|
@@ -1,96 +1,52 @@
|
|
|
/**
|
|
/**
|
|
|
- * The model-facing bash tools: `bash`, `bash_output`, `bash_kill`. Pure
|
|
|
|
|
- * schema + text shaping — every process concern lives behind the `ctx.bash`
|
|
|
|
|
- * executor seam (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash`), so sandbox/permission/remote
|
|
|
|
|
- * executor implementations swap in without touching what the model sees.
|
|
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
|
|
- * Background notifications: when a background task completes, a short notice
|
|
|
|
|
- * is injected into the owning agent's session (`agent.inject()` — the
|
|
|
|
|
- * documented context seam). Injection is durable context for the NEXT model
|
|
|
|
|
- * request, not a wake-up: an idle agent stays idle until something sends a
|
|
|
|
|
- * message, which is why the tool descriptions tell the model to poll with
|
|
|
|
|
- * `bash_output`.
|
|
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
|
|
- * Task ownership: a background task's OWNER is an opaque token — the owning
|
|
|
|
|
- * agent's `session.header.id` — passed to the executor at spawn
|
|
|
|
|
- * (`resolve({ …, owner })`) and stored ON THE TASK inside the executor
|
|
|
|
|
- * (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash`'s `ownerOf(id)` seam), NOT in a plugin-local map.
|
|
|
|
|
- * `bash_output`/`bash_kill` compare `ctx.bash.ownerOf(id)` to the caller's token
|
|
|
|
|
- * and reject a task owned by a DIFFERENT session (`owner !== undefined && owner
|
|
|
|
|
- * !== caller`); an unowned task (no token — started by a non-agent caller) is
|
|
|
|
|
- * open to anyone. Task ids are global and predictable (`bash-1`, …); under
|
|
|
|
|
- * multi-session ACP (RFC 011) this token check is the fence that stops one
|
|
|
|
|
- * session's agent from reading or killing another session's background task.
|
|
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
|
|
- * Storing the token on the task in the EXECUTOR (disposed with the `dsh-bash`
|
|
|
|
|
- * fiber), rather than in this plugin, is what makes ownership survive a
|
|
|
|
|
- * `tool-bash` HMR reload — a reload that reset a plugin-local map would orphan
|
|
|
|
|
- * a task spawned before it. (The `onTaskDone` listener is still effect-scoped
|
|
|
|
|
- * to this plugin's `apply`, so a
|
|
|
|
|
- * completion landing during the reload gap still drops its one notice — the
|
|
|
|
|
- * pre-existing reload-gap drop — but the ownership fence itself is HMR-proof.)
|
|
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
|
|
- * Commands run with the executor's full authority unless a sandboxing
|
|
|
|
|
- * executor (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox`) confines them; per-call
|
|
|
|
|
- * allow/deny/ask policy is the `tools/pre-execute` waterfall — see
|
|
|
|
|
- * docs/architecture.md § Extension And Composition. Under a sandboxing
|
|
|
|
|
- * executor this plugin also advertises the ESCALATION surface
|
|
|
|
|
- * (`sandbox_permissions`/`justification` — the sandbox RFC § Escalation,
|
|
|
|
|
- * docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md): a command the
|
|
|
|
|
- * sandbox denied may be retried once under a strictly wider mode, resolved
|
|
|
|
|
- * through `ctx.approval` BEFORE anything executes and failing closed on every
|
|
|
|
|
- * unanswerable path. The fields exist only when the mounted executor reports
|
|
|
|
|
- * a confining default (`ctx.bash.sandboxMode`) — a lever is never advertised
|
|
|
|
|
- * that the composition cannot honor.
|
|
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
|
|
- * Per-session mode switching (the sandbox RFC § Per-session mode switching): a session may carry a
|
|
|
|
|
- * standing sandbox-mode override — the `sandbox/mode` event fold from
|
|
|
|
|
- * `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash` — which this plugin makes real at EXECUTION: each
|
|
|
|
|
- * call is stamped `escalation grant > session override > executor default`.
|
|
|
|
|
- * The prompt deliberately does NOT state the mode and no switch is narrated:
|
|
|
|
|
- * the model learns the boundary from the denial marker (which names the mode
|
|
|
|
|
- * it ran under) exactly when it matters, instead of preemptively refusing
|
|
|
|
|
- * work a standing declaration would discourage.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ * Model-facing `bash` tool over the `ctx.bash` executor seam. Background calls
|
|
|
|
|
+ * register process handles with `ctx.tasks`; their work uses task cancellation
|
|
|
|
|
+ * rather than the tool-call signal after an id is returned.
|
|
|
*
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
+ * TODO(permissions): deployment policy belongs in `tools/pre-execute` and
|
|
|
|
|
+ * sandboxing executors; see docs/architecture.md § Extending The Harness.
|
|
|
* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-bash
|
|
* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-bash
|
|
|
*/
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
import type { Context } from 'cordis'
|
|
import type { Context } from 'cordis'
|
|
|
|
|
+import z from 'schemastery'
|
|
|
import { isAbsolute, resolve as resolvePath } from 'node:path'
|
|
import { isAbsolute, resolve as resolvePath } from 'node:path'
|
|
|
import { defineTool } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools'
|
|
import { defineTool } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools'
|
|
|
import type { GenericCallView, TerminalCallView, ToolExecution, ToolResult, ToolResultView } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools'
|
|
import type { GenericCallView, TerminalCallView, ToolExecution, ToolResult, ToolResultView } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools'
|
|
|
import type { Agent } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent'
|
|
import type { Agent } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent'
|
|
|
import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-system-prompt'
|
|
import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-system-prompt'
|
|
|
-// Side-effect type import: declaration-merges `ctx.approval`, consumed
|
|
|
|
|
-// opportunistically by the escalation gate (`ctx.get('approval')` — the seam
|
|
|
|
|
-// stays optional at runtime, same pattern as dsh-tools' ask routing).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tasks'
|
|
|
import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval'
|
|
import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval'
|
|
|
import type { SandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
|
|
import type { SandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
|
|
|
-import {
|
|
|
|
|
- ESCALATION_TARGETS,
|
|
|
|
|
- approveEscalation,
|
|
|
|
|
- escalationHintMarker,
|
|
|
|
|
- sandboxDenialMarker,
|
|
|
|
|
- validateEscalationArgs,
|
|
|
|
|
-} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+import { ESCALATION_TARGETS, approveEscalation, validateEscalationArgs } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
|
|
|
import { effectiveSandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy'
|
|
import { effectiveSandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-policy'
|
|
|
-import { BashTaskId, OwnerToken } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash'
|
|
|
|
|
-import type { BashTask } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash'
|
|
|
|
|
-import { parseExitStatus, renderResult } from './render.ts'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+import { processOutcome } from './background.ts'
|
|
|
|
|
+import { parseExitStatus, renderProcessRead, renderResult } from './render.ts'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
export const name = 'tool-bash'
|
|
export const name = 'tool-bash'
|
|
|
export const inject = ['tools', 'bash', 'systemPrompt']
|
|
export const inject = ['tools', 'bash', 'systemPrompt']
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
|
|
- * Validate the constraints the SchemaSpec can't express. `defineTool` now
|
|
|
|
|
- * validates parsed args against the SchemaSpec before `execute` runs (the
|
|
|
|
|
- * arg-validation RFC), so type/required/enum checks are already done and `args`
|
|
|
|
|
- * is the validated `InferArgs` shape here. What remains are value constraints
|
|
|
|
|
- * the DSL has no vocabulary for: non-empty strings, a positive finite timeout,
|
|
|
|
|
- * and the escalation pairing (`sandbox_permissions` and `justification` travel
|
|
|
|
|
- * together — an approval prompt without a reason, or a reason driving nothing,
|
|
|
|
|
- * is a malformed ask).
|
|
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+/** Configures whether the model may background commands. */
|
|
|
|
|
+export interface Config {
|
|
|
|
|
+ /** Expose `run_in_background` (default true); disabled calls are also rejected. */
|
|
|
|
|
+ enableRunInBackground?: boolean
|
|
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+export const Config: z<Config> = z.object({
|
|
|
|
|
+ enableRunInBackground: z.boolean().default(true),
|
|
|
|
|
+})
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
|
|
+/** Parsed tool args; execute validates value constraints absent from SchemaSpec. */
|
|
|
|
|
+interface BashToolArgs {
|
|
|
|
|
+ command: string
|
|
|
|
|
+ description: string
|
|
|
|
|
+ timeoutMs?: number
|
|
|
|
|
+ workdir?: string
|
|
|
|
|
+ run_in_background?: boolean
|
|
|
|
|
+ sandbox_permissions?: string
|
|
|
|
|
+ justification?: string
|
|
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
function validateBashArgs(args: BashToolArgs): void {
|
|
function validateBashArgs(args: BashToolArgs): void {
|
|
|
if (args.command.trim().length === 0) {
|
|
if (args.command.trim().length === 0) {
|
|
|
throw new Error('invalid command: expected a non-empty string')
|
|
throw new Error('invalid command: expected a non-empty string')
|
|
@@ -106,95 +62,38 @@ function validateBashArgs(args: BashToolArgs): void {
|
|
|
validateEscalationArgs(args.sandbox_permissions, args.justification)
|
|
validateEscalationArgs(args.sandbox_permissions, args.justification)
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
|
|
- * Reject an empty `task_id`. Type and presence are guaranteed by the
|
|
|
|
|
- * SchemaSpec validation (the arg-validation RFC); only the non-empty constraint, which the
|
|
|
|
|
- * DSL can't express, is left to check here.
|
|
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
|
|
-function validateTaskId(value: string): BashTaskId {
|
|
|
|
|
- if (value.length === 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
- throw new Error(`invalid task_id: expected a string, got ${JSON.stringify(value)}`)
|
|
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
|
|
- return BashTaskId(value)
|
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
|
|
- * The bash tool's validated argument shape — the base parameters plus the two
|
|
|
|
|
- * escalation fields, which are ADVERTISED only when the mounted executor
|
|
|
|
|
- * reports a confining default mode (absent from the schema otherwise, so the
|
|
|
|
|
- * SchemaSpec validator rejects them before `execute` ever sees one).
|
|
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
|
|
-interface BashToolArgs {
|
|
|
|
|
- command: string
|
|
|
|
|
- description: string
|
|
|
|
|
- timeoutMs?: number
|
|
|
|
|
- workdir?: string
|
|
|
|
|
- run_in_background?: boolean
|
|
|
|
|
- sandbox_permissions?: string
|
|
|
|
|
- justification?: string
|
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
|
|
- * The bash tool's static description. The base text is byte-stable regardless
|
|
|
|
|
- * of composition (it is part of the pinned snapshot header); the escalation
|
|
|
|
|
- * teaching rides only when the mounted executor actually honors the fields —
|
|
|
|
|
- * it names the ONE sanctioned exception to the base text's "do not retry
|
|
|
|
|
- * another way" rule. Its deference clause ("If the session states approval
|
|
|
|
|
- * prompts are disabled…") points at the approval plugin's never-policy prompt
|
|
|
|
|
- * sentence by meaning, not by parsed wording — a rendezvous kept working by
|
|
|
|
|
- * that sentence continuing to open with the approvals-disabled claim.
|
|
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
|
|
-function bashDescription(escalationModes: readonly SandboxMode[]): string {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+function bashDescription(backgroundEnabled: boolean, escalationModes: readonly SandboxMode[]): string {
|
|
|
|
|
+ const background = backgroundEnabled
|
|
|
|
|
+ ? 'Set `run_in_background: true` for long-running commands: the call returns a task id immediately; read its output with `task_output` and stop it with `task_kill`.'
|
|
|
|
|
+ : 'Background execution is not available; long-running commands must finish within the timeout.'
|
|
|
const base = 'Execute a bash command (`bash -c`) and return its stdout/stderr. '
|
|
const base = 'Execute a bash command (`bash -c`) and return its stdout/stderr. '
|
|
|
+ 'Each call runs in a fresh shell: no state (cwd, variables, functions) persists between calls — '
|
|
+ 'Each call runs in a fresh shell: no state (cwd, variables, functions) persists between calls — '
|
|
|
+ 'pass `workdir` instead of using `cd`. Non-zero exits are reported as `[exit code: N]`. '
|
|
+ 'pass `workdir` instead of using `cd`. Non-zero exits are reported as `[exit code: N]`. '
|
|
|
- + 'Commands may run under a file sandbox; a blocked file operation is reported as `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` — a policy denial, not a bug in the command; do not retry another way (a background task reports the same marker via bash_output once it has finished). '
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ + 'Commands may run under a file sandbox; a blocked file operation is reported as `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` — a policy denial, not a bug in the command; do not retry another way. '
|
|
|
+ 'Long output is truncated to its tail; the full output is saved to a file whose path is reported when available. '
|
|
+ 'Long output is truncated to its tail; the full output is saved to a file whose path is reported when available. '
|
|
|
- + 'Set `run_in_background: true` for long-running commands: the call returns a task id immediately; '
|
|
|
|
|
- + 'poll it with `bash_output` and stop it with `bash_kill`.'
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ + background
|
|
|
if (escalationModes.length === 0) return base
|
|
if (escalationModes.length === 0) return base
|
|
|
return base + ' Attempting a command the sandbox may deny is safe and expected: run it and read the '
|
|
return base + ' Attempting a command the sandbox may deny is safe and expected: run it and read the '
|
|
|
- + 'marker rather than assuming the denial. When a command IS denied and a wider mode would let it '
|
|
|
|
|
- + 'succeed, escalate immediately in the SAME turn — the ONE sanctioned exception to a denial: retry '
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ + 'marker rather than assuming the denial. When a command is denied and a wider mode would let it '
|
|
|
|
|
+ + 'succeed, escalate immediately in the same turn — the one sanctioned exception to a denial: retry '
|
|
|
+ 'the exact same command once with `sandbox_permissions` (the narrowest wider mode that suffices) '
|
|
+ 'the exact same command once with `sandbox_permissions` (the narrowest wider mode that suffices) '
|
|
|
+ 'plus a one-sentence `justification`. Do not detour through chat to ask permission first — the '
|
|
+ 'plus a one-sentence `justification`. Do not detour through chat to ask permission first — the '
|
|
|
- + 'approval prompt raised by that retry IS how the user consents. If the session states approval '
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ + 'approval prompt raised by that retry is how the user consents. If the session states approval '
|
|
|
+ 'prompts are disabled, there is no exception: a denial is final — do not set `sandbox_permissions`. '
|
|
+ 'prompts are disabled, there is no exception: a denial is final — do not set `sandbox_permissions`. '
|
|
|
- + 'Never escalate speculatively: ground the request in a real denial — normally the one THIS command '
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ + 'Never escalate speculatively: ground the request in a real denial — normally the one this command '
|
|
|
+ 'just hit; escalating up front is fine only when this session already denied the same access. '
|
|
+ 'just hit; escalating up front is fine only when this session already denied the same access. '
|
|
|
- + 'A rejected escalation is final for THAT command — stop and explain, never work around '
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ + 'A rejected escalation is final for that command — stop and explain, never work around '
|
|
|
+ 'it — but it does not forbid attempting or escalating other commands later.'
|
|
+ 'it — but it does not forbid attempting or escalating other commands later.'
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-// Pure tool-owned presentation used for both live events and replay.
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
/**
|
|
|
- * Pending-state presentation for a `bash` call. The TITLE is the exact `command`
|
|
|
|
|
- * — a `kind: 'execute'` card is rendered as a terminal whose header label IS the
|
|
|
|
|
- * title, and an execute-kind card HIDES `rawInput` (Zed: `should_show_raw_input
|
|
|
|
|
- * = !is_terminal_tool`), so the command must BE the title to be seen. This
|
|
|
|
|
- * mirrors the reference ACP adapters (claude-agent-acp, codex-acp), which both
|
|
|
|
|
- * use the bare command as an execute tool's title. The model-written
|
|
|
|
|
- * `description` (a readable summary) rides as a `content` text block shown ABOVE
|
|
|
|
|
- * the card. (Note: claude-agent-acp DROPS the description in terminal mode and
|
|
|
|
|
- * shows only the card; surfacing it as a content block is a deliberate
|
|
|
|
|
- * divergence here — we keep the human summary visible alongside the card.)
|
|
|
|
|
- * `rawInput` still carries the bare command for non-execute UIs that DO render it.
|
|
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
|
|
- * `terminal` marks the call so a capable UI renders a TERMINAL card — but ONLY a
|
|
|
|
|
- * FOREGROUND run is a terminal: a `run_in_background` call returns a task id
|
|
|
|
|
- * immediately (it never streams a terminal; its output is polled via
|
|
|
|
|
- * `bash_output`), so it is NOT marked terminal and renders as an ordinary
|
|
|
|
|
- * execute card. For a foreground run the `terminal.cwd` (header) is the model
|
|
|
|
|
- * `workdir` when given — ABSOLUTE as-is, RELATIVE for the UI bridge to resolve
|
|
|
|
|
- * against the session cwd; when omitted the bridge fills the session workspace
|
|
|
|
|
- * cwd (this PURE presenter, args only, can't see it).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ * Present foreground calls as terminals and background starts as generic cards.
|
|
|
|
|
+ * The command remains the title on both paths; foreground cwd is passed through
|
|
|
|
|
+ * for the bridge to resolve, while background descriptions remain card content.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
*/
|
|
|
type BashCallArgs = { command: string; description: string; workdir?: string; run_in_background?: boolean }
|
|
type BashCallArgs = { command: string; description: string; workdir?: string; run_in_background?: boolean }
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
function presentBashCall(args: BashCallArgs): GenericCallView | TerminalCallView {
|
|
function presentBashCall(args: BashCallArgs): GenericCallView | TerminalCallView {
|
|
|
- // A background start is not an interactive terminal — a generic execute card
|
|
|
|
|
- // with the command as rawInput and the description as a content block.
|
|
|
|
|
if (args.run_in_background === true) {
|
|
if (args.run_in_background === true) {
|
|
|
return {
|
|
return {
|
|
|
card: 'generic',
|
|
card: 'generic',
|
|
@@ -204,8 +103,6 @@ function presentBashCall(args: BashCallArgs): GenericCallView | TerminalCallView
|
|
|
content: [{ type: 'text', text: args.description }],
|
|
content: [{ type: 'text', text: args.description }],
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
- // A foreground run IS a terminal: the command titles the card, the description
|
|
|
|
|
- // renders above it, and the cwd (when the model gave a workdir) heads it.
|
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
return {
|
|
|
card: 'terminal',
|
|
card: 'terminal',
|
|
|
title: args.command,
|
|
title: args.command,
|
|
@@ -215,57 +112,24 @@ function presentBashCall(args: BashCallArgs): GenericCallView | TerminalCallView
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
/**
|
|
|
- * Completed-state presentation for a `bash` call. Two parallel renderings of the
|
|
|
|
|
- * same output: `terminal.output` for a UI that shows a terminal card (the run's
|
|
|
|
|
- * stdout/stderr + status markers, exactly as the model sees them — the RAW text,
|
|
|
|
|
- * newlines preserved, since a terminal renderer relies on exact bytes), and a
|
|
|
|
|
- * fenced ```console `content` block as the fallback for a UI without terminal
|
|
|
|
|
- * support (the fences are a UI-only affordance, so they live here, not in the
|
|
|
|
|
- * model-facing result; the fenced body is trimmed of trailing blank lines for a
|
|
|
|
|
- * tidy block). A capable UI also gets an exit-status pill from `terminal.exitCode`
|
|
|
|
|
- * / `terminal.signal`, parsed from the status markers `renderResult` appended.
|
|
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
|
|
- * Terminal output/exit is suppressed for results that are NOT a finished
|
|
|
|
|
- * foreground run: a `run_in_background` start (`isBackground` — the text is a
|
|
|
|
|
- * task-id ack, not a streamed run) and an `isError` result (a spawn failure or
|
|
|
|
|
- * abort — there is no real process exit to pill, and the body is an error
|
|
|
|
|
- * message, not `renderResult` output, so parsing it would be meaningless). Those
|
|
|
|
|
- * return a `generic` result whose content is the fenced ```console block. A
|
|
|
|
|
- * finished foreground run returns a `terminal` result carrying the RAW output
|
|
|
|
|
- * and the parsed exit status; the BRIDGE derives the fenced fallback from
|
|
|
|
|
- * `output` for a UI without terminal support, so the tool does not double-encode
|
|
|
|
|
- * it. A non-text result (unexpected for bash) falls through to `undefined`.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ * Present completed foreground output as a terminal; background acknowledgements
|
|
|
|
|
+ * and execution errors use generic fenced output without an exit-status pill.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
*/
|
|
|
function presentBashResult(args: unknown, result: ToolResult): ToolResultView | undefined {
|
|
function presentBashResult(args: unknown, result: ToolResult): ToolResultView | undefined {
|
|
|
const block = result.content.length === 1 ? result.content[0] : undefined
|
|
const block = result.content.length === 1 ? result.content[0] : undefined
|
|
|
if (block === undefined || block.type !== 'text') return undefined
|
|
if (block === undefined || block.type !== 'text') return undefined
|
|
|
const raw = block.text
|
|
const raw = block.text
|
|
|
const isBackground = typeof args === 'object' && args !== null && (args as { run_in_background?: unknown }).run_in_background === true
|
|
const isBackground = typeof args === 'object' && args !== null && (args as { run_in_background?: unknown }).run_in_background === true
|
|
|
- // A background ack or an errored run is not a real terminal exit: render the
|
|
|
|
|
- // fenced ```console fallback as generic content (no exit pill).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ // Background acknowledgements and errors have no terminal exit status.
|
|
|
if (isBackground || result.isError) {
|
|
if (isBackground || result.isError) {
|
|
|
return { card: 'generic', content: [{ type: 'text', text: `\`\`\`console\n${raw.replace(/\n+$/, '')}\n\`\`\`` }] }
|
|
return { card: 'generic', content: [{ type: 'text', text: `\`\`\`console\n${raw.replace(/\n+$/, '')}\n\`\`\`` }] }
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
- // A finished foreground run: RAW output + parsed exit for the terminal card.
|
|
|
|
|
- // The bridge derives the no-capability fenced fallback from `output`.
|
|
|
|
|
return { card: 'terminal', output: raw, ...parseExitStatus(raw) }
|
|
return { card: 'terminal', output: raw, ...parseExitStatus(raw) }
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Pending-state presentation for `bash_output`/`bash_kill` (background-task tools). */
|
|
|
|
|
-function presentTaskCall(verb: string, args: { task_id: string }): GenericCallView {
|
|
|
|
|
- return { card: 'generic', title: `${verb} background task ${args.task_id}`, kind: 'execute', rawInput: args.task_id }
|
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
/**
|
|
|
- * Resolve the working directory for a bash call. Precedence: an explicit model
|
|
|
|
|
- * `workdir` wins; otherwise default to the calling agent's session cwd
|
|
|
|
|
- * (`session.header.cwd`) so each ACP session's commands run in ITS workspace,
|
|
|
|
|
- * not the server's launch dir. A RELATIVE model `workdir` is resolved against
|
|
|
|
|
- * the session cwd (the tool tells the model to pass `workdir` instead of `cd`,
|
|
|
|
|
- * so a relative one should be relative to the session's root, not `process.cwd()`).
|
|
|
|
|
- * Returns `undefined` when neither is available (no agent / headerless session /
|
|
|
|
|
- * no session cwd) — the executor then applies its own config/`process.cwd()`
|
|
|
|
|
- * default, preserving today's non-ACP behavior.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ * Resolve an explicit workdir first, making a relative one session-cwd-relative;
|
|
|
|
|
+ * otherwise use the session cwd and leave executor defaulting as the fallback.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
*/
|
|
|
function resolveWorkdir(modelWorkdir: string | undefined, exec: { agent?: Agent }): string | undefined {
|
|
function resolveWorkdir(modelWorkdir: string | undefined, exec: { agent?: Agent }): string | undefined {
|
|
|
const sessionCwd = exec.agent?.session.header.cwd
|
|
const sessionCwd = exec.agent?.session.header.cwd
|
|
@@ -276,102 +140,11 @@ function resolveWorkdir(modelWorkdir: string | undefined, exec: { agent?: Agent
|
|
|
return modelWorkdir
|
|
return modelWorkdir
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Status line for background task reads. */
|
|
|
|
|
-function statusLine(task: BashTask): string {
|
|
|
|
|
- switch (task.status) {
|
|
|
|
|
- case 'running': return '[status: running]'
|
|
|
|
|
- case 'killed': return `[status: killed${task.signal !== null ? ` by ${task.signal}` : ''}]`
|
|
|
|
|
- case 'completed': return `[status: completed, exit code: ${task.exitCode ?? 0}]`
|
|
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
-export function apply(ctx: Context): void {
|
|
|
|
|
- // The bash tools' cross-call HABIT, which the per-tool descriptions cannot
|
|
|
|
|
- // carry (they describe one call each): the exit-code marker is only useful
|
|
|
|
|
- // if the model actually checks it every time.
|
|
|
|
|
- ctx.systemPrompt.section({
|
|
|
|
|
- name: 'tool:bash',
|
|
|
|
|
- order: 105,
|
|
|
|
|
- text: 'Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures before moving on.',
|
|
|
|
|
- })
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- /**
|
|
|
|
|
- * The caller's owner TOKEN — the owning agent's `session.header.id`, or
|
|
|
|
|
- * `undefined` for a non-agent caller. Read `session.header.id` (NOT
|
|
|
|
|
- * `session.id`): every other subsystem keys off the header id (the ACP bridge,
|
|
|
|
|
- * both persistence backends), and the sibling `resolveWorkdir` already reads
|
|
|
|
|
- * `session.header.cwd`, so using `session.id` here would be the asymmetry smell
|
|
|
|
|
- * the conventions flag. The two are equal in production, but the header is the
|
|
|
|
|
- * canonical identity.
|
|
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
|
|
- const callerToken = (exec: { agent?: Agent }): OwnerToken | undefined =>
|
|
|
|
|
- exec.agent ? OwnerToken(exec.agent.session.header.id) : undefined
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- /**
|
|
|
|
|
- * Authorize a `bash_output`/`bash_kill` call against the task's stored owner
|
|
|
|
|
- * token. Rejects when the task HAS an owner and it differs from the caller's
|
|
|
|
|
- * token — using `!== undefined` semantics, NOT truthiness, so an empty-string
|
|
|
|
|
- * token is still a real owner (never treated as unowned). An unowned task
|
|
|
|
|
- * (`ownerOf` returns `undefined`) is allowed; a truly unknown id is also
|
|
|
|
|
- * `undefined` here and then fails loudly at the subsequent
|
|
|
|
|
- * `readOutput`/`kill` ("unknown bash task"). The conservative no-agent caller
|
|
|
|
|
- * (`callerToken` undefined) cannot match an owned task and is rejected.
|
|
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
|
|
- const assertTaskAccess = (taskId: BashTaskId, exec: { agent?: Agent }): void => {
|
|
|
|
|
- const owner = ctx.bash.ownerOf(taskId)
|
|
|
|
|
- if (owner !== undefined && owner !== callerToken(exec)) {
|
|
|
|
|
- throw new Error(`task ${taskId} belongs to another session`)
|
|
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- // Background completion → inject a notice into the owning agent's session.
|
|
|
|
|
- // Find the live agent by its session id token via the agent registry, read
|
|
|
|
|
- // opportunistically with `ctx.get('agents')` (NOT `ctx.agents`/static inject):
|
|
|
|
|
- // this listener runs from `task.done.then` on the bash fiber — a foreign
|
|
|
|
|
- // fiber — where the `ctx.agents` property proxy would throw through the
|
|
|
|
|
- // traceable shadow; `ctx.get(name)` is the topology-independent lookup. No
|
|
|
|
|
- // registry mounted (`undefined`) → drop the notice. Match on
|
|
|
|
|
- // `agent.session.header.id`, NOT the registry key: a config agent's id differs
|
|
|
|
|
- // from its session id, and the owner token IS the session id.
|
|
|
|
|
- ctx.bash.onTaskDone((task) => {
|
|
|
|
|
- const ownerToken = ctx.bash.ownerOf(task.id)
|
|
|
|
|
- if (ownerToken === undefined) return
|
|
|
|
|
- const agent = ctx.get('agents')?.list().find(a => OwnerToken(a.session.header.id) === ownerToken)
|
|
|
|
|
- if (!agent) return
|
|
|
|
|
- try {
|
|
|
|
|
- agent.inject(
|
|
|
|
|
- [{ type: 'text', text: `background bash task ${task.id} finished ${statusLine(task)}. Read its output with bash_output.` }],
|
|
|
|
|
- { source: { kind: 'plugin', plugin: 'tool-bash' } },
|
|
|
|
|
- )
|
|
|
|
|
- } catch (error: unknown) {
|
|
|
|
|
- // The ONE expected failure: the agent was disposed between task
|
|
|
|
|
- // completion and this injection (ReactLoopAgent.inject throws
|
|
|
|
|
- // `agent "<id>" is disposed`). That race is benign — drop the notice.
|
|
|
|
|
- // Anything else is a real bug and must surface, not be swallowed.
|
|
|
|
|
- if (error instanceof Error && error.message.includes('is disposed')) return
|
|
|
|
|
- throw error
|
|
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
|
|
- })
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- // The escalation surface exists whenever the mounted executor confines.
|
|
|
|
|
- // Its enum is the closed target vocabulary, deliberately NOT cut down by
|
|
|
|
|
- // the configured default: a session may switch to a narrower effective mode
|
|
|
|
|
- // while sharing this globally registered schema. Strict widening therefore
|
|
|
|
|
- // belongs to the per-call check below. An executor swap restarts this fiber
|
|
|
|
|
- // (static inject) and re-registers the schema.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+export function apply(ctx: Context, config: Config): void {
|
|
|
|
|
+ const backgroundEnabled = config.enableRunInBackground ?? true
|
|
|
const defaultMode = ctx.bash.sandboxMode
|
|
const defaultMode = ctx.bash.sandboxMode
|
|
|
const escalationModes: readonly SandboxMode[] = defaultMode === undefined ? [] : ESCALATION_TARGETS
|
|
const escalationModes: readonly SandboxMode[] = defaultMode === undefined ? [] : ESCALATION_TARGETS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /**
|
|
|
|
|
- * The session's standing mode override for an ordinary (non-escalating)
|
|
|
|
|
- * call: the `sandbox/mode` fold of the calling agent's log, stamped
|
|
|
|
|
- * onto the request so EXECUTION follows the same effective mode the prompt
|
|
|
|
|
- * section states. Weakest precedence — an escalation grant (freshly
|
|
|
|
|
- * approved for exactly this call) outranks it, and without either the
|
|
|
|
|
- * executor's `resolve()` applies its configured default. Undefined for a
|
|
|
|
|
- * non-sandboxing executor (nothing honors it) and for agent-less callers
|
|
|
|
|
- * (no session to fold).
|
|
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
|
|
const sessionOverride = (exec: ToolExecution): SandboxMode | undefined =>
|
|
const sessionOverride = (exec: ToolExecution): SandboxMode | undefined =>
|
|
|
defaultMode === undefined || exec.agent === undefined ? undefined : effectiveSandboxMode(exec.agent.session.events)
|
|
defaultMode === undefined || exec.agent === undefined ? undefined : effectiveSandboxMode(exec.agent.session.events)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -382,9 +155,9 @@ export function apply(ctx: Context): void {
|
|
|
* {@link approveEscalation}. This tool contributes only the composition
|
|
* {@link approveEscalation}. This tool contributes only the composition
|
|
|
* guard (the fields are unadvertised without a sandboxing executor, yet
|
|
* guard (the fields are unadvertised without a sandboxing executor, yet
|
|
|
* schema validation checks advertised keys only, so an unadvertised
|
|
* schema validation checks advertised keys only, so an unadvertised
|
|
|
- * `sandbox_permissions` still reaches execute) and the channel closure over
|
|
|
|
|
- * `ctx.approval` — consumed opportunistically (`ctx.get`, the dsh-tools
|
|
|
|
|
- * ask-routing pattern) so a deployment without it degrades per call.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ * `sandbox_permissions` still reaches execute) and the approval ingredients
|
|
|
|
|
+ * — the seam is consumed opportunistically (`ctx.get`) so a deployment
|
|
|
|
|
+ * without it degrades per call.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
*/
|
|
|
const approveBashEscalation = (mode: string, justification: string, exec: ToolExecution): Promise<SandboxMode> => {
|
|
const approveBashEscalation = (mode: string, justification: string, exec: ToolExecution): Promise<SandboxMode> => {
|
|
|
if (escalationModes.length === 0) {
|
|
if (escalationModes.length === 0) {
|
|
@@ -403,9 +176,16 @@ export function apply(ctx: Context): void {
|
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ // Cross-call guidance belongs in the prompt rather than one-call schema prose.
|
|
|
|
|
+ ctx.systemPrompt.section({
|
|
|
|
|
+ name: 'tool:bash',
|
|
|
|
|
+ order: 105,
|
|
|
|
|
+ text: 'Check the [exit code: N] marker on every bash result; investigate failures before moving on.',
|
|
|
|
|
+ })
|
|
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
ctx.tools.register(defineTool({
|
|
ctx.tools.register(defineTool({
|
|
|
name: 'bash',
|
|
name: 'bash',
|
|
|
- description: bashDescription(escalationModes),
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ description: bashDescription(backgroundEnabled, escalationModes),
|
|
|
parameters: {
|
|
parameters: {
|
|
|
command: { type: 'string', required: true, description: 'The bash command to execute.' },
|
|
command: { type: 'string', required: true, description: 'The bash command to execute.' },
|
|
|
description: {
|
|
description: {
|
|
@@ -417,117 +197,69 @@ export function apply(ctx: Context): void {
|
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
|
timeoutMs: { type: 'number', description: 'Timeout in milliseconds. The executor applies its configured default and cap, and kills the command on expiry.' },
|
|
timeoutMs: { type: 'number', description: 'Timeout in milliseconds. The executor applies its configured default and cap, and kills the command on expiry.' },
|
|
|
workdir: { type: 'string', description: 'Working directory for this command. Defaults to the session workspace; a relative path is resolved against it.' },
|
|
workdir: { type: 'string', description: 'Working directory for this command. Defaults to the session workspace; a relative path is resolved against it.' },
|
|
|
- run_in_background: { type: 'boolean', description: 'Run in the background and return a task id immediately. No timeout applies.' },
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ ...backgroundEnabled ? {
|
|
|
|
|
+ run_in_background: { type: 'boolean' as const, description: 'Run in the background and return a task id immediately (collect with task_output, stop with task_kill). No timeout applies.' },
|
|
|
|
|
+ } : {},
|
|
|
...escalationModes.length > 0 ? {
|
|
...escalationModes.length > 0 ? {
|
|
|
sandbox_permissions: {
|
|
sandbox_permissions: {
|
|
|
type: 'string' as const,
|
|
type: 'string' as const,
|
|
|
enum: [...escalationModes],
|
|
enum: [...escalationModes],
|
|
|
- description: 'The wider sandbox mode this command needs. Only valid as a one-shot retry '
|
|
|
|
|
- + 'of a command the sandbox just denied; requires justification and user approval.',
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ description: 'The wider sandbox mode this command needs. Only valid as a one-shot retry of a command the sandbox just denied; requires justification and user approval.',
|
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
|
justification: {
|
|
justification: {
|
|
|
type: 'string' as const,
|
|
type: 'string' as const,
|
|
|
- description: 'Required with sandbox_permissions: one sentence for the user explaining '
|
|
|
|
|
- + 'why this exact command needs the wider access.',
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ description: 'Required with sandbox_permissions: one sentence for the user explaining why this exact command needs the wider access.',
|
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
|
} : {},
|
|
} : {},
|
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
|
async execute(args: BashToolArgs, exec) {
|
|
async execute(args: BashToolArgs, exec) {
|
|
|
validateBashArgs(args)
|
|
validateBashArgs(args)
|
|
|
- // `description` is display/logging metadata only (surfaced to UIs via
|
|
|
|
|
- // the tool/call session event); it is intentionally NOT forwarded to
|
|
|
|
|
- // ctx.bash and has no effect on execution.
|
|
|
|
|
- // An escalating call resolves approval BEFORE anything executes; every
|
|
|
|
|
- // non-grant outcome throws its distinct error text and runs nothing.
|
|
|
|
|
- // (validateBashArgs pinned the pairing, so the double narrow is exact.)
|
|
|
|
|
- // An ordinary call carries the session's standing override instead —
|
|
|
|
|
- // grant > session override > executor default (see sessionOverride).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ // Description is display metadata; workdir defaults to the caller's session.
|
|
|
const sandboxMode = args.sandbox_permissions !== undefined && args.justification !== undefined
|
|
const sandboxMode = args.sandbox_permissions !== undefined && args.justification !== undefined
|
|
|
? await approveBashEscalation(args.sandbox_permissions, args.justification, exec)
|
|
? await approveBashEscalation(args.sandbox_permissions, args.justification, exec)
|
|
|
: sessionOverride(exec)
|
|
: sessionOverride(exec)
|
|
|
- // Default the workdir to the calling agent's session cwd so each ACP
|
|
|
|
|
- // session runs in its own workspace (see resolveWorkdir); an explicit
|
|
|
|
|
- // model workdir still wins.
|
|
|
|
|
const workdir = resolveWorkdir(args.workdir, exec)
|
|
const workdir = resolveWorkdir(args.workdir, exec)
|
|
|
const request = {
|
|
const request = {
|
|
|
command: args.command,
|
|
command: args.command,
|
|
|
...workdir !== undefined ? { workdir } : {},
|
|
...workdir !== undefined ? { workdir } : {},
|
|
|
...args.timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs: args.timeoutMs } : {},
|
|
...args.timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs: args.timeoutMs } : {},
|
|
|
- ...exec.signal ? { signal: exec.signal } : {},
|
|
|
|
|
...sandboxMode !== undefined ? { sandboxMode } : {},
|
|
...sandboxMode !== undefined ? { sandboxMode } : {},
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
if (args.run_in_background === true) {
|
|
if (args.run_in_background === true) {
|
|
|
- // Stamp the owner token (the agent's session id) onto the spec so the
|
|
|
|
|
- // executor stores it on the task — the isolation fence for bash_output/
|
|
|
|
|
- // bash_kill. Foreground runs pass no owner (they finish inline; nothing
|
|
|
|
|
- // to fence).
|
|
|
|
|
- const task = ctx.bash.start(ctx.bash.resolve({ ...request, owner: callerToken(exec) }))
|
|
|
|
|
- return [{ type: 'text', text: `started background task ${task.id}` }]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ // Undeclared keys are allowed, so schema omission also needs enforcement.
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (!backgroundEnabled) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ throw new Error('run_in_background is disabled for this deployment (enableRunInBackground: false)')
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ const tasks = ctx.get('tasks')
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (tasks === undefined) {
|
|
|
|
|
+ throw new Error('background tasks unavailable: load @deepseek-ai/dsh-tasks and @deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-tasks')
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ // Reject pre-start cancellation; returned tasks use their own lifecycle.
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (exec.signal?.aborted) throw new Error('command aborted')
|
|
|
|
|
+ // Task preflight finishes before the starter can spawn a process.
|
|
|
|
|
+ const id = tasks.start({
|
|
|
|
|
+ kind: 'bash',
|
|
|
|
|
+ label: args.command,
|
|
|
|
|
+ ...exec.agent ? { owner: exec.agent } : {},
|
|
|
|
|
+ run: () => {
|
|
|
|
|
+ const proc = ctx.bash.start(ctx.bash.resolve(request))
|
|
|
|
|
+ return {
|
|
|
|
|
+ cancel: () => void proc.kill(),
|
|
|
|
|
+ done: proc.done.then(() => processOutcome(proc)),
|
|
|
|
|
+ readOutput: () => renderProcessRead(proc.readOutput(), proc.sandbox, escalationModes),
|
|
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
+ },
|
|
|
|
|
+ })
|
|
|
|
|
+ return [{ type: 'text', text: `started background task ${id}` }]
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
- const result = await ctx.bash.run(ctx.bash.resolve(request))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ const result = await ctx.bash.run(ctx.bash.resolve({
|
|
|
|
|
+ ...request,
|
|
|
|
|
+ ...exec.signal ? { signal: exec.signal } : {},
|
|
|
|
|
+ }))
|
|
|
if (result.aborted) throw new Error('command aborted')
|
|
if (result.aborted) throw new Error('command aborted')
|
|
|
return [{ type: 'text', text: renderResult(result, escalationModes) }]
|
|
return [{ type: 'text', text: renderResult(result, escalationModes) }]
|
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
|
presentCall: presentBashCall,
|
|
presentCall: presentBashCall,
|
|
|
presentResult: presentBashResult,
|
|
presentResult: presentBashResult,
|
|
|
}))
|
|
}))
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- ctx.tools.register(defineTool({
|
|
|
|
|
- name: 'bash_output',
|
|
|
|
|
- description: 'Read new output from a background bash task started with `bash` + `run_in_background`. '
|
|
|
|
|
- + 'Returns only output produced since the previous bash_output call, plus the task status. '
|
|
|
|
|
- + 'Tasks keep running while you do other work; poll again later for more output.',
|
|
|
|
|
- parameters: {
|
|
|
|
|
- task_id: { type: 'string', required: true, description: 'Task id returned by the bash tool.' },
|
|
|
|
|
- },
|
|
|
|
|
- // execute is synchronous (registry reads + string shaping) but the
|
|
|
|
|
- // ToolDefinition contract wants a Promise — hence resolve(), not async.
|
|
|
|
|
- execute(args, exec) {
|
|
|
|
|
- const id = validateTaskId(args.task_id)
|
|
|
|
|
- assertTaskAccess(id, exec)
|
|
|
|
|
- const read = ctx.bash.readOutput(id)
|
|
|
|
|
- let text = read.delta.length > 0 ? read.delta : '(no new output)'
|
|
|
|
|
- if (read.lossy) {
|
|
|
|
|
- const paths = [read.stdoutSpillPath, read.stderrSpillPath].filter((p): p is string => p !== undefined)
|
|
|
|
|
- const fullOutput = paths.length > 0 ? paths.join(', ') : '(unavailable)'
|
|
|
|
|
- text += `\n[some output was dropped from memory; full output: ${fullOutput}]`
|
|
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
|
|
- text += `\n${statusLine(read.task)}`
|
|
|
|
|
- if (read.task.sandbox?.runnerFailed) {
|
|
|
|
|
- // The sandbox RUNNER itself failed — the command never ran. The
|
|
|
|
|
- // foreground path surfaces this as the structured SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE
|
|
|
|
|
- // error; a settled task's read carries the marker instead.
|
|
|
|
|
- text += `\n[sandbox: the sandbox runner itself failed under ${read.task.sandbox.mode} mode — the command did not run; this is a sandbox problem, not a command failure]`
|
|
|
|
|
- } else if (read.task.sandbox?.denied) {
|
|
|
|
|
- // Mirrors the foreground result marker (and its same-turn escalation
|
|
|
|
|
- // hint). Background denials are only classifiable once the task
|
|
|
|
|
- // settles (the classifier needs the whole stderr), so the marker
|
|
|
|
|
- // rides every read that sees the settled task.
|
|
|
|
|
- text += `\n${sandboxDenialMarker(read.task.sandbox.mode)}`
|
|
|
|
|
- if (escalationModes.length > 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
- text += `\n${escalationHintMarker('command')}`
|
|
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
|
|
- return Promise.resolve([{ type: 'text', text }])
|
|
|
|
|
- },
|
|
|
|
|
- presentCall: args => presentTaskCall('Read output from', args),
|
|
|
|
|
- }))
|
|
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
|
|
- ctx.tools.register(defineTool({
|
|
|
|
|
- name: 'bash_kill',
|
|
|
|
|
- description: 'Ask the executor to kill a running background bash task by task id.',
|
|
|
|
|
- parameters: {
|
|
|
|
|
- task_id: { type: 'string', required: true, description: 'Task id returned by the bash tool.' },
|
|
|
|
|
- },
|
|
|
|
|
- execute(args, exec) {
|
|
|
|
|
- const id = validateTaskId(args.task_id)
|
|
|
|
|
- assertTaskAccess(id, exec)
|
|
|
|
|
- const killed = ctx.bash.kill(id)
|
|
|
|
|
- return Promise.resolve([{
|
|
|
|
|
- type: 'text',
|
|
|
|
|
- text: killed ? `killed background task ${id}` : `task ${id} had already finished`,
|
|
|
|
|
- }])
|
|
|
|
|
- },
|
|
|
|
|
- presentCall: args => presentTaskCall('Kill', args),
|
|
|
|
|
- }))
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|