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@@ -23,14 +23,13 @@
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*/
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import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'
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-import { realpathSync } from 'node:fs'
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-import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
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-import { grantArgs as landlockGrantArgs, LAUNCHER_BIN, launcherPath as landlockLauncherPath, probe as defaultProbeLandlock } from 'node-addon-landlock-run'
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+import { LAUNCHER_BIN, launcherPath as landlockLauncherPath, probe as defaultProbeLandlock } from 'node-addon-landlock-run'
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import { Context } from 'cordis'
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import z from 'schemastery'
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import { assertNever } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm'
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import { SandboxProvider, SandboxUnavailableError } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
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import type { ConfinedArgv, ConfinedSandboxMode, SandboxEnforcement, SandboxPolicy } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
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+import { bwrapProfileArgs, landlockProfileArgs, seatbeltProfileArgs } from './profiles.ts'
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/** Plugin config. All optional — `static Config` supplies the defaults. */
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export interface Config {
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@@ -73,103 +72,6 @@ export interface Config {
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probeTimeoutMs?: number
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}
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-/**
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- * The `bwrap` profile arguments for one policy. The whole host tree is bound
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- * read-only; a fresh `/dev` keeps `>/dev/null` redirects working and a fresh
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- * `/proc` keeps process-inspecting tools working. `workspace-write`
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- * additionally mounts an ephemeral writable `/tmp` and rebinds the workspace
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- * root read-write (bind order matters: later binds overlay earlier ones).
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- * Deliberately NO `--unshare-pid` (it would break the process-group kill
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- * semantics shell consumers rely on) and NO network unsharing (the seam's
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- * mode vocabulary promises file effects only).
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- * @param policy - the file-effect policy to express as bwrap arguments.
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- * @returns the bwrap profile arguments (before the trailing `--` + argv).
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- */
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-export function bwrapProfileArgs(policy: SandboxPolicy): string[] {
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- const args = ['--ro-bind', '/', '/', '--dev', '/dev', '--proc', '/proc', '--die-with-parent']
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- if (policy.mode === 'workspace-write') {
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- args.push('--tmpfs', '/tmp')
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- args.push('--bind', policy.workspaceRoot, policy.workspaceRoot)
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- }
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- return args
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-}
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-
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-/**
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- * The `landlock-run` grant arguments for one policy — the bwrap
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- * profile's file-effect semantics expressed as a Landlock allow-list
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- * (Landlock cannot mount, so there are no fresh/ephemeral filesystems). The
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- * whole tree is readable and executable; of `/dev`, ONLY `/dev/null` is
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- * writable — a whole-`/dev` grant would expose real host paths beneath it
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- * (`/dev/shm`, a shared tmpfs) to persistent writes, which `read-only`
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- * promises never happen. bwrap can hand out a fresh ephemeral `/dev`; on the
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- * host's own `/dev` the write grant must be node-by-node, and `>/dev/null`
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- * is the one redirects need. `workspace-write` adds the HOST `/tmp` (shared
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- * and persistent, where bwrap's is ephemeral — the honest difference,
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- * recorded in the sandbox RFC's runner notes) plus the workspace
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- * root read-write. The flag spelling belongs to `node-addon-landlock-run`'s
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- * `grantArgs`; this function owns only the policy → grants mapping.
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- * @param policy - the file-effect policy to express as launcher grants.
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- * @returns the launcher grant arguments (before `--` + argv).
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- */
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-export function landlockProfileArgs(policy: SandboxPolicy): string[] {
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- const readWrite = ['/dev/null']
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- if (policy.mode === 'workspace-write') {
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- readWrite.push('/tmp', policy.workspaceRoot)
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- }
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- return landlockGrantArgs({ readOnly: ['/'], readWrite })
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-}
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-
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-/**
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- * Resolve a granted root to the path the kernel actually sees. Seatbelt path
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- * filters match the CANONICAL path (symlinks resolved), and the roots this
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- * profile grants are symlinked on every macOS: `/tmp` is `/private/tmp` and
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- * the user temp dir lives under `/var` → `/private/var` — an as-spelled
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- * grant would match nothing.
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- */
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-function canonicalPath(path: string): string {
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- try {
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- return realpathSync(path)
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- } catch {
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- // realpathSync failed: the path (or a prefix) is missing or unreadable.
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- // Grant the spelling as-is — an unresolvable root matches nothing until
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- // it exists, which is the conservative outcome, and inventing a fallback
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- // resolution here would grant a path the caller never named.
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- return path
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- }
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-}
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-
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-/** Quote one path as an SBPL string literal (backslashes and double quotes escaped). */
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-function sbplString(path: string): string {
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- return `"${path.replaceAll('\\', String.raw`\\`).replaceAll('"', String.raw`\"`)}"`
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-}
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-
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-/**
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- * The `sandbox-exec` arguments for one policy: `-p` plus a Seatbelt (SBPL)
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- * profile with the same file-effect semantics as the other dialects, built
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- * as allow-default → `(deny file-write*)` → write allow-list (later rules
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- * win), so exactly the mode's promised file effects are governed — network
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- * and process visibility stay unrestricted, which is all the seam's mode
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- * vocabulary claims. Of `/dev`, ONLY the `/dev/null` literal is writable
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- * (the same node-not-directory reasoning as the Landlock grant).
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- * `workspace-write` adds the workspace root, the host `/tmp`, and the
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- * per-user darwin temp dir (`os.tmpdir()`, launchd's `TMPDIR`, inherited by
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- * the confined child) — on darwin that directory IS the platform's `/tmp`
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- * for every mkstemp-family tool, so omitting it would deny the mode's
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- * promised temp area. All granted roots are canonicalized because Seatbelt
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- * matches resolved paths ({@link canonicalPath}); duplicates after
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- * resolution collapse.
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- * @param policy - the file-effect policy to express as an SBPL profile.
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- * @returns the `sandbox-exec` arguments (`-p` + profile, before `--` + argv).
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- */
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-export function seatbeltProfileArgs(policy: SandboxPolicy): string[] {
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- const forms = ['(version 1)', '(allow default)', '(deny file-write*)', `(allow file-write* (literal ${sbplString('/dev/null')}))`]
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- if (policy.mode === 'workspace-write') {
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- const roots = [...new Set([policy.workspaceRoot, '/tmp', tmpdir()].map(canonicalPath))]
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- forms.push(`(allow file-write* ${roots.map(root => `(subpath ${sbplString(root)})`).join(' ')})`)
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- }
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- return ['-p', forms.join(' ')]
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-}
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-
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/**
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* Functional `bwrap` probe: can it actually build the read-only profile on
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* this host? (`--version` alone would miss a disabled unprivileged user
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