description: "CPython subprocess implementation of the DeepSeek Harness code-execution seam, with fd-3 bindings, resource limits, log capture, and process-group teardown."
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CPython-subprocess implementation of the @deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime seam. Companion to @deepseek-ai/dsh-code-runtime-worker-thread; trades the Node worker thread for a fresh python3 subprocess so model code is Python instead of TypeScript.
The package ships PythonCodeRuntime as its default export. The plugin registers as codeRuntime with language: 'python' and isolation: 'process'. Each run() spawns a fresh python3 -I process, sends a boot frame and the program over fd 3, and resolves a CodeRunResult for every program outcome — rejecting only for seam misuse (a malformed binding namespace or non-positive config). The child runs the program as the body of an async function, so top-level await and return both work; binding calls travel back over fd 3 as JSON-lines. Containment (not a security boundary — model code has bash-equivalent trust) comes from an empty environment, RLIMIT_CPU/RLIMIT_AS, a wall-clock ceiling, and a SIGTERM→grace→SIGKILL teardown on the child's process group.
The host and the CPython subprocess exchange a versionless, JSON-lines protocol on the child's fd 3 — one JSON object per line, leaving stdout/stderr free for the program's own output. src/protocol.ts is the host side; py/protocol.py mirrors its message shapes and the shared truncation-marker text on the Python side.
stdio: ['pipe','pipe','pipe','pipe']; the Python bootstrap reads the same PROTOCOL_FD constant. JSON-lines framing.validateChildFrame shape-validates and REBUILDS each frame before the host reads it: forged extra fields never ride along, a non-number call id can never be echoed into a reply, and junk drops to undefined rather than throwing in the host's message handler. The Python side trusts host replies (the host is not model-controlled).encodeJsonPlain serializes a JSON.parse-produced value without recursion, so a deep value below the byte budget crosses intact instead of dying on JSON.stringify's stack limit; checkDoneValue meters a forged completion value's byte length AND number losslessness in one bounded traversal that rejects an over-budget payload before enqueuing its children; hasUnsafeIntegerToken reads the raw frame text to catch an integer token that JSON.parse would silently round; hasNonLosslessNumber rejects a non-finite or negative-zero number in unbounded call.args. Beyond-safe-range integral doubles serialize through BigInt digits so the exact integer crosses, not the rounded String() form.logTruncationMarker(maxBytes) produces byte-identical text on both sides, so a truncated log run reads the same however the cap was hit. The log frame's truncated flag distinguishes the child ledger's own marker from program output.Every cap is a validated Config field with a default, changeable from cordis.yml (no hardcoded tunables). cpuSeconds (default 60) is the RLIMIT_CPU whole-second budget; the child sets the soft limit to cpuSeconds and the hard limit to cpuSeconds + 1, so the kernel's SIGXCPU at the soft limit classifies as a timeout while the +1s hard limit is a SIGKILL backstop. maxWallMs (default 600000) is the wall-clock ceiling that backstops CPU time for a program awaiting a promise nobody resolves. addressSpaceMb (default 512) is the RLIMIT_AS cap, not applied on Darwin (the dyld shared cache mapped into every process exceeds any practical cap there; cpuSeconds and maxWallMs still bound the run). maxLogBytes (default 65536) is the shared captured-log byte budget; maxValueBytes (default 32768) caps the completion value; graceMs (default 3000) is the SIGTERM→SIGKILL grace window; pythonBin (default python3) is the interpreter, resolved against PATH before the child spawns with an empty environment.
Indirectly, through Code Mode in dsh-tools, which renders this backend's exact completion value when it fits (or an explicit invalid-output / output-limit failure), plus the exact [dsh-code-runtime-python] log capture truncated at <maxLogBytes> bytes log marker, into a retained run_code result.
No direct invalidation; the named consumer owns any request-prefix changes.
tests/protocol-mirror.e2e.ts compares PROTOCOL_FD, the log truncation marker, and each TypedDict's required and optional fields against a real python3. Comparing field types across TypeScript and Python has no mechanical equivalent here, so review plus the backend's real-subprocess suite owns type-level drift.RLIMIT_AS is not enforced on macOS — the dyld shared cache mapped into every process at exec exceeds any practical address-space cap, and the kernel rejects the setrlimit call, so addressSpaceMb is skipped there. cpuSeconds and maxWallMs still bound every run.setsid() / start_new_session=True escapes teardown. Termination signals the child's process group with kill(-pid); a descendant that moves itself into a fresh session is no longer in that group and no signal reaches it. If it also releases the inherited stdout/stderr/fd-3 pipes, the leader's close still settles the run, and after the closeDeadline bound the fiber goes quiescent while that orphan keeps running. This is the containment boundary, not a security one — model code has bash-equivalent trust, and a bash tool can setsid away just the same. Reaching such an orphan would require tracking every descendant pid (as the bash-local backend's process-inspector does) and is deferred; the process-group teardown reaps everything that stays in the group.