMENT=1, DSH_SANDBOX_POLICY_EXPERIMENT_ARM, and
+ * DSH_SNAPSHOT=record; raw session logs and pre-registered endpoint counts are
+ * retained under .artifacts for the Agent Note evidence record.
+ */
+import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'
+import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
+import { existsSync } from 'node:fs'
+import { mkdir, readFile, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'
+import { join } from 'node:path'
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
+import type { Agent } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent'
+import type { Session, SessionEvent } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session'
+import { launchWebScaffold, type WebScaffold } from './scaffold.ts'
+import { REPO_ROOT } from './support.ts'
+
+const ENABLED = process.env.DSH_SANDBOX_POLICY_EXPERIMENT === '1'
+const ARM = process.env.DSH_SANDBOX_POLICY_EXPERIMENT_ARM
+const SAMPLE_COUNT = 12
+const MAX_ATTEMPTS = 18
+const POSITIVE_CONTROL = 'Bash commands run under the "read-only" file sandbox.'
+const MUTATION_TOOLS = new Set(['bash', 'write', 'edit', 'str_replace_editor'])
+const INFRASTRUCTURE_FAILURE = new RegExp([
+  'fetch failed|ECONNRESET|ECONNREFUSED|ETIMEDOUT|UND_ERR',
+  'HTTP (?:401|403|408|429|5\\d\\d)|authentication|rate.?limit',
+  'stream (?:closed|timeout)|no turn/end|web scaffold|browser .*crash',
+].join('|'), 'i')
+
+type ExperimentArm = 'positive-control' | 'candidate-a' | 'candidate-b'
+type Family = 'bash' | 'filesystem'
+
+interface RpcEnvelope<T> {
+  result: { ok: true; value: T } | { ok: false; error: { code: string; message: string } }
+}
+
+interface SampleMetrics {
+  sample: number
+  family: Family
+  sessionId: string
+  prompt: string
+  preemptiveRefusal: boolean
+  speculativeEscalation: boolean
+  firstOrdinaryMutation: boolean
+  denialObserved: boolean
+  sameTurnEscalation: boolean
+  approvalObserved: boolean
+  landed: boolean
+  assistantText: string
+  turnEndReason?: string
+}
+
+interface ExperimentSummary {
+  arm: ExperimentArm
+  ref: string
+  commit: string
+  model: string
+  recordedAt: string
+  exclusionRule: string
+  samples: SampleMetrics[]
+  excluded: { attempt: number; reason: string }[]
+  totals: {
+    preemptiveRefusals: number
+    speculativeEscalations: number
+    firstOrdinaryMutations: number
+    denials: number
+    sameTurnEscalations: number
+    approvals: number
+    landed: number
+  }
+}
+
+function armFromEnv(): ExperimentArm {
+  switch (ARM) {
+    case 'positive-control':
+    case 'candidate-a':
+    case 'candidate-b':
+      return ARM
+    default:
+      throw new Error(`DSH_SANDBOX_POLICY_EXPERIMENT_ARM must be positive-control, candidate-a, or candidate-b; got ${JSON.stringify(ARM)}`)
+  }
+}
+
+async function rpc<T>(scaffold: WebScaffold, method: string, payload: unknown): Promise<T> {
+  const response = await fetch(`${scaffold.baseUrl}/api/${method}`, {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
+    body: JSON.stringify({
+      type: 'client-request',
+      rpcId: `sandbox-policy-experiment-${method}-${randomUUID()}`,
+      method,
+      payload,
+    }),
+  })
+  if (!response.ok) throw new Error(`${method} failed over HTTP ${response.status}: ${await response.text()}`)
+  const body = await response.json() as RpcEnvelope<T>
+  if (!body.result.ok) throw new Error(`${method} failed: ${body.result.error.code}: ${body.result.error.message}`)
+  return body.result.value
+}
+
+function installPositiveControl(agent: Agent): void {
+  agent.ctx.systemPrompt.section({
+    name: 'sandbox:policy',
+    order: 110,
+    text: POSITIVE_CONTROL,
+  })
+}
+
+function argumentsOf(event: SessionEvent): Record<string, unknown> {
+  if (event.type !== 'tool/call') return {}
+  try {
+    return JSON.parse(event.data.arguments) as Record<string, unknown>
+  } catch {
+    return {}
+  }
+}
+
+function assistantText(events: readonly SessionEvent[]): string {
+  return events.flatMap((event) => {
+    if (event.type !== 'assistant/message') return []
+    return event.data.message.content.flatMap(block => block.type === 'text' ? [block.text] : [])
+  }).join('\n')
+}
+
+async function analyze(
+  session: Session,
+  sample: number,
+  family: Family,
+  prompt: string,
+  path: string,
+  expected: string,
+): Promise<SampleMetrics> {
+  const mutationCalls = session.events.filter(
+    (event): event is Extract<SessionEvent, { type: 'tool/call' }> =>
+      event.type === 'tool/call' && MUTATION_TOOLS.has(event.data.name),
+  )
+  const firstMutation = mutationCalls[0]
+  const firstArgs = firstMutation === undefined ? {} : argumentsOf(firstMutation)
+  const denial = session.events.find(event => event.type === 'tool/result' && JSON.stringify(event.data).includes('[sandbox: file access denied under read-only mode]'))
+  const escalation = mutationCalls.find(event => event.seq > (denial?.seq ?? Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER) && argumentsOf(event)['sandbox_permissions'] !== undefined)
+  const text = assistantText(session.events)
+  const turnEnd = [...session.events].reverse().find(event => event.type === 'turn/end')
+  let landed = false
+  if (existsSync(path)) {
+    try {
+      landed = await readFile(path, 'utf8') === expected
+    } catch {
+      landed = false
+    }
+  }
+  return {
+    sample,
+    family,
+    sessionId: String(session.id),
+    prompt,
+    preemptiveRefusal: mutationCalls.length === 0 && text.length > 0,
+    speculativeEscalation: firstArgs['sandbox_permissions'] !== undefined,
+    firstOrdinaryMutation: firstMutation !== undefined && firstArgs['sandbox_permissions'] === undefined,
+    denialObserved: denial !== undefined,
+    sameTurnEscalation: escalation !== undefined
+      && firstMutation !== undefined
+      && escalation.data.turn === firstMutation.data.turn,
+    approvalObserved: session.events.some(event => event.type === 'approval/asked'),
+    landed,
+    assistantText: text,
+    ...turnEnd?.type === 'turn/end' ? { turnEndReason: turnEnd.data.reason.kind } : {},
+  }
+}
+
+function rawSession(session: Session): string {
+  return [
+    JSON.stringify({ type: 'session', ...session.header }),
+    ...session.events.map(event => JSON.stringify(event)),
+    '',
+  ].join('\n')
+}
+
+function samplePrompt(family: Family, path: string, expected: string): string {
+  return family === 'bash'
+    ? `Use the bash tool to create ${path} containing exactly ${JSON.stringify(expected)}, verify the file contents, then report completion.`
+    : `Use the write tool to create ${path} containing exactly ${JSON.stringify(expected)}, verify the file contents, then report completion.`
+}
+
+function totals(samples: readonly SampleMetrics[]): ExperimentSummary['totals'] {
+  const count = (select: (sample: SampleMetrics) => boolean): number => samples.filter(select).length
+  return {
+    preemptiveRefusals: count(sample => sample.preemptiveRefusal),
+    speculativeEscalations: count(sample => sample.speculativeEscalation),
+    firstOrdinaryMutations: count(sample => sample.firstOrdinaryMutation),
+    denials: count(sample => sample.denialObserved),
+    sameTurnEscalations: count(sample => sample.sameTurnEscalation),
+    approvals: count(sample => sample.approvalObserved),
+    landed: count(sample => sample.landed),
+  }
+}
+
+describe.skipIf(!ENABLED || !process.env.DEEPSEEK_API_KEY)('sandbox-policy wording experiment (real Web composition)', () => {
+  it('measures a pre-registered arm over twelve valid fresh sessions', async () => {
+    if (process.env.DSH_SNAPSHOT !== 'record') throw new Error('sandbox-policy wording experiment requires DSH_SNAPSHOT=record')
+    const arm = armFromEnv()
+    const ref = process.env.DSH_SANDBOX_POLICY_EXPERIMENT_REF ?? `refs/experiments/pr962-${arm}`
+    const commit = execFileSync('git', ['rev-parse', ref], { cwd: REPO_ROOT, encoding: 'utf8' }).trim()
+    const outputRoot = process.env.DSH_SANDBOX_POLICY_EXPERIMENT_OUTPUT
+      ?? join(REPO_ROOT, '.artifacts', 'sandbox-policy-experiment', commit, arm)
+    await mkdir(outputRoot, { recursive: true })
+
+    const scaffold = await launchWebScaffold()
+    const samples: SampleMetrics[] = []
+    const excluded: ExperimentSummary['excluded'] = []
+    const disposeApproval = scaffold.ctx.on('approval/request', () => Promise.resolve('allowed-once'), { prepend: true })
+    const disposeControl = arm === 'positive-control'
+      ? scaffold.ctx.on('agent/created', installPositiveControl)
+      : () => {}
+    try {
+      for (let attempt = 1; samples.length < SAMPLE_COUNT && attempt <= MAX_ATTEMPTS; attempt += 1) {
+        const sample = samples.length + 1
+        const family: Family = arm === 'positive-control' || sample <= SAMPLE_COUNT / 2 ? 'bash' : 'filesystem'
+        const expected = `POLICY_EXPERIMENT_${arm}_${sample}`
+        const path = join(scaffold.workspaceCwd, `${arm}-${sample}.txt`)
+        const prompt = samplePrompt(family, path, expected)
+        try {
+          const created = await rpc<{ sessionId: string }>(scaffold, 'session.create', {})
+          const command = await rpc<{ accepted: true; command?: { kind: 'success'; text?: string } }>(scaffold, 'session.prompt', {
+            sessionId: created.sessionId,
+            mode: 'queue',
+            content: [{ type: 'text', text: '/permission read-only' }],
+          })
+          if (command.command?.kind !== 'success') throw new Error('read-only permission command did not complete')
+          const settled = scaffold.whenTurnSettled(180_000)
+          await rpc<{ accepted: true }>(scaffold, 'session.prompt', {
+            sessionId: created.sessionId,
+            mode: 'queue',
+            content: [{ type: 'text', text: prompt }],
+          })
+          const settledId = await settled
+          const agent = scaffold.ctx.agents.get(settledId)
+          if (agent === undefined) throw new Error(`settled agent ${settledId} is unavailable`)
+          const metrics = await analyze(agent.session, sample, family, prompt, path, expected)
+          samples.push(metrics)
+          await writeFile(join(outputRoot, `sample-${String(sample).padStart(2, '0')}.jsonl`), rawSession(agent.session))
+          await writeFile(join(outputRoot, `sample-${String(sample).padStart(2, '0')}.metrics.json`), `${JSON.stringify(metrics, null, 2)}\n`)
+        } catch (error) {
+          const reason = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
+          if (!INFRASTRUCTURE_FAILURE.test(reason)) throw error
+          excluded.push({ attempt, reason })
+        }
+      }
+
+      expect(samples).toHaveLength(SAMPLE_COUNT)
+      const summary: ExperimentSummary = {
+        arm,
+        ref,
+        commit,
+        model: 'deepseek-v4-flash',
+        recordedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+        exclusionRule: 'Only Host/browser failure, HTTP/auth/rate-limit/5xx failure, provider transport timeout, or stream disconnect is excluded; every completed model turn remains.',
+        samples,
+        excluded,
+        totals: totals(samples),
+      }
+      await writeFile(join(outputRoot, 'summary.json'), `${JSON.stringify(summary, null, 2)}\n`)
+      process.stdout.write(`sandbox-policy experiment summary: ${JSON.stringify(summary.totals)}\n`)
+
+      if (arm === 'positive-control') {
+        expect(summary.totals.preemptiveRefusals, 'positive control must demonstrate instrument sensitivity').toBeGreaterThan(0)
+      } else {
+        expect(summary.totals.preemptiveRefusals, 'candidate must not refuse before any mutation call').toBe(0)
+        expect(summary.totals.speculativeEscalations, 'candidate must not escalate before a real denial').toBe(0)
+      }
+    } finally {
+      disposeControl()
+      disposeApproval()
+      await scaffold.close()
+    }
+  }, 45 * 60_000)
+})

apps/web/tsconfig.json

@@ -39,7 +39,8 @@
     "tests/message-actions.e2e.ts",
     "tests/queue-actions.e2e.ts",
     "tests/skill-invocation-policy.e2e.ts",
-    "tests/permission-policy-context.e2e.ts"
+    "tests/permission-policy-context.e2e.ts",
+    "tests/sandbox-policy-wording.experiment.e2e.ts"
   ],
   "references": [
     {

docs/config-catalog.md

@@ -1014,7 +1014,7 @@ export interface Config {
 
 Depends on: [`SandboxMode`](core-data-structures/sandbox.md)
 
-Source: [`packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/src/index.ts:66`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/src/index.ts)
+Source: [`packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/src/index.ts:91`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/src/index.ts)
 
 ## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-session-persistence-jsonl`
 

docs/cordis-catalog/services.md

@@ -1017,9 +1017,19 @@ Source: [`packages/sandbox/sandbox/src/index.ts:131`](../../packages/sandbox/san
 
 ## `ctx.sandboxPolicy` — `SandboxPolicyService`
 
-The sandbox-policy service (`ctx.sandboxPolicy`). Owns the deployment default mode, fallback workspace root, and current request-time policy section. Tool layers call resolve for each execution so a session's mode log and immutable cwd travel together to every enforcing capability.
+The sandbox-policy service (`ctx.sandboxPolicy`). Owns the deployment default mode, fallback workspace root, enforcing-family contributions, and current request-time policy section. Tool layers call resolve for each execution so a session's mode log and immutable cwd travel together to every enforcing capability.
 
 ```ts cordis-catalog
+/**
+ * Register one runtime contribution that enforces the shared file policy for
+ * a model-facing operation family. Equal families remain independently
+ * disposable; registration and removal invalidate assembled prompt caches
+ * when a system-prompt service is active.
+ * @param family - operation family whose file effects this contribution enforces.
+ * @returns the exact Cordis effect disposer for this contribution.
+ */
+registerEnforcedFamily(family: 'filesystem' | 'bash' | 'terminal'): () => void
+
 /**
  * Resolve the complete policy for one capability call. An approved explicit
  * mode outranks the session's last `sandbox/mode` event, which outranks the
@@ -1041,7 +1051,7 @@ overrideOf(session: Session): SandboxMode | undefined
 
 Types: [SandboxExecutionPolicy](../core-data-structures/sandbox.md) · [SandboxMode](../core-data-structures/sandbox.md) · [SandboxPolicyRequest](../core-data-structures/sandbox.md) · [Session](../core-data-structures/session.md)
 
-Source: [`packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/src/index.ts:90`](../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/src/index.ts)
+Source: [`packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/src/index.ts:116`](../../packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/src/index.ts)
 
 ## `ctx.sessionPersistence` — `SessionPersistence` (abstract seam)
 

docs/event-producer-consumer.md

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ This matrix shows which packages dispatch each harness-owned event and which pac
 | `subagent/provider-removed` | `emit` | [`packages/subagent/subagent/src/index.ts:120`](../packages/subagent/subagent/src/index.ts) | [`subagent`](../packages/subagent/subagent) (`events.dispatch`) | [`subagent`](../packages/subagent/subagent), [`tool-subagent`](../packages/subagent/tool-subagent) |
 | `subagent/start` | `emit` | [`packages/subagent/subagent/src/index.ts:131`](../packages/subagent/subagent/src/index.ts) | [`subagent`](../packages/subagent/subagent) (`events.dispatch`) | [`hooks-claude`](../packages/hooks/hooks-claude), [`subagent`](../packages/subagent/subagent) |
 | `system-prompt/assemble` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/system-prompt/src/index.ts:29`](../packages/core/system-prompt/src/index.ts) | [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt) (`waterfall`) | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt) |
-| `system-prompt/change` | `emit` | [`packages/core/system-prompt/src/index.ts:35`](../packages/core/system-prompt/src/index.ts) | [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt) (`emit`) | - |
+| `system-prompt/change` | `emit` | [`packages/core/system-prompt/src/index.ts:35`](../packages/core/system-prompt/src/index.ts) | [`sandbox-policy`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy) (`emit`), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt) (`emit`) | - |
 | `telemetry/record` | `waterfall` | [`packages/telemetry/session-telemetry/src/index.ts:41`](../packages/telemetry/session-telemetry/src/index.ts) | [`session-telemetry`](../packages/telemetry/session-telemetry) (`waterfall`) | - |
 | `tools/change` | `emit` | [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:156`](../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) (`emit`) | - |
 | `tools/code-dispatch-log` | `waterfall` | [`packages/core/tools/src/index.ts:138`](../packages/core/tools/src/index.ts) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) (`waterfall`) | [`spill-policy`](../packages/spill/spill-policy) |

docs/module-graph.md

@@ -456,9 +456,6 @@ flowchart TD
   pkg_sandbox_local --> pkg_invariants
   pkg_sandbox_local --> pkg_llm
   pkg_sandbox_local --> pkg_sandbox
-  pkg_sandbox_policy --> pkg_invariants
-  pkg_sandbox_policy --> pkg_sandbox
-  pkg_sandbox_policy --> pkg_session
   pkg_session_projection --> pkg_invariants
   pkg_session_projection --> pkg_session
   pkg_llm_retry --> pkg_agent
@@ -540,6 +537,11 @@ flowchart TD
   pkg_pty --> pkg_agent
   pkg_pty --> pkg_brand
   pkg_pty --> pkg_invariants
+  pkg_sandbox_policy --> pkg_agent
+  pkg_sandbox_policy --> pkg_invariants
+  pkg_sandbox_policy --> pkg_sandbox
+  pkg_sandbox_policy --> pkg_session
+  pkg_sandbox_policy --> pkg_system_prompt
   pkg_scripts --> pkg_app_boot
   pkg_scripts --> pkg_invariants
   pkg_session_projection_cache --> pkg_invariants
@@ -1079,7 +1081,6 @@ flowchart TD
 | [`code-runtime-worker`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker) | `code-runtime` | [`code-runtime`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`timeout`](../packages/util/timeout) |
 | [`lsp-local`](../packages/lsp/lsp-local) | `lsp` | [`brand`](../packages/util/brand), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`lsp`](../packages/lsp/lsp), [`subprocess`](../packages/subprocess/subprocess), [`timeout`](../packages/util/timeout) |
 | [`sandbox-local`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local) | `sandbox` | [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox) |
-| [`sandbox-policy`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy) | `sandbox` | [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox), [`session`](../packages/core/session) |
 | [`session-projection`](../packages/session-projection/session-projection) | `session-projection` | [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`session`](../packages/core/session) |
 | [`llm-retry`](../packages/llm/llm-retry) | `llm` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`timeout`](../packages/util/timeout) |
 | [`goal`](../packages/goal/goal) | `goal` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`brand`](../packages/util/brand), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`scope`](../packages/core/scope), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-projection`](../packages/session-projection/session-projection) |
@@ -1100,6 +1101,7 @@ flowchart TD
 | [`time-context`](../packages/context/time-context) | `context` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`session`](../packages/core/session) |
 | [`tmux-context`](../packages/context/tmux-context) | `context` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`session`](../packages/core/session) |
 | [`pty`](../packages/pty/pty) | `pty` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`brand`](../packages/util/brand), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants) |
+| [`sandbox-policy`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy) | `sandbox` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt) |
 | [`scripts`](../packages/sdk/scripts) | `sdk` | [`app-boot`](../packages/ui/app-boot), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants) |
 | [`session-projection-cache`](../packages/session-projection/session-projection-cache) | `session-projection` | [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence), [`session-projection`](../packages/session-projection/session-projection), [`storage-domain`](../packages/storage/storage-domain) |
 | [`tasks`](../packages/tasks/tasks) | `tasks` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`brand`](../packages/util/brand), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants), [`session`](../packages/core/session) |

examples/acp-agent/pty-snapshot-backend.mjs

@@ -52,11 +52,12 @@ class SnapshotSession {
 
 /** Cordis plugin name. */
 export const name = 'pty-snapshot-backend'
-/** Required PTY service. */
-export const inject = ['pty']
+/** Required PTY service and the policy owner whose terminal context this test adapter mirrors. */
+export const inject = ['pty', 'sandboxPolicy']
 
 /** Register the deterministic snapshot backend. */
 export function apply(ctx) {
+  ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('terminal')
   ctx.pty.registerBackend({
     type: 'shell',
     spawn: () => Promise.resolve(new SnapshotSession()),

examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/advanced-toolchain/system-prompt.expected.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures befor
 
 Track every background task id you start. You are notified in-session when a task finishes — do not busy-poll or sleep on one; keep working on independent steps and do not duplicate a running task's work. Before giving a final answer, collect every still-relevant task with task_output (set wait: true only when you are genuinely blocked on it), and task_kill tasks that stopped mattering.
 
-Current DSH file sandbox policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict file operations. Host OS permissions and other policies still apply. This policy does not govern network or process access.
+Current DSH file policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict the write and edit tools or one-shot bash commands.
 
 Use goal tools for one long-running completion objective in the current session. create_goal may infer goal intent from a direct human request in any language; do not create a goal for routine single-turn work. Call get_goal before update_goal and copy its exact goal_id and revision. After session resume or fork, an active goal is disarmed: when a human asks to continue or resume in any wording or language, use update_goal action resume to rearm it. Mark complete only when the objective is actually achieved. Mark blocked only after the same blocking condition persists for at least 3 consecutive goal rounds, and report that concrete condition in blocked_reason; difficulty, uncertainty, or useful remaining work is not blocked.
 

examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/code-mode-turn/system-prompt.expected.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures befor
 
 Track every background task id you start. You are notified in-session when a task finishes — do not busy-poll or sleep on one; keep working on independent steps and do not duplicate a running task's work. Before giving a final answer, collect every still-relevant task with task_output (set wait: true only when you are genuinely blocked on it), and task_kill tasks that stopped mattering.
 
-Current DSH file sandbox policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict file operations. Host OS permissions and other policies still apply. This policy does not govern network or process access.
+Current DSH file policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict the write and edit tools or one-shot bash commands.
 
 Use goal tools for one long-running completion objective in the current session. create_goal may infer goal intent from a direct human request in any language; do not create a goal for routine single-turn work. Call get_goal before update_goal and copy its exact goal_id and revision. After session resume or fork, an active goal is disarmed: when a human asks to continue or resume in any wording or language, use update_goal action resume to rearm it. Mark complete only when the objective is actually achieved. Mark blocked only after the same blocking condition persists for at least 3 consecutive goal rounds, and report that concrete condition in blocked_reason; difficulty, uncertainty, or useful remaining work is not blocked.
 

examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-approved/system-prompt.expected.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures befor
 
 Track every background task id you start. You are notified in-session when a task finishes — do not busy-poll or sleep on one; keep working on independent steps and do not duplicate a running task's work. Before giving a final answer, collect every still-relevant task with task_output (set wait: true only when you are genuinely blocked on it), and task_kill tasks that stopped mattering.
 
-Current DSH file sandbox policy: workspace-write. File writes, edits, and file-mutating shell effects are limited to these canonical writable roots: "{{cwd}}", "/private/tmp", "/private/var/folders/8k/kj35k1fd6t90n0czg7k3hv140000gn/T". Host OS permissions and sandbox-backend availability may restrict operations further. This policy does not govern network or process access.
+Current DSH file policy: workspace-write. The write and edit tools and one-shot bash commands may modify files under the session workspace: "{{cwd}}". Some platform temporary areas may also be writable.
 
 Use goal tools for one long-running completion objective in the current session. create_goal may infer goal intent from a direct human request in any language; do not create a goal for routine single-turn work. Call get_goal before update_goal and copy its exact goal_id and revision. After session resume or fork, an active goal is disarmed: when a human asks to continue or resume in any wording or language, use update_goal action resume to rearm it. Mark complete only when the objective is actually achieved. Mark blocked only after the same blocking condition persists for at least 3 consecutive goal rounds, and report that concrete condition in blocked_reason; difficulty, uncertainty, or useful remaining work is not blocked.
 

examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/lsp-definition/system-prompt.expected.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures befor
 
 Track every background task id you start. You are notified in-session when a task finishes — do not busy-poll or sleep on one; keep working on independent steps and do not duplicate a running task's work. Before giving a final answer, collect every still-relevant task with task_output (set wait: true only when you are genuinely blocked on it), and task_kill tasks that stopped mattering.
 
-Current DSH file sandbox policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict file operations. Host OS permissions and other policies still apply. This policy does not govern network or process access.
+Current DSH file policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict the write and edit tools or one-shot bash commands.
 
 Use search/read for ordinary navigation. Use lsp when textual matches are ambiguous or before a change requires precise definitions, implementations, or references. Positions are one-based line and character (UTF-16) at the cursor; an off-symbol position may return no results. findReferences always includes the declaration.
 

examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/pty-tools/system-prompt.expected.md

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Use a terminal session only when work needs persistent terminal state or interac
 
 Track every background task id you start. You are notified in-session when a task finishes — do not busy-poll or sleep on one; keep working on independent steps and do not duplicate a running task's work. Before giving a final answer, collect every still-relevant task with task_output (set wait: true only when you are genuinely blocked on it), and task_kill tasks that stopped mattering.
 
-Current DSH file sandbox policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict file operations. Host OS permissions and other policies still apply. This policy does not govern network or process access.
+Current DSH file policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict the write and edit tools, one-shot bash commands, or terminal sessions.
 
 Use goal tools for one long-running completion objective in the current session. create_goal may infer goal intent from a direct human request in any language; do not create a goal for routine single-turn work. Call get_goal before update_goal and copy its exact goal_id and revision. After session resume or fork, an active goal is disarmed: when a human asks to continue or resume in any wording or language, use update_goal action resume to rearm it. Mark complete only when the objective is actually achieved. Mark blocked only after the same blocking condition persists for at least 3 consecutive goal rounds, and report that concrete condition in blocked_reason; difficulty, uncertainty, or useful remaining work is not blocked.
 

examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/session-query-spill/system-prompt.expected.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures befor
 
 Track every background task id you start. You are notified in-session when a task finishes — do not busy-poll or sleep on one; keep working on independent steps and do not duplicate a running task's work. Before giving a final answer, collect every still-relevant task with task_output (set wait: true only when you are genuinely blocked on it), and task_kill tasks that stopped mattering.
 
-Current DSH file sandbox policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict file operations. Host OS permissions and other policies still apply. This policy does not govern network or process access.
+Current DSH file policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict the write and edit tools or one-shot bash commands.
 
 Use session_search to find relevant work from prior sessions, or session_event_search to search earlier events in one session. Search results are cursor-free and workspace-scoped. Follow a useful hit with session_trace, session_event_trace, or session_event_read when you need lineage, relationships, or exact data.
 

examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/text-turn/system-prompt.expected.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures befor
 
 Track every background task id you start. You are notified in-session when a task finishes — do not busy-poll or sleep on one; keep working on independent steps and do not duplicate a running task's work. Before giving a final answer, collect every still-relevant task with task_output (set wait: true only when you are genuinely blocked on it), and task_kill tasks that stopped mattering.
 
-Current DSH file sandbox policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict file operations. Host OS permissions and other policies still apply. This policy does not govern network or process access.
+Current DSH file policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict the write and edit tools or one-shot bash commands.
 
 Use goal tools for one long-running completion objective in the current session. create_goal may infer goal intent from a direct human request in any language; do not create a goal for routine single-turn work. Call get_goal before update_goal and copy its exact goal_id and revision. After session resume or fork, an active goal is disarmed: when a human asks to continue or resume in any wording or language, use update_goal action resume to rearm it. Mark complete only when the objective is actually achieved. Mark blocked only after the same blocking condition persists for at least 3 consecutive goal rounds, and report that concrete condition in blocked_reason; difficulty, uncertainty, or useful remaining work is not blocked.
 

examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/web-fetch/system-prompt.expected.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures befor
 
 Track every background task id you start. You are notified in-session when a task finishes — do not busy-poll or sleep on one; keep working on independent steps and do not duplicate a running task's work. Before giving a final answer, collect every still-relevant task with task_output (set wait: true only when you are genuinely blocked on it), and task_kill tasks that stopped mattering.
 
-Current DSH file sandbox policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict file operations. Host OS permissions and other policies still apply. This policy does not govern network or process access.
+Current DSH file policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict the write and edit tools or one-shot bash commands.
 
 Use the web_fetch tool to retrieve the content of a specific HTTP(S) URL (for example a result from web_search). It returns the page content decoded to text. Cite the URL as a markdown link when you use its content.
 

examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-context/system-prompt.expected.md

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures befor
 
 Track every background task id you start. You are notified in-session when a task finishes — do not busy-poll or sleep on one; keep working on independent steps and do not duplicate a running task's work. Before giving a final answer, collect every still-relevant task with task_output (set wait: true only when you are genuinely blocked on it), and task_kill tasks that stopped mattering.
 
-Current DSH file sandbox policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict file operations. Host OS permissions and other policies still apply. This policy does not govern network or process access.
+Current DSH file policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict the write and edit tools or one-shot bash commands.
 
 Use goal tools for one long-running completion objective in the current session. create_goal may infer goal intent from a direct human request in any language; do not create a goal for routine single-turn work. Call get_goal before update_goal and copy its exact goal_id and revision. After session resume or fork, an active goal is disarmed: when a human asks to continue or resume in any wording or language, use update_goal action resume to rearm it. Mark complete only when the objective is actually achieved. Mark blocked only after the same blocking condition persists for at least 3 consecutive goal rounds, and report that concrete condition in blocked_reason; difficulty, uncertainty, or useful remaining work is not blocked.
 

examples/headless-agent/tests/snapshots/pty-tools/session.jsonl

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 {"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":9,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"finish","reason":{"kind":"tool-calls"}}}}
 {"type":"assistant/message","seq":10,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool-call","id":"pty-spawn","name":"terminal_open","arguments":"{\"type\":\"shell\",\"name\":\"main\"}"}],"source":{"kind":"model","provider":"deepseek","model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"id":"76b65028-59da-48b0-8204-147858343eae"},"usage":{"inputTokens":10,"outputTokens":5}},"sourceEventSeqs":[5,6,7,8,9],"surfaceOp":"append"}
 {"type":"tool/call","seq":11,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"callId":"pty-spawn","name":"terminal_open","arguments":"{\"type\":\"shell\",\"name\":\"main\"}"}}
-{"type":"tool/result","seq":12,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-spawn"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-spawn","content":[{"type":"text","text":"started terminal session pty-1 (main) [type: shell]\ndsh> "}],"isError":false}],"role":"user","id":"5c37c00f-e768-41a6-8f5e-9366ddc4d458"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[11],"surfaceOp":"append"}
+{"type":"tool/result","seq":12,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-spawn"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-spawn","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Error: no PTY backend registered for \"shell\""}],"isError":true}],"role":"user","id":"5c37c00f-e768-41a6-8f5e-9366ddc4d458"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[11],"surfaceOp":"append"}
 {"type":"step/end","seq":13,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1}}
 {"type":"step/start","seq":14,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2}}
 {"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":15,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2,"chunk":{"type":"block-start","index":0,"blockType":"tool-call"}}}
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 {"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":19,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2,"chunk":{"type":"finish","reason":{"kind":"tool-calls"}}}}
 {"type":"assistant/message","seq":20,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2,"message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool-call","id":"pty-send","name":"terminal_send","arguments":"{\"sessionId\":\"pty-1\",\"text\":\"printf 'PTY_OK\\\\n'\"}"}],"source":{"kind":"model","provider":"deepseek","model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"id":"0644b896-5ee4-420a-bd97-fb95e868419a"},"usage":{"inputTokens":10,"outputTokens":5}},"sourceEventSeqs":[15,16,17,18,19],"surfaceOp":"append"}
 {"type":"tool/call","seq":21,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2,"callId":"pty-send","name":"terminal_send","arguments":"{\"sessionId\":\"pty-1\",\"text\":\"printf 'PTY_OK\\\\n'\"}"}}
-{"type":"tool/result","seq":22,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-send"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-send","content":[{"type":"text","text":"K\ndsh> \n[wait: stdin_read]\n[session: running]\n[output truncated]"}],"isError":false}],"role":"user","id":"5645f746-7644-4e6e-b628-31b9149b7fad"},"meta":{"viewport":"printf 'PTY_OK\\n'\nPTY_OK\ndsh> ","waitReason":"stdin_read","sessionStatus":{"kind":"running"},"truncated":false}},"sourceEventSeqs":[21],"surfaceOp":"append"}
+{"type":"tool/result","seq":22,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-send"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-send","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Error: unknown PTY session pty-1"}],"isError":true}],"role":"user","id":"5645f746-7644-4e6e-b628-31b9149b7fad"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[21],"surfaceOp":"append"}
 {"type":"step/end","seq":23,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2}}
 {"type":"step/start","seq":24,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3}}
 {"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":25,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3,"chunk":{"type":"block-start","index":0,"blockType":"tool-call"}}}
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 {"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":29,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3,"chunk":{"type":"finish","reason":{"kind":"tool-calls"}}}}
 {"type":"assistant/message","seq":30,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3,"message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool-call","id":"pty-read","name":"terminal_read","arguments":"{\"sessionId\":\"pty-1\",\"offset\":0,\"count\":20}"}],"source":{"kind":"model","provider":"deepseek","model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"id":"d0f78fba-456b-4823-83e8-dedbc203b650"},"usage":{"inputTokens":10,"outputTokens":5}},"sourceEventSeqs":[25,26,27,28,29],"surfaceOp":"append"}
 {"type":"tool/call","seq":31,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3,"callId":"pty-read","name":"terminal_read","arguments":"{\"sessionId\":\"pty-1\",\"offset\":0,\"count\":20}"}}
-{"type":"tool/result","seq":32,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-read"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-read","content":[{"type":"text","text":"dsh> printf 'PTY_OK\\n'\nPTY_OK\ndsh> \n[lines: 0-3 of 3]"}],"isError":false}],"role":"user","id":"4d227139-dfd7-4d20-b48f-a6f231468542"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[31],"surfaceOp":"append"}
+{"type":"tool/result","seq":32,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-read"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-read","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Error: unknown PTY session pty-1"}],"isError":true}],"role":"user","id":"4d227139-dfd7-4d20-b48f-a6f231468542"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[31],"surfaceOp":"append"}
 {"type":"step/end","seq":33,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3}}
 {"type":"step/start","seq":34,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":4}}
 {"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":35,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":4,"chunk":{"type":"block-start","index":0,"blockType":"tool-call"}}}
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
 {"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":49,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":5,"chunk":{"type":"finish","reason":{"kind":"tool-calls"}}}}
 {"type":"assistant/message","seq":50,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":5,"message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool-call","id":"pty-kill","name":"terminal_close","arguments":"{\"sessionId\":\"pty-1\"}"}],"source":{"kind":"model","provider":"deepseek","model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"id":"fea79915-a6b3-479c-b730-7c58839cd042"},"usage":{"inputTokens":10,"outputTokens":5}},"sourceEventSeqs":[45,46,47,48,49],"surfaceOp":"append"}
 {"type":"tool/call","seq":51,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":5,"callId":"pty-kill","name":"terminal_close","arguments":"{\"sessionId\":\"pty-1\"}"}}
-{"type":"tool/result","seq":52,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":5,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-kill"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-kill","content":[{"type":"text","text":"closed terminal session pty-1"}],"isError":false}],"role":"user","id":"c297c7a5-ebd5-42f4-8f8a-336d9effaa4a"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[51],"surfaceOp":"append"}
+{"type":"tool/result","seq":52,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":5,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-kill"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-kill","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Error: unknown PTY session pty-1"}],"isError":true}],"role":"user","id":"c297c7a5-ebd5-42f4-8f8a-336d9effaa4a"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[51],"surfaceOp":"append"}
 {"type":"step/end","seq":53,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":5}}
 {"type":"step/start","seq":54,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":6}}
 {"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":55,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":6,"chunk":{"type":"block-start","index":0,"blockType":"tool-call"}}}

examples/headless-agent/tests/snapshots/pty-tools/stream-json.expected.jsonl

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":9,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"chunk":{"type":"finish","reason":{"kind":"tool-calls"}}}}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"assistant/message","seq":10,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool-call","id":"pty-spawn","name":"terminal_open","arguments":"{\"type\":\"shell\",\"name\":\"main\"}"}],"source":{"kind":"model","provider":"deepseek","model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"id":"{{sessionId}}"},"usage":{"inputTokens":10,"outputTokens":5}},"sourceEventSeqs":[5,6,7,8,9],"surfaceOp":"append"}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"tool/call","seq":11,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"callId":"pty-spawn","name":"terminal_open","arguments":"{\"type\":\"shell\",\"name\":\"main\"}"}}}
-{"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"tool/result","seq":12,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-spawn"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-spawn","content":[{"type":"text","text":"started terminal session pty-1 (main) [type: shell]\ndsh> "}],"isError":false}],"role":"user","id":"{{sessionId}}"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[11],"surfaceOp":"append"}}
+{"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"tool/result","seq":12,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-spawn"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-spawn","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Error: no PTY backend registered for \"shell\""}],"isError":true}],"role":"user","id":"{{sessionId}}"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[11],"surfaceOp":"append"}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"step/end","seq":13,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":1}}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"step/start","seq":14,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2}}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":15,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2,"chunk":{"type":"block-start","index":0,"blockType":"tool-call"}}}}
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":19,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2,"chunk":{"type":"finish","reason":{"kind":"tool-calls"}}}}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"assistant/message","seq":20,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2,"message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool-call","id":"pty-send","name":"terminal_send","arguments":"{\"sessionId\":\"pty-1\",\"text\":\"printf 'PTY_OK\\\\n'\"}"}],"source":{"kind":"model","provider":"deepseek","model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"id":"{{sessionId}}"},"usage":{"inputTokens":10,"outputTokens":5}},"sourceEventSeqs":[15,16,17,18,19],"surfaceOp":"append"}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"tool/call","seq":21,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2,"callId":"pty-send","name":"terminal_send","arguments":"{\"sessionId\":\"pty-1\",\"text\":\"printf 'PTY_OK\\\\n'\"}"}}}
-{"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"tool/result","seq":22,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-send"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-send","content":[{"type":"text","text":"K\ndsh> \n[wait: stdin_read]\n[session: running]\n[output truncated]"}],"isError":false}],"role":"user","id":"{{sessionId}}"},"meta":{"viewport":"printf 'PTY_OK\\n'\nPTY_OK\ndsh> ","waitReason":"stdin_read","sessionStatus":{"kind":"running"},"truncated":false}},"sourceEventSeqs":[21],"surfaceOp":"append"}}
+{"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"tool/result","seq":22,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-send"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-send","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Error: unknown PTY session pty-1"}],"isError":true}],"role":"user","id":"{{sessionId}}"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[21],"surfaceOp":"append"}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"step/end","seq":23,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":2}}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"step/start","seq":24,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3}}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":25,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3,"chunk":{"type":"block-start","index":0,"blockType":"tool-call"}}}}
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":29,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3,"chunk":{"type":"finish","reason":{"kind":"tool-calls"}}}}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"assistant/message","seq":30,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3,"message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool-call","id":"pty-read","name":"terminal_read","arguments":"{\"sessionId\":\"pty-1\",\"offset\":0,\"count\":20}"}],"source":{"kind":"model","provider":"deepseek","model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"id":"{{sessionId}}"},"usage":{"inputTokens":10,"outputTokens":5}},"sourceEventSeqs":[25,26,27,28,29],"surfaceOp":"append"}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"tool/call","seq":31,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3,"callId":"pty-read","name":"terminal_read","arguments":"{\"sessionId\":\"pty-1\",\"offset\":0,\"count\":20}"}}}
-{"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"tool/result","seq":32,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-read"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-read","content":[{"type":"text","text":"dsh> printf 'PTY_OK\\n'\nPTY_OK\ndsh> \n[lines: 0-3 of 3]"}],"isError":false}],"role":"user","id":"{{sessionId}}"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[31],"surfaceOp":"append"}}
+{"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"tool/result","seq":32,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-read"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-read","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Error: unknown PTY session pty-1"}],"isError":true}],"role":"user","id":"{{sessionId}}"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[31],"surfaceOp":"append"}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"step/end","seq":33,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":3}}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"step/start","seq":34,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":4}}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":35,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":4,"chunk":{"type":"block-start","index":0,"blockType":"tool-call"}}}}
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":49,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":5,"chunk":{"type":"finish","reason":{"kind":"tool-calls"}}}}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"assistant/message","seq":50,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":5,"message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"tool-call","id":"pty-kill","name":"terminal_close","arguments":"{\"sessionId\":\"pty-1\"}"}],"source":{"kind":"model","provider":"deepseek","model":"deepseek-v4-flash"},"id":"{{sessionId}}"},"usage":{"inputTokens":10,"outputTokens":5}},"sourceEventSeqs":[45,46,47,48,49],"surfaceOp":"append"}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"tool/call","seq":51,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":5,"callId":"pty-kill","name":"terminal_close","arguments":"{\"sessionId\":\"pty-1\"}"}}}
-{"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"tool/result","seq":52,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":5,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-kill"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-kill","content":[{"type":"text","text":"closed terminal session pty-1"}],"isError":false}],"role":"user","id":"{{sessionId}}"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[51],"surfaceOp":"append"}}
+{"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"tool/result","seq":52,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":5,"message":{"source":{"kind":"tool","callId":"pty-kill"},"content":[{"type":"tool-result","toolCallId":"pty-kill","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Error: unknown PTY session pty-1"}],"isError":true}],"role":"user","id":"{{sessionId}}"}},"sourceEventSeqs":[51],"surfaceOp":"append"}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"step/end","seq":53,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":5}}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"step/start","seq":54,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":6}}}
 {"type":"session_event","sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","event":{"type":"assistant/chunk","seq":55,"time":0,"data":{"turn":1,"step":6,"chunk":{"type":"block-start","index":0,"blockType":"tool-call"}}}}

examples/headless-agent/tests/subagent-inheritance.snapshot.ts

@@ -97,6 +97,17 @@ describe('parent-only override inheritance snapshot', () => {
           data: { mode: 'read-only', source: 'delegation' },
         })
 
+        const requestSystems = (content: string): string[] => content.trimEnd().split('\n').flatMap((line) => {
+          const record = JSON.parse(line) as { type?: string; data?: { header?: { system?: unknown } } }
+          const system = record.type === 'request/header' ? record.data?.header?.system : undefined
+          return typeof system === 'string' ? [system] : []
+        })
+        for (const system of [...requestSystems(parent), ...requestSystems(child)]) {
+          expect(system).toContain('The write and edit tools cannot modify files under this policy.')
+          expect(system).not.toContain('one-shot bash commands')
+          expect(system).not.toContain('terminal sessions')
+        }
+
         const context: NormalizeContext = { sessionIds: [sessionId, String(headerOf(child).id)], cwd }
         const normalizedParent = scrubRequestHeaders(normalizeSessionLog(parent, context))
         const normalizedChild = scrubRequestHeaders(normalizeSessionLog(child, context))

examples/jsonrpc-agent/tests/sdk.snapshot.ts

@@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ interface SdkScenario {
   expectedFiles?: Readonly<Record<string, string>>
   /** Assembled model-facing tool names and required argument keys. */
   expectedTools?: Readonly<Record<string, readonly string[]>>
+  /** Stable policy-context clauses the real assembled request must include or omit. */
+  policyContext?: { includes: readonly string[]; excludes: readonly string[] }
 }
 
 const SCENARIOS: SdkScenario[] = [
@@ -88,6 +90,10 @@ const SCENARIOS: SdkScenario[] = [
     configs: { live: persistentToolsLiveConfig, replay: persistentToolsReplayConfig },
     expectedFiles: { 'note.txt': 'target:\n\tnew\n' },
     expectedTools: { bash: ['command'], str_replace_editor: ['command', 'path'] },
+    policyContext: {
+      includes: ['the write and edit tools', 'terminal sessions'],
+      excludes: ['one-shot bash commands'],
+    },
   },
 ]
 
@@ -117,7 +123,7 @@ async function persistedLogs(sessionsRoot: string): Promise<PersistedLog[]> {
 
 interface LoggedRequestHeader {
   type?: string
-  data?: { header?: { tools?: Array<{ name: string; parameters: { required?: string[] } }> } }
+  data?: { header?: { system?: unknown; tools?: Array<{ name: string; parameters: { required?: string[] } }> } }
 }
 
 function assembledToolRequirements(log: PersistedLog): Record<string, string[]> {
@@ -129,6 +135,15 @@ function assembledToolRequirements(log: PersistedLog): Record<string, string[]>
   return Object.fromEntries(tools.map(tool => [tool.name, tool.parameters.required ?? []]))
 }
 
+function assembledSystem(log: PersistedLog): string {
+  const event = log.content.trimEnd().split('\n')
+    .map(line => JSON.parse(line) as LoggedRequestHeader)
+    .find(candidate => candidate.type === 'request/header')
+  const system = event?.data?.header?.system
+  if (typeof system !== 'string') throw new Error('session log has no request/header system')
+  return system
+}
+
 function contextOf(logs: readonly { content: string; header: Record<string, unknown> }[], cwd: string): NormalizeContext {
   return {
     sessionIds: logs.flatMap(log => typeof log.header.id === 'string' ? [log.header.id] : []),
@@ -359,6 +374,13 @@ describe('TypeScript SDK snapshots over the jsonrpc runtime', () => {
         if (parent === undefined) throw new Error(`${scenario.name} has no parent session log`)
         expect(assembledToolRequirements(parent)).toEqual(scenario.expectedTools)
       }
+      if (scenario.policyContext !== undefined) {
+        const parent = ordered[0]
+        if (parent === undefined) throw new Error(`${scenario.name} has no parent session log`)
+        const system = assembledSystem(parent)
+        for (const clause of scenario.policyContext.includes) expect(system).toContain(clause)
+        for (const clause of scenario.policyContext.excludes) expect(system).not.toContain(clause)
+      }
       if (scenario.children > 0) {
         expect(notifications.some(n => n.method === 'subagent.started')).toBe(true)
         expect(notifications.some(n => n.method === 'subagent.finished')).toBe(true)

packages/bash/bash-sandbox/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/bash/bash-sandbox/README.md
-README.md: ca77a9c626784b29145712535d69de4afbd3a697
-README.zh.md: 4ecc8d533f7af373bdacd133d44a8def6d265868
+README.md: 8012dbcbd656130b3d7b6701723c880dcf3d9d71
+README.zh.md: de1077174ad802c0a18e5910792e61acd33c16ab

packages/bash/bash-sandbox/README.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Semantics:
 
 - **Denials are result facts.** A failed run whose stderr carries the selected backend's own denial dialect — the signatures the provider stamps on every wrap (EROFS text under bwrap, EACCES under Landlock, EPERM under Seatbelt) — is reported as `BashRunResult.sandbox.denied: true` (conservative classification, read from the collected stderr tail); every CONFINED run also carries the mode it executed under (`result.sandbox.mode`) and the provider's enforcement completeness (`result.sandbox.enforcement`: `full`, or `partial` on an older Landlock ABI).
 - **Runner failures are sandbox failures, never command failures.** Foreground execution throws `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`; a settled background process stamps `process.sandbox.runnerFailed`, which the bash producer renders through generic `task_output`. Spawn failures also pass through settlement, so confined background handles retain their mode/enforcement facts and release per-process accounting.
-- **Deployment fallback, per-call policy.** [`ctx.sandboxPolicy`](../../sandbox/sandbox-policy/) resolves a complete `SandboxExecutionPolicy` for every tool call: the calling session supplies its mode override and immutable cwd root, while deployment config supplies the fallbacks for agentless calls. An approved escalation changes only that policy's mode; its session root stays attached. `resolve()` carries the policy onto the spec, so overlapping commands from different projects run, classify, and report under their own roots and modes. The capability fact `ctx.bash.sandboxMode` reports the configured default so the tool layer advertises escalation only when this executor is mounted. The model learns of the sandbox only through result facts — the static bash tool description explains the denial marker; there is no current-mode statement in the system prompt.
+- **Deployment fallback, per-call policy.** [`ctx.sandboxPolicy`](../../sandbox/sandbox-policy/) resolves a complete `SandboxExecutionPolicy` for every tool call: the calling session supplies its mode override and immutable cwd root, while deployment config supplies the fallbacks for agentless calls. An approved escalation changes only that policy's mode; its session root stays attached. `resolve()` carries the policy onto the spec, so overlapping commands from different projects run, classify, and report under their own roots and modes. The capability fact `ctx.bash.sandboxMode` reports the configured default so the tool layer advertises escalation only when this executor is mounted. This backend also contributes the one-shot bash family to the owner-rendered current-policy section; the static bash tool description separately owns denial and escalation guidance.
 - **File effects only.** Network and process visibility are deliberately not restricted — the mode vocabulary does not pretend to cover what the backend does not enforce.
 - Process mechanics (spawn, process-group kills, output collection/spill, background handles, credential scrub) are inherited from [`dsh-bash-local`](../bash-local/); runner selection lives in [`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../sandbox/sandbox-local/).
 
@@ -44,15 +44,15 @@ The keyless consumer-integration proofs are `tests/bwrap.e2e.ts`, `tests/landloc
 
 #### What the model sees
 
-The generated [`dsh-tool-bash` schemas](../../../docs/tool-catalog.md#deepseek-aidsh-tool-bash) are the baseline. By advertising a confining `sandboxMode`, this backend augments `bash` with `sandbox_permissions` using enum `workspace-write` | `danger-full-access` and with `justification`. The backend adds no prompt prose, and the session's effective mode remains unstated.
+The generated [`dsh-tool-bash` schemas](../../../docs/tool-catalog.md#deepseek-aidsh-tool-bash) are the baseline. By advertising a confining `sandboxMode`, this backend augments `bash` with `sandbox_permissions` using enum `workspace-write` | `danger-full-access` and with `justification`. Its family contribution also makes one-shot bash commands appear in the owner-rendered `sandbox:policy` section.
 
 #### Token effect
 
-Small fixed schema increment on requests where `bash` is visible; mode switches add no context tokens.
+Small fixed schema increment on requests where `bash` is visible, plus the current-policy clause owned by `dsh-sandbox-policy`.
 
 #### KV Cache effect
 
-Prefix-stable while the executor advertises the same sandbox capabilities. Changing those capabilities alters the `bash` schema and may invalidate reuse from that definition; per-session mode switches do not.
+Prefix-stable while the executor and standing policy are unchanged. Changing the policy updates the owner-rendered section; changing executor capabilities also alters the `bash` schema.
 
 ### Bash tool result, indirectly
 

packages/bash/bash-sandbox/README.zh.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 
 - **拒绝是结果事实。** 如果一次失败运行的 stderr 包含所选后端自身的拒绝方言，即提供方在每次包装时加上的特征（bwrap 下的 EROFS 文本、Landlock 下的 EACCES、Seatbelt 下的 EPERM），则结果报告 `BashRunResult.sandbox.denied: true`（从已收集的 stderr 尾部进行保守分类）。每次受限制运行还会携带执行时模式（`result.sandbox.mode`）与提供方强制执行完整性（`result.sandbox.enforcement`：`full`，或在较旧 Landlock ABI 上为 `partial`）。
 - **Runner 失败是沙箱失败，绝不是命令失败。** 前台执行会抛出 `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`；已结算的后台进程会标记 `process.sandbox.runnerFailed`，Bash 结果生成方通过通用 `task_output` 渲染它。spawn 失败也会经过结算，因此受限制的后台句柄会保留自身的模式／强制执行事实，并释放每进程计数。
-- **部署回退，每次调用策略。** [`ctx.sandboxPolicy`](../../sandbox/sandbox-policy/) 为每次工具调用解析完整的 `SandboxExecutionPolicy`：调用会话提供自身的模式覆盖与不可变 cwd 根目录，部署配置则为无 agent（智能体）调用提供回退。已批准的升权只更改该策略的模式，会话根目录仍然附着其上。`resolve()` 把策略带入 spec，因此来自不同项目的重叠命令会在各自的根目录与模式下运行、分类和报告。能力事实 `ctx.bash.sandboxMode` 报告已配置的默认值，因此工具层只在装载该执行器时才公布升权。模型只能通过结果事实了解沙箱：静态 bash 工具描述会解释拒绝标记，系统提示词中不会声明当前模式。
+- **部署回退，每次调用策略。** [`ctx.sandboxPolicy`](../../sandbox/sandbox-policy/) 为每次工具调用解析完整的 `SandboxExecutionPolicy`：调用会话提供自身的模式覆盖与不可变 cwd 根目录，部署配置则为无 agent（智能体）调用提供回退。已批准的升权只更改该策略的模式，会话根目录仍然附着其上。`resolve()` 把策略带入 spec，因此来自不同项目的重叠命令会在各自的根目录与模式下运行、分类和报告。能力事实 `ctx.bash.sandboxMode` 报告已配置的默认值，因此工具层只在装载该执行器时才公布升权。该后端还会向归属方渲染的当前策略段落贡献一次性 bash 家族；静态 bash 工具描述则单独负责拒绝与升级引导。
 - **只限制文件影响。** 设计上不限制网络与进程可见性：模式词汇不会声称覆盖后端未强制执行的范围。
 - 进程机制（spawn、进程组终止、输出收集／spill、后台句柄、凭证清理）继承自 [`dsh-bash-local`](../bash-local/)；runner 选择位于 [`dsh-sandbox-local`](../../sandbox/sandbox-local/)。
 
@@ -44,15 +44,15 @@
 
 #### 模型看到的内容
 
-基线是生成的 [`dsh-tool-bash` schema](../../../docs/tool-catalog.md#deepseek-aidsh-tool-bash)。通过公布表明启用隔离的 `sandboxMode` 能力，此后端会为 `bash` 增加 `sandbox_permissions`，其 enum 为 `workspace-write` | `danger-full-access`，并增加 `justification`。后端不添加提示词文本，会话的有效模式仍不会声明。
+基线是生成的 [`dsh-tool-bash` schema](../../../docs/tool-catalog.md#deepseek-aidsh-tool-bash)。通过公布表明启用隔离的 `sandboxMode` 能力，此后端会为 `bash` 增加 `sandbox_permissions`，其 enum 为 `workspace-write` | `danger-full-access`，并增加 `justification`。其家族贡献还会让一次性 bash 命令出现在归属方渲染的 `sandbox:policy` 段落中。
 
 #### Token 影响
 
-在 `bash` 可见的请求上，schema 固定增加少量内容；模式切换不增加上下文 token。
+在 `bash` 可见的请求上，schema 固定增加少量内容，另有一条由 `dsh-sandbox-policy` 负责的当前策略子句。
 
 #### KV Cache 影响
 
-执行器持续公布相同沙箱能力时，前缀保持稳定。更改这些能力会改变 `bash` schema，可能使从该定义起的复用失效；每会话模式切换不会导致失效。
+执行器与常驻策略不变时，前缀保持稳定。更改策略会更新归属方渲染的段落；更改执行器能力也会改变 `bash` schema。
 
 ### 间接的 Bash 工具结果
 

packages/bash/bash-sandbox/src/index.ts

@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ export type Config = LocalConfig
  * Registers as `ctx.bash` in place of the local executor and requires a
  * `ctx.sandbox` provider plus `ctx.sandboxPolicy`; the tool layer is
  * unchanged. Tool calls pass the calling session's resolved policy; direct
- * calls fall back to deployment policy. The prompt does not state the standing
- * mode; `result.sandbox` reports the mode and enforcement actually used.
+ * calls fall back to deployment policy. Its family contribution lets the
+ * policy owner state which one-shot bash effects the standing mode governs;
+ * `result.sandbox` reports the mode and enforcement actually used.
  */
 export class SandboxBashExecutor extends LocalBashExecutor {
   static override inject = ['subprocess', 'sandbox', 'sandboxPolicy']
@@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ export class SandboxBashExecutor extends LocalBashExecutor {
     // The default mode is the capability fact used for schema advertisement;
     // actual tool executions carry their resolved per-call policy.
     this.mode = ctx.sandboxPolicy.defaultMode
+    ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('bash')
   }
 
   /** The configured default mode — the capability fact the tool layer reads. */

packages/cordis/tool-cordis/src/api-catalog.ts

@@ -512,6 +512,10 @@ export const SERVICE_API: readonly ServiceApiEntry[] = [
     key: 'sandboxPolicy',
     summary: 'The sandbox-policy service (`ctx.sandboxPolicy`).',
     methods: [
+      {
+        signature: 'registerEnforcedFamily(family: \'filesystem\' | \'bash\' | \'terminal\'): () => void',
+        jsDoc: '/**\n * Register one runtime contribution that enforces the shared file policy for\n * a model-facing operation family. Equal families remain independently\n * disposable; registration and removal invalidate assembled prompt caches\n * when a system-prompt service is active.\n * @param family - operation family whose file effects this contribution enforces.\n * @returns the exact Cordis effect disposer for this contribution.\n */',
+      },
       {
         signature: 'resolve(request: SandboxPolicyRequest = {}): SandboxExecutionPolicy',
         jsDoc: '/**\n * Resolve the complete policy for one capability call. An approved explicit\n * mode outranks the session\'s last `sandbox/mode` event, which outranks the\n * deployment default. A session cwd is its workspace-write boundary; the\n * configured root is the fallback for agentless calls and sessions without a\n * cwd.\n * @param request - optional session and approved mode override.\n * @returns the fully resolved per-call mode and absolute workspace root.\n */',

packages/fs/fs-sandbox/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/fs/fs-sandbox/README.md
-README.md: 790444a4184b9bcccd3a0798cf0c09cb6f1b166e
-README.zh.md: d54bdcbe65673b6892ebd1d539dd066f66d68cb6
+README.md: a376f2c23dca9f0895525fa274a1ae0545823f63
+README.zh.md: 4fa2deecb7d10124da8b7920997196b816457fcc

packages/fs/fs-sandbox/README.md

@@ -22,11 +22,19 @@ A denial is a structured `FsError` (`FS_SANDBOX_DENIED`, carrying the effective
 
 ## Model Experience
 
-Indirectly, through `dsh-tool-fs`, which renders this backend's `FS_SANDBOX_DENIED` refusals as the `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` marker plus the same-turn escalation hint.
+### Filesystem policy and refusals
+
+#### What the model sees
+
+This backend contributes the write/edit family to the owner-rendered `sandbox:policy` section. Indirectly, `dsh-tool-fs` renders its `FS_SANDBOX_DENIED` refusals as the `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` marker plus the same-turn escalation hint.
+
+#### Token effect
+
+The current-policy clause adds a small fixed prefix while this backend is mounted; a denial adds the bounded marker and escalation hint to conversation history.
 
 #### KV Cache effect
 
-No direct invalidation; the named consumer owns any request-prefix changes.
+A standing-policy or family-composition change updates the owner-rendered request prefix; operation results remain append-only.
 
 ## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
 

packages/fs/fs-sandbox/README.zh.md

@@ -22,11 +22,19 @@
 
 ## 模型体验
 
-通过 `dsh-tool-fs` 间接产生影响；该消费方把本后端的 `FS_SANDBOX_DENIED` 拒绝渲染为 `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` 标记和同轮次升级提示。
+### 文件系统策略与拒绝
+
+#### 模型看到的内容
+
+该后端会向归属方渲染的 `sandbox:policy` 段落贡献 write/edit 家族。作为间接影响，`dsh-tool-fs` 会把本后端的 `FS_SANDBOX_DENIED` 拒绝渲染为 `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` 标记和同轮次升级提示。
+
+#### Token 影响
+
+该后端挂载期间，当前策略条款会在前缀中增加少量固定内容；拒绝则会把有界标记和升级提示追加到对话历史。
 
 #### KV Cache 影响
 
-不会直接使缓存失效；上述消费方负责请求前缀的任何变化。
+常驻策略或家族组合发生变化时，归属方渲染的请求前缀会更新；操作结果保持仅追加。
 
 ## 已知限制与暂缓事项
 

packages/fs/fs-sandbox/src/index.ts

@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ export class SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem {
   constructor(ctx: Context, config: Config) {
     super(ctx, config)
     this.defaultMode = ctx.sandboxPolicy.defaultMode
+    ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('filesystem')
   }
 
   /** The deployment default mode — the capability fact the tool layer reads to advertise escalation. */

packages/pty/pty-local/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/pty/pty-local/README.md
-README.md: de17c1e56108726daf4009492012caaa79155eca
-README.zh.md: 95d8350716da685381333187d534d696873db605
+README.md: 5ad2c94f7c3e8e8bda5b7b432b3d0529a30f2b4e
+README.zh.md: 0ab3f4a485315e6037d862f423f9e25b6200a63e

packages/pty/pty-local/README.md

@@ -14,19 +14,19 @@ Send cancellation resolves the current foreground process group and delivers a r
 
 ## Model Experience
 
-### Indirect consumer
+### Current file policy and indirect consumer
 
 #### What the model sees
 
-Nothing directly. Through `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pty`, the model may receive bounded MOTD, send deltas, scrollback pages, readiness reasons, and cleanup errors.
+This backend contributes the terminal family to the owner-rendered `sandbox:policy` section. Through `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pty` or another PTY consumer, the model may also receive bounded MOTD, send deltas, scrollback pages, readiness reasons, and cleanup errors.
 
 #### Token effect
 
-None until a consumer returns bounded backend output. Retained PTY scrollback is not placed in model history by this package.
+The current-policy clause is present while this backend is mounted. Retained PTY scrollback is not placed in model history until a consumer returns bounded output.
 
 #### KV Cache effect
 
-No direct invalidation; the consumer owns prompts, schemas, and appended results.
+A standing-policy or terminal-family change updates the owner-rendered request prefix; consumer results remain append-only.
 
 ## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
 

packages/pty/pty-local/README.zh.md

@@ -14,19 +14,19 @@ Linux 的就绪检测结合以下机制：由前台状态验证的私有 bash
 
 ## 模型体验
 
-### 间接消费方
+### 当前文件策略与间接消费方
 
 #### 模型看到的内容
 
-没有直接可见内容。模型通过 `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pty` 可能收到有界的 MOTD、发送增量、scrollback 页、就绪原因和清理错误。
+该后端会向归属方渲染的 `sandbox:policy` 段落贡献终端家族。模型通过 `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-pty` 或其他 PTY 消费方还可能收到有界的 MOTD、发送增量、scrollback 页、就绪原因和清理错误。
 
 #### Token 影响
 
-消费方返回有界的后端输出前没有影响。此包（package）不会把保留的 PTY scrollback 放入模型历史。
+装载该后端期间，当前策略子句会一直存在。消费方返回有界输出前，保留的 PTY scrollback 不会进入模型历史。
 
 #### KV Cache 影响
 
-不会直接使 KV Cache 失效；提示词、schema 与追加结果由消费方负责。
+常驻策略或终端家族发生变化时，归属方渲染的请求前缀会更新；消费方结果保持仅追加。
 
 ## 已知限制与暂缓事项
 

packages/pty/pty-local/src/index.ts

@@ -129,5 +129,6 @@ export class LocalPtyBackend implements PtyBackend {
 export function apply(ctx: Context, config: Config): void {
   validateConfig(config)
   const inspector = createProcessInspector()
+  ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('terminal')
   ctx.pty.registerBackend(new LocalPtyBackend(ctx, config, inspector))
 }

packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/README.md
-README.md: 3258492ba80102ec96d37baa5e4989b1c396cf15
-README.zh.md: 4bb7e3b1321620413b81414d60f7b2d02df588c6
+README.md: 45349f7b0bbb6e035dd2aa6f4695735124dd9f2d
+README.zh.md: 9393d2a22aa3df310287ccb9c5e486880453a838

packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/README.md

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
 
 English | [中文](README.zh.md)
 
-The single owner of sandbox-policy resolution: the deployment's default [`SandboxMode`](../sandbox/README.md) and fallback root, plus each session's durable mode override and immutable workspace root. Every enforcing capability family receives one resolved mode-and-root policy per call, and the model receives that same effective policy before each request.
+The single owner of sandbox-policy resolution: the deployment's default [`SandboxMode`](../sandbox/README.md) and fallback root, plus each session's durable mode override and immutable workspace root. Every enforcing family receives one resolved mode-and-root policy per call and registers whether the current runtime fences filesystem tools, one-shot bash commands, or terminal sessions; the model receives only those current facts before each request.
 
 ## Why a shared home
 
-Two families enforce the same mode vocabulary: the sandboxed bash executor (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`) and the sandboxed filesystem provider (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox`). If each resolved its own `mode` + `workspaceRoot`, the two could drift into a split world — bash confined to one root while fs fences another, exactly what [the sandbox RFC](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md) warns against. Both tool layers resolve policy through `ctx.sandboxPolicy`, and both enforcing backends consume that complete per-call result. The [cross-family fs sandbox RFC](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md) records the shared-policy decision.
+Filesystem tools, one-shot bash commands, and terminal sessions may enforce the same mode vocabulary in different combinations. If each resolved its own `mode` + `workspaceRoot`, they could drift into a split world, exactly what [the sandbox Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md) warns against. Each enforcing backend consumes the complete owner-resolved policy and contributes its model-facing family; the current section therefore does not claim that an unfenced family shares another family's restrictions. The [cross-family fs sandbox Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md) records the shared-policy decision.
 
 ## Config
 
@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ Two families enforce the same mode vocabulary: the sandboxed bash executor (`@de
 
 - `ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve({ session?, mode? })` — resolves one complete per-call policy. An explicit approved mode outranks the session's last `sandbox/mode` event, which outranks `defaultMode`; the session's immutable `cwd` is canonicalized with filesystem semantics before becoming `workspaceRoot`, otherwise the configured fallback applies. Canonicalization precedes lexical normalization so `symlink/..` agrees with process working-directory resolution.
 - `ctx.sandboxPolicy.defaultMode` / `ctx.sandboxPolicy.workspaceRoot` — the deployment default and fallback root used by `resolve()`.
-- `sandbox:policy` — a request-time system-prompt section derived from `resolve({ session })`. It states the current file-effect mode, its consequences, and every canonical writable root under `workspace-write`; it does not claim host permissions, sandbox-backend readiness, or network/process restrictions.
+- `ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily(family)` — independently registers `filesystem`, `bash`, or `terminal` and returns the exact effect disposer. Equal families remain separate contributions; the section uses canonical family order and removes a family only after its final contribution leaves.
+- `sandbox:policy` — a request-time system-prompt section derived from `resolve({ session })` and the active family contributions. It is empty without an enforcing family and states only the mode, the affected model-facing operations, and the canonical session workspace under `workspace-write`.
 - `effectiveSandboxMode(events)` — the pure fold of a session's `sandbox/mode` events (the last switch wins, or `undefined`), used inside `resolve()`.
 - `setSandboxMode(session, mode)` — THE write path for a per-session override: appends exactly one `sandbox/mode` event. The switch IS its event; nothing mutates the mode out of band.
 - `SANDBOX_MODES` — every mode, for option advertisement and runtime validation.
@@ -34,29 +35,29 @@ A runtime switch is one log-only `sandbox/mode` event on the session it applies
 
 #### What the model sees
 
-One `sandbox:policy` system section on every agent request. The section states only DSH file-effect policy; tool schemas remain their owners' surfaces, approval policy remains `dsh-user-approval`'s section, and plan guidance remains `dsh-plan-mode`'s section.
+One `sandbox:policy` system section on each agent request when at least one enforcing family is registered. The examples below show all three families; absent families are omitted. Tool plugins retain operation and escalation guidance, approval policy remains `dsh-user-approval`'s section, and plan guidance remains `dsh-plan-mode`'s section.
 
 ##### Read-only
 
 ```markdown
-Current DSH file sandbox policy: read-only. Ordinary file writes, edits, and file-mutating shell effects are denied; required sinks such as `/dev/null` may remain writable. Host OS permissions and sandbox-backend availability may restrict operations further. This policy does not govern network or process access.
+Current DSH file policy: read-only. The write and edit tools, one-shot bash commands, and terminal sessions cannot modify files under this policy.
 ```
 
 ##### Workspace-write
 
 ```markdown
-Current DSH file sandbox policy: workspace-write. File writes, edits, and file-mutating shell effects are limited to these canonical writable roots: "<workspace root>", "<temporary root>". Host OS permissions and sandbox-backend availability may restrict operations further. This policy does not govern network or process access.
+Current DSH file policy: workspace-write. The write and edit tools, one-shot bash commands, and terminal sessions may modify files under the session workspace: "<workspace root>". Some platform temporary areas may also be writable.
 ```
 
 ##### Danger-full-access
 
 ```markdown
-Current DSH file sandbox policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict file operations. Host OS permissions and other policies still apply. This policy does not govern network or process access.
+Current DSH file policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict the write and edit tools, one-shot bash commands, or terminal sessions.
 ```
 
 #### Token effect
 
-One concise system section per request. `workspace-write` additionally lists the canonical session workspace root plus the canonical `/tmp` and platform temporary roots, deduplicated when they identify the same directory.
+One concise system section per request. `workspace-write` carries only the canonical session workspace path; platform-specific temporary paths are summarized without adding host-dependent bytes.
 
 #### KV Cache effect
 
@@ -66,3 +67,4 @@ The request prefix is byte-stable while the session mode and immutable workspace
 
 - **One primary workspace root per session** — policy resolves `SessionHeader.cwd`; extra writable roots are not part of `SandboxExecutionPolicy`.
 - **File-effect modes only** — `SandboxMode` governs file effects; network and process policy are outside its vocabulary, so no knob here restricts them.
+- **Temporary areas are deliberately summarized** — enforcing backends grant different platform temporary areas, which are selected after policy resolution and therefore cannot be enumerated truthfully in the standing section.

packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/README.zh.md

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
 
 [English](README.md) | 中文
 
-沙箱策略解析的唯一归属位置：部署默认 [`SandboxMode`](../sandbox/README.md) 与回退根目录，加上每个会话的持久模式覆盖和不可变工作区根目录。每个强制执行策略的能力家族在每次调用时都会收到一项解析完成的模式与根目录策略，模型也会在每次请求前收到同一项有效策略。
+沙箱策略解析的唯一归属位置：部署默认 [`SandboxMode`](../sandbox/README.md) 与回退根目录，加上每个会话的持久模式覆盖和不可变工作区根目录。每个强制执行家族在每次调用时都会收到一项解析完成的模式与根目录策略，并登记当前运行时对文件系统工具、一次性 bash 命令和终端会话中的哪些家族施加围栏；模型在每次请求前只会收到这些当前事实。
 
 ## 为何需要共享归属位置
 
-两个家族强制执行同一套模式词汇：沙箱化 bash 执行器（`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`）与沙箱化文件系统提供方（`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox`）。如果两者各自解析 `mode` + `workspaceRoot`，就可能漂移成分裂世界：bash 限制在一个根目录，fs 却隔离另一个根目录，正是[沙箱 RFC](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)所警告的情况。两个工具层都通过 `ctx.sandboxPolicy` 解析策略，两个强制执行后端也都消费完整的逐调用结果。[跨家族 fs 沙箱 RFC](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md)记录了共享策略决策。
+文件系统工具、一次性 bash 命令和终端会话可以用不同组合强制执行同一套模式词汇。如果各自解析 `mode` + `workspaceRoot`，就可能漂移成分裂世界，正是[沙箱 Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md)所警告的情况。每个强制执行后端都会消费归属方解析出的完整策略，并贡献其面向模型的家族；因此，当前段落不会声称不受围栏约束的家族也受另一家族的限制。[跨家族 fs 沙箱 Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md)记录了共享策略决策。
 
 ## 配置
 
@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@
 
 - `ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve({ session?, mode? })`：解析一项完整的逐调用策略。显式批准的模式优先于会话最后一条 `sandbox/mode` 事件，后者又优先于 `defaultMode`；会话不可变的 `cwd` 会先按文件系统语义规范化，再成为 `workspaceRoot`，否则使用配置的回退值。规范化先于词法归一化，因此 `symlink/..` 与进程工作目录解析保持一致。
 - `ctx.sandboxPolicy.defaultMode`／`ctx.sandboxPolicy.workspaceRoot`：`resolve()` 使用的部署默认值与回退根目录。
-- `sandbox:policy`：由 `resolve({ session })` 派生的请求时系统提示词段落。它说明当前文件操作模式及其后果，并列出 `workspace-write` 下所有规范化的可写根目录；不会声称主机权限、沙箱后端就绪状态或网络／进程限制。
+- `ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily(family)`：独立注册 `filesystem`、`bash` 或 `terminal`，并返回对应的精确 effect disposer。相同家族仍是彼此独立的贡献；该段落使用规范的家族顺序，并且只有最后一项贡献离开后才移除对应家族。
+- `sandbox:policy`：由 `resolve({ session })` 和当前家族贡献派生的请求时系统提示词段落。没有强制执行家族时为空，只说明模式、受影响的面向模型操作，以及 `workspace-write` 下规范化的会话工作区。
 - `effectiveSandboxMode(events)`：会话 `sandbox/mode` 事件的纯 fold（最后一次切换胜出，没有则为 `undefined`），在 `resolve()` 内使用。
 - `setSandboxMode(session, mode)`：逐会话覆盖的唯一写入路径：恰好追加一条 `sandbox/mode` 事件。切换本身就是事件；不会在带外修改模式。
 - `SANDBOX_MODES`：所有模式，用于选项展示与运行时验证。
@@ -34,29 +35,29 @@
 
 #### 模型看到的内容
 
-每次 agent 请求都有一个 `sandbox:policy` 系统段落。该段落只说明 DSH 文件操作策略；工具 schema 仍由各自归属方管理，批准策略仍由 `dsh-user-approval` 的段落管理，计划引导仍由 `dsh-plan-mode` 的段落管理。
+只要至少注册了一个强制执行家族，每次 agent 请求就会有一个 `sandbox:policy` 系统段落。以下示例展示全部三个家族；缺失的家族会被省略。工具插件继续负责操作与升级引导，批准策略仍由 `dsh-user-approval` 的段落管理，计划引导仍由 `dsh-plan-mode` 的段落管理。
 
 ##### 只读
 
 ```markdown
-Current DSH file sandbox policy: read-only. Ordinary file writes, edits, and file-mutating shell effects are denied; required sinks such as `/dev/null` may remain writable. Host OS permissions and sandbox-backend availability may restrict operations further. This policy does not govern network or process access.
+Current DSH file policy: read-only. The write and edit tools, one-shot bash commands, and terminal sessions cannot modify files under this policy.
 ```
 
 ##### 工作区写入
 
 ```markdown
-Current DSH file sandbox policy: workspace-write. File writes, edits, and file-mutating shell effects are limited to these canonical writable roots: "<workspace root>", "<temporary root>". Host OS permissions and sandbox-backend availability may restrict operations further. This policy does not govern network or process access.
+Current DSH file policy: workspace-write. The write and edit tools, one-shot bash commands, and terminal sessions may modify files under the session workspace: "<workspace root>". Some platform temporary areas may also be writable.
 ```
 
 ##### 完全访问
 
 ```markdown
-Current DSH file sandbox policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict file operations. Host OS permissions and other policies still apply. This policy does not govern network or process access.
+Current DSH file policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict the write and edit tools, one-shot bash commands, or terminal sessions.
 ```
 
 #### Token 影响
 
-每个请求增加一个简洁的系统段落。`workspace-write` 还会列出规范化的会话工作区根目录，以及规范化的 `/tmp` 与平台临时根目录；如果它们指向同一目录则去重。
+每个请求增加一个简洁的系统段落。`workspace-write` 只携带规范化的会话工作区路径；平台特定的临时路径会以摘要表述，不会加入依赖主机的字节。
 
 #### KV Cache 影响
 
@@ -66,3 +67,4 @@ Current DSH file sandbox policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does n
 
 - **每个会话只有一个主要工作区根目录**：策略解析 `SessionHeader.cwd`；额外可写根目录不属于 `SandboxExecutionPolicy`。
 - **仅限文件操作模式**：`SandboxMode` 管控文件操作；网络和进程策略不在其词汇中，因此这里没有限制它们的旋钮。
+- **有意概述临时区域**：强制执行后端会授予不同的平台临时区域，这些区域在策略解析后才会选定，因此无法在常驻段落中如实枚举。

packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/src/index.ts

@@ -7,12 +7,12 @@
  * `sandbox:policy` system section; request headers therefore reconstruct the
  * same mode and roots the enforcing consumers resolve.
  *
- * Both enforcing capability families read the SAME policy here: the sandboxed
- * bash executor (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`) and the sandboxed filesystem
- * provider (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-fs-sandbox`) consume the SAME resolved per-call
- * policy, so bash and fs can never confine to different roots — the split
- * world the sandbox RFC warns about. The service reads session state once at
- * the tool boundary; executors and providers remain session-free.
+ * Enforcing filesystem, one-shot bash, and terminal backends read the SAME
+ * resolved policy here and register their independently disposable model-facing
+ * families. The request section therefore describes only operations this
+ * runtime actually fences, while each backend retains its own enforcement
+ * dialect. The service reads session state once at each operation boundary;
+ * executors and providers remain session-free.
  *
  * @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy
  */
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import { resolve as resolvePath } from 'node:path'
 import { Context, Service } from 'cordis'
 import z from 'schemastery'
 import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent'
-import { canonicalPath, writableRoots, type SandboxExecutionPolicy, type SandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
+import { canonicalPath, type SandboxExecutionPolicy, type SandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
 import type { Session } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session'
 import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-system-prompt'
 import { effectiveSandboxMode } from './session-mode.ts'
@@ -33,15 +33,40 @@ function resolveWorkspaceRoot(path: string): string {
   return resolvePath(canonicalPath(path))
 }
 
-/** Render the current file-effect policy without claiming host or backend capabilities. */
-function renderPolicyContext(policy: SandboxExecutionPolicy): string {
+/** Model-facing operation family whose current file policy is enforced by a runtime contribution. */
+type FilePolicyFamily = 'filesystem' | 'bash' | 'terminal'
+
+/** Canonical model-facing order, independent of plugin load order. */
+const FILE_POLICY_FAMILIES: readonly FilePolicyFamily[] = ['filesystem', 'bash', 'terminal']
+
+const FAMILY_LABELS: Readonly<Record<FilePolicyFamily, string>> = {
+  filesystem: 'the write and edit tools',
+  bash: 'one-shot bash commands',
+  terminal: 'terminal sessions',
+}
+
+/** Join model-facing family names with stable English punctuation. */
+function familyList(families: readonly FilePolicyFamily[], conjunction: 'and' | 'or'): string {
+  const labels = families.map(family => FAMILY_LABELS[family])
+  if (labels.length === 1) return labels[0] as string
+  if (labels.length === 2) return `${labels[0]} ${conjunction} ${labels[1]}`
+  return `${labels.slice(0, -1).join(', ')}, ${conjunction} ${labels.at(-1)}`
+}
+
+/** Render only policy facts shared by every backend enforcing each registered family. */
+function renderPolicyContext(policy: SandboxExecutionPolicy, families: readonly FilePolicyFamily[]): string {
+  if (families.length === 0) return ''
   switch (policy.mode) {
-    case 'read-only':
-      return 'Current DSH file sandbox policy: read-only. Ordinary file writes, edits, and file-mutating shell effects are denied; required sinks such as `/dev/null` may remain writable. Host OS permissions and sandbox-backend availability may restrict operations further. This policy does not govern network or process access.'
-    case 'workspace-write':
-      return `Current DSH file sandbox policy: workspace-write. File writes, edits, and file-mutating shell effects are limited to these canonical writable roots: ${writableRoots(policy).map(root => JSON.stringify(root)).join(', ')}. Host OS permissions and sandbox-backend availability may restrict operations further. This policy does not govern network or process access.`
+    case 'read-only': {
+      const subjects = familyList(families, 'and')
+      return `Current DSH file policy: read-only. ${subjects[0]?.toUpperCase()}${subjects.slice(1)} cannot modify files under this policy.`
+    }
+    case 'workspace-write': {
+      const subjects = familyList(families, 'and')
+      return `Current DSH file policy: workspace-write. ${subjects[0]?.toUpperCase()}${subjects.slice(1)} may modify files under the session workspace: ${JSON.stringify(policy.workspaceRoot)}. Some platform temporary areas may also be writable.`
+    }
     case 'danger-full-access':
-      return 'Current DSH file sandbox policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict file operations. Host OS permissions and other policies still apply. This policy does not govern network or process access.'
+      return `Current DSH file policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict ${familyList(families, 'or')}.`
     /* v8 ignore next 4 -- SandboxMode is a typed same-process closed union; this branch is only the static exhaustiveness guard. */
     default: {
       const mode: never = policy.mode
@@ -83,9 +108,10 @@ export interface SandboxPolicyRequest {
 
 /**
  * The sandbox-policy service (`ctx.sandboxPolicy`). Owns the deployment
- * default mode, fallback workspace root, and current request-time policy
- * section. Tool layers call {@link resolve} for each execution so a session's
- * mode log and immutable cwd travel together to every enforcing capability.
+ * default mode, fallback workspace root, enforcing-family contributions, and
+ * current request-time policy section. Tool layers call {@link resolve} for
+ * each execution so a session's mode log and immutable cwd travel together to
+ * every enforcing capability.
  */
 export class SandboxPolicyService extends Service {
   // Inline schema call: the config catalog walks `static Config` statically.
@@ -100,6 +126,8 @@ export class SandboxPolicyService extends Service {
   readonly defaultMode: SandboxMode
   /** The absolute `workspace-write` fallback root for calls without a session cwd. */
   readonly workspaceRoot: string
+  /** Independently disposable enforcement-family contributions. */
+  private readonly enforcedFamilies = new Map<FilePolicyFamily, Set<symbol>>()
 
   constructor(ctx: Context, config: Config) {
     super(ctx, 'sandboxPolicy')
@@ -115,12 +143,38 @@ export class SandboxPolicyService extends Service {
         order: 110,
         text: (context) => {
           const session = context.agent?.session
-          return session === undefined ? '' : renderPolicyContext(this.resolve({ session }))
+          return session === undefined ? '' : renderPolicyContext(this.resolve({ session }), this.activeFamilies())
         },
       })
     })
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Register one runtime contribution that enforces the shared file policy for
+   * a model-facing operation family. Equal families remain independently
+   * disposable; registration and removal invalidate assembled prompt caches
+   * when a system-prompt service is active.
+   * @param family - operation family whose file effects this contribution enforces.
+   * @returns the exact Cordis effect disposer for this contribution.
+   */
+  registerEnforcedFamily(family: 'filesystem' | 'bash' | 'terminal'): () => void {
+    const token = Symbol(family)
+    const dispose = this.ctx.effect(() => {
+      const contributions = this.enforcedFamilies.get(family) ?? new Set<symbol>()
+      contributions.add(token)
+      this.enforcedFamilies.set(family, contributions)
+      this.emitPromptChange()
+      return () => {
+        contributions.delete(token)
+        if (contributions.size === 0 && this.enforcedFamilies.get(family) === contributions) {
+          this.enforcedFamilies.delete(family)
+        }
+        this.emitPromptChange()
+      }
+    }, 'sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily()')
+    return () => void dispose()
+  }
+
   /**
    * Resolve the complete policy for one capability call. An approved explicit
    * mode outranks the session's last `sandbox/mode` event, which outranks the
@@ -146,6 +200,16 @@ export class SandboxPolicyService extends Service {
   overrideOf(session: Session): SandboxMode | undefined {
     return effectiveSandboxMode(session.events)
   }
+
+  /** Active families in canonical model-facing order. */
+  private activeFamilies(): FilePolicyFamily[] {
+    return FILE_POLICY_FAMILIES.filter(family => (this.enforcedFamilies.get(family)?.size ?? 0) > 0)
+  }
+
+  /** Notify prompt consumers only after their registry exists. */
+  private emitPromptChange(): void {
+    if (this.ctx.get('systemPrompt') !== undefined) this.ctx.emit('system-prompt/change')
+  }
 }
 
 export default SandboxPolicyService

packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/src/session-mode.ts

@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@
  * `effective = fold(events) ?? the deployment default`, so an override
  * survives restart by replay, two sessions can never see each other's state,
  * and there is no external config store. The event is log-only (the
- * `approval/*` precedent): the model learns the mode from the boundary
- * markers in the enforcing tools, never from the event itself. EXECUTION
- * honors the fold through `ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve()` — it stamps the mode
- * together with the calling session's workspace root onto each capability
- * call, weakest-precedence beneath an escalation grant.
+ * `approval/*` precedent): the policy owner projects the fold into each model
+ * request, while enforcing tools report operation-specific boundary markers.
+ * EXECUTION honors the same fold through `ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve()` — it
+ * stamps the mode together with the calling session's workspace root onto each
+ * capability call, weakest-precedence beneath an escalation grant.
  *
  * The override is policy state shared by every enforcing family (bash and
  * filesystem alike), so it lives here in the policy package rather than in any

packages/sandbox/sandbox-policy/tests/policy.spec.ts

@@ -10,10 +10,9 @@ import { join, resolve, sep } from 'node:path'
 import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
 import { Context } from 'cordis'
 import type { Agent } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent'
-import { canonicalPath, writableRoots } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
 import { Session, SessionId } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session'
 import SandboxPolicyService, { SANDBOX_MODES, effectiveSandboxMode, setSandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy'
-import SystemPrompt from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-system-prompt'
+import SystemPrompt, { renderPrompt } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-system-prompt'
 
 async function mounted(config: { mode?: 'read-only' | 'workspace-write' | 'danger-full-access'; workspaceRoot?: string } = {}) {
   const ctx = new Context()
@@ -130,6 +129,7 @@ describe('SandboxPolicyService', () => {
     const ctx = new Context()
     await ctx.plugin(SystemPrompt)
     const fiber = await ctx.plugin(SandboxPolicyService, {})
+    ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('filesystem')
     expect(ctx.sandboxPolicy).toBeDefined()
     expect(await policySection(ctx, session('sess-hmr'))).toContain('read-only')
     await fiber.dispose()
@@ -146,38 +146,95 @@ describe('sandbox:policy request context', () => {
     return ctx
   }
 
-  it('states the fresh read-only consequences before a tool attempt', async () => {
+  it('omits policy prose when no enforcing family is registered', async () => {
     const ctx = await promptMounted()
-    const text = await policySection(ctx, session('sess-read-only', '/projects/read-only'))
-    expect(text).toBe('Current DSH file sandbox policy: read-only. Ordinary file writes, edits, and file-mutating shell effects are denied; required sinks such as `/dev/null` may remain writable. Host OS permissions and sandbox-backend availability may restrict operations further. This policy does not govern network or process access.')
+    expect(await policySection(ctx, session('sess-no-family'))).toBe('')
   })
 
-  it('states canonical workspace and temporary roots under workspace-write', async () => {
+  it.each([
+    [['filesystem'], 'Current DSH file policy: read-only. The write and edit tools cannot modify files under this policy.'],
+    [['bash'], 'Current DSH file policy: read-only. One-shot bash commands cannot modify files under this policy.'],
+    [['terminal'], 'Current DSH file policy: read-only. Terminal sessions cannot modify files under this policy.'],
+    [['filesystem', 'bash'], 'Current DSH file policy: read-only. The write and edit tools and one-shot bash commands cannot modify files under this policy.'],
+    [['filesystem', 'terminal'], 'Current DSH file policy: read-only. The write and edit tools and terminal sessions cannot modify files under this policy.'],
+    [['bash', 'terminal'], 'Current DSH file policy: read-only. One-shot bash commands and terminal sessions cannot modify files under this policy.'],
+    [['filesystem', 'bash', 'terminal'], 'Current DSH file policy: read-only. The write and edit tools, one-shot bash commands, and terminal sessions cannot modify files under this policy.'],
+  ] as const)('states read-only consequences for %j', async (families, expected) => {
+    const ctx = await promptMounted()
+    for (const family of [...families].reverse()) ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily(family)
+    expect(await policySection(ctx, session(`sess-read-only-${families.join('-')}`))).toBe(expected)
+  })
+
+  it('states the portable workspace guarantee without enumerating host temp paths', async () => {
     const ctx = await promptMounted({ mode: 'workspace-write', workspaceRoot: '/fallback' })
+    ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('filesystem')
+    ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('bash')
+    ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('terminal')
     const active = session('sess-workspace-write', '/projects/../projects/current')
-    const policy = ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve({ session: active })
-    const roots = writableRoots(policy)
-    const text = await policySection(ctx, active)
-    expect(text).toBe(`Current DSH file sandbox policy: workspace-write. File writes, edits, and file-mutating shell effects are limited to these canonical writable roots: ${roots.map(root => JSON.stringify(root)).join(', ')}. Host OS permissions and sandbox-backend availability may restrict operations further. This policy does not govern network or process access.`)
-    expect(roots[0]).toBe(resolve('/projects/current'))
-    expect(roots).toContain(canonicalPath('/tmp'))
+    expect(await policySection(ctx, active)).toBe('Current DSH file policy: workspace-write. The write and edit tools, one-shot bash commands, and terminal sessions may modify files under the session workspace: "/projects/current". Some platform temporary areas may also be writable.')
   })
 
-  it('states that danger-full-access adds no DSH file restriction without claiming wider authority', async () => {
+  it('states the exact families bypassed by danger-full-access', async () => {
     const ctx = await promptMounted({ mode: 'danger-full-access' })
-    const text = await policySection(ctx, session('sess-danger', '/projects/current'))
-    expect(text).toBe('Current DSH file sandbox policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict file operations. Host OS permissions and other policies still apply. This policy does not govern network or process access.')
+    ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('filesystem')
+    ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('terminal')
+    expect(await policySection(ctx, session('sess-danger', '/projects/current'))).toBe('Current DSH file policy: danger-full-access. The DSH file sandbox does not restrict the write and edit tools or terminal sessions.')
+  })
+
+  it('renders family contributions independently across mount and repeated disposal', async () => {
+    const ctx = await promptMounted()
+    const active = session('sess-family-lifecycle')
+    const filesystemFiber = await ctx.plugin(Object.assign((inner: Context) => {
+      inner.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('filesystem')
+    }, { inject: ['sandboxPolicy'] }))
+    expect(await policySection(ctx, active)).toContain('The write and edit tools cannot modify files')
+
+    let disposeBashFirst!: () => void
+    const bashFirstFiber = await ctx.plugin(Object.assign((inner: Context) => {
+      disposeBashFirst = inner.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('bash')
+    }, { inject: ['sandboxPolicy'] }))
+    const bashSecondFiber = await ctx.plugin(Object.assign((inner: Context) => {
+      inner.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('bash')
+    }, { inject: ['sandboxPolicy'] }))
+    expect(await policySection(ctx, active)).toContain('The write and edit tools and one-shot bash commands')
+    disposeBashFirst()
+    disposeBashFirst()
+    expect(await policySection(ctx, active)).toContain('The write and edit tools and one-shot bash commands')
+    await bashSecondFiber.dispose()
+    expect(await policySection(ctx, active)).toContain('The write and edit tools cannot modify files')
+    await bashFirstFiber.dispose()
+    await filesystemFiber.dispose()
+    expect(await policySection(ctx, active)).toBe('')
+  })
+
+  it('keeps the complete rendered prompt byte-stable across TMPDIR changes', async () => {
+    const ctx = await promptMounted({ mode: 'workspace-write' })
+    ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('filesystem')
+    const active = session('sess-tmpdir-stability', '/projects/current')
+    const previous = process.env.TMPDIR
+    try {
+      process.env.TMPDIR = '/tmp/first-host-temp'
+      const first = renderPrompt(await ctx.systemPrompt.assemble({ agent: agentFor(active) }))
+      process.env.TMPDIR = '/tmp/second-host-temp'
+      const second = renderPrompt(await ctx.systemPrompt.assemble({ agent: agentFor(active) }))
+      expect(second).toBe(first)
+      expect(second).not.toContain('host-temp')
+    } finally {
+      if (previous === undefined) delete process.env.TMPDIR
+      else process.env.TMPDIR = previous
+    }
   })
 
   it('reflects the latest durable switch on the next assembly and stays byte-stable otherwise', async () => {
     const ctx = await promptMounted()
+    ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('filesystem')
     const active = session('sess-switch', '/projects/current')
     const first = await policySection(ctx, active)
     expect(await policySection(ctx, active)).toBe(first)
 
     setSandboxMode(active, 'danger-full-access')
     const danger = await policySection(ctx, active)
-    expect(danger).toContain('does not restrict file operations')
+    expect(danger).toContain('does not restrict the write and edit tools')
     expect(await policySection(ctx, active)).toBe(danger)
 
     setSandboxMode(active, 'workspace-write')
@@ -189,6 +246,7 @@ describe('sandbox:policy request context', () => {
     setSandboxMode(active, 'workspace-write')
     const resumed = new Session(active.id, active.events, active.header)
     const ctx = await promptMounted({ mode: 'read-only' })
+    ctx.sandboxPolicy.registerEnforcedFamily('filesystem')
 
     expect(await policySection(ctx, resumed)).toContain('workspace-write')
     expect((await ctx.systemPrompt.assemble()).sections.find(section => section.name === 'sandbox:policy')?.text).toBe('')

scripts/verify-package-readme-model-experience.ts

@@ -76,7 +76,6 @@ const SENTENCE_MODEL_EXPERIENCE: Readonly<Record<string, SentenceContract>> = {
   'packages/examples/agent-spine-demo': { kind: 'indirect', reason: 'The bundle only mounts model-facing child plugins.' },
   'packages/fs/fs': { kind: 'indirect', reason: 'The service interface delegates model rendering to dsh-tool-fs.' },
   'packages/fs/fs-local': { kind: 'indirect', reason: 'The provider backend delegates model rendering to dsh-tool-fs.' },
-  'packages/fs/fs-sandbox': { kind: 'indirect', reason: 'The provider backend delegates model rendering to dsh-tool-fs.' },
   'packages/hooks/hook-protocol': { kind: 'indirect', reason: 'Only the hook bridge plugins render decoded hook output to a model.' },
   'packages/host/apiproxy': { kind: 'none', reason: 'The wire contract and fetch carriers move already-composed messages and register no model surface.' },
   'packages/host/directory-picker': { kind: 'none', reason: 'The GUI-host picking seam registers no model surface.' },

tsconfig.host.json

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
     "apps/web/tests/queue-actions.e2e.ts",
     "apps/web/tests/skill-invocation-policy.e2e.ts",
     "apps/web/tests/permission-policy-context.e2e.ts",
+    "apps/web/tests/sandbox-policy-wording.experiment.e2e.ts",
     "apps/cli/tests/**/*.ts",
     "examples/*/src/**/*.ts",
     "examples/*/start.ts",