fix: community security wave — 8 PRs, 4 contributors (v0.15.13.0) (#847)

* fix(bin): pass search params via env vars (RCE fix) (#819)

Replace shell string interpolation with process.env in gstack-learnings-search
to prevent arbitrary code execution via crafted learnings entries. Also fixes
the CROSS_PROJECT interpolation that the original PR missed.

Adds 3 regression tests verifying no shell interpolation remains in the bun -e block.

Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): add path validation to upload command (#821)

Add isPathWithin() and path traversal checks to the upload command,
blocking file exfiltration via crafted upload paths. Uses existing
SAFE_DIRECTORIES constant instead of a local copy. Adds 3 regression tests.

Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): symlink resolution in meta-commands validateOutputPath (#820)

Add realpathSync to validateOutputPath in meta-commands.ts to catch
symlink-based directory escapes in screenshot, pdf, and responsive
commands. Resolves SAFE_DIRECTORIES through realpathSync to handle
macOS /tmp -> /private/tmp symlinks. Existing path validation tests
pass with the hardened implementation.

Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add uninstall instructions to README (#812)

Community PR #812 by @0531Kim. Adds two uninstall paths: the gstack-uninstall
script (handles everything) and manual removal steps for when the repo isn't
cloned. Includes CLAUDE.md cleanup note and Playwright cache guidance.

Co-Authored-By: 0531Kim <0531Kim@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): Windows launcher extraEnv + headed-mode token (#822)

Community PR #822 by @pieterklue. Three fixes:
1. Windows launcher now merges extraEnv into spawned server env (was
   only passing BROWSE_STATE_FILE, dropping all other env vars)
2. Welcome page fallback serves inline HTML instead of about:blank
   redirect (avoids ERR_UNSAFE_REDIRECT on Windows)
3. /health returns auth token in headed mode even without Origin header
   (fixes Playwright Chromium extensions that don't send it)

Also adds HOME/USERPROFILE fallback for cross-platform compatibility.

Co-Authored-By: pieterklue <pieterklue@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): terminate orphan server when parent process exits (#808)

Community PR #808 by @mmporong. Passes BROWSE_PARENT_PID to the spawned
server process. The server polls every 15s with signal 0 and calls
shutdown() if the parent is gone. Prevents orphaned chrome-headless-shell
processes when Claude Code sessions exit abnormally.

Co-Authored-By: mmporong <mmporong@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): IPv6 ULA blocking, cookie redaction, per-tab cancel, targeted token (#664)

Community PR #664 by @mr-k-man (security audit round 1, new parts only).

- IPv6 ULA prefix blocking (fc00::/7) in url-validation.ts with false-positive
  guard for hostnames like fd.example.com
- Cookie value redaction for tokens, API keys, JWTs in browse cookies command
- Per-tab cancel files in killAgent() replacing broken global kill-signal
- design/serve.ts: realpathSync upgrade prevents symlink bypass in /api/reload
- extension: targeted getToken handler replaces token-in-health-broadcast
- Supabase migration 003: column-level GRANT restricts anon UPDATE scope
- Telemetry sync: upsert error logging
- 10 new tests for IPv6, cookie redaction, DNS rebinding, path traversal

Co-Authored-By: mr-k-man <mr-k-man@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): CSS injection guard, timeout clamping, session validation, tests (#806)

Community PR #806 by @mr-k-man (security audit round 2, new parts only).

- CSS value validation (DANGEROUS_CSS) in cdp-inspector, write-commands, extension inspector
- Queue file permissions (0o700/0o600) in cli, server, sidebar-agent
- escapeRegExp for frame --url ReDoS fix
- Responsive screenshot path validation with validateOutputPath
- State load cookie filtering (reject localhost/.internal/metadata cookies)
- Session ID format validation in loadSession
- /health endpoint: remove currentUrl and currentMessage fields
- QueueEntry interface + isValidQueueEntry validator for sidebar-agent
- SIGTERM->SIGKILL escalation in timeout handler
- Viewport dimension clamping (1-16384), wait timeout clamping (1s-300s)
- Cookie domain validation in cookie-import and cookie-import-browser
- DocumentFragment-based tab switching (XSS fix in sidepanel)
- pollInProgress reentrancy guard for pollChat
- toggleClass/injectCSS input validation in extension inspector
- Snapshot annotated path validation with realpathSync
- 714-line security-audit-r2.test.ts + 33-line learnings-injection.test.ts

Co-Authored-By: mr-k-man <mr-k-man@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.13.0)

Community security wave: 8 PRs from 4 contributors (@garagon, @mr-k-man,
@mmporong, @0531Kim, @pieterklue). IPv6 ULA blocking, cookie redaction,
per-tab cancel signaling, CSS injection guards, timeout clamping, session
validation, DocumentFragment XSS fix, parent process watchdog, uninstall
docs, Windows fixes, and 750+ lines of security regression tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: 0531Kim <0531Kim@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: pieterklue <pieterklue@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: mmporong <mmporong@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: mr-k-man <mr-k-man@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
2026-04-06 00:47:04 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent b3d064aabb
commit 03973c2fab
30 changed files with 4066 additions and 108 deletions

View File

@@ -20,12 +20,50 @@ const SERVER_URL = `http://127.0.0.1:${SERVER_PORT}`;
const POLL_MS = 200; // 200ms poll — keeps time-to-first-token low
const B = process.env.BROWSE_BIN || path.resolve(__dirname, '../../.claude/skills/gstack/browse/dist/browse');
const CANCEL_DIR = path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.gstack');
function cancelFileForTab(tabId: number): string {
return path.join(CANCEL_DIR, `sidebar-agent-cancel-${tabId}`);
}
interface QueueEntry {
prompt: string;
args?: string[];
stateFile?: string;
cwd?: string;
tabId?: number | null;
message?: string | null;
pageUrl?: string | null;
sessionId?: string | null;
ts?: string;
}
function isValidQueueEntry(e: unknown): e is QueueEntry {
if (typeof e !== 'object' || e === null) return false;
const obj = e as Record<string, unknown>;
if (typeof obj.prompt !== 'string' || obj.prompt.length === 0) return false;
if (obj.args !== undefined && (!Array.isArray(obj.args) || !obj.args.every(a => typeof a === 'string'))) return false;
if (obj.stateFile !== undefined) {
if (typeof obj.stateFile !== 'string') return false;
if (obj.stateFile.includes('..')) return false;
}
if (obj.cwd !== undefined) {
if (typeof obj.cwd !== 'string') return false;
if (obj.cwd.includes('..')) return false;
}
if (obj.tabId !== undefined && obj.tabId !== null && typeof obj.tabId !== 'number') return false;
if (obj.message !== undefined && obj.message !== null && typeof obj.message !== 'string') return false;
if (obj.pageUrl !== undefined && obj.pageUrl !== null && typeof obj.pageUrl !== 'string') return false;
if (obj.sessionId !== undefined && obj.sessionId !== null && typeof obj.sessionId !== 'string') return false;
return true;
}
let lastLine = 0;
let authToken: string | null = null;
// Per-tab processing — each tab can run its own agent concurrently
const processingTabs = new Set<number>();
// Active claude subprocesses — keyed by tabId for targeted kill
const activeProcs = new Map<number, ReturnType<typeof spawn>>();
let activeProc: ReturnType<typeof spawn> | null = null;
// Kill-file timestamp last seen — avoids double-kill on same write
let lastKillTs = 0;
@@ -228,7 +266,7 @@ async function handleStreamEvent(event: any, tabId?: number): Promise<void> {
}
}
async function askClaude(queueEntry: any): Promise<void> {
async function askClaude(queueEntry: QueueEntry): Promise<void> {
const { prompt, args, stateFile, cwd, tabId } = queueEntry;
const tid = tabId ?? 0;
@@ -250,6 +288,10 @@ async function askClaude(queueEntry: any): Promise<void> {
effectiveCwd = process.cwd();
}
// Clear any stale cancel signal for this tab before starting
const cancelFile = cancelFileForTab(tid);
try { fs.unlinkSync(cancelFile); } catch {}
const proc = spawn('claude', claudeArgs, {
stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
cwd: effectiveCwd,
@@ -270,9 +312,23 @@ async function askClaude(queueEntry: any): Promise<void> {
// Track active procs so kill-file polling can terminate them
activeProcs.set(tid, proc);
activeProc = proc;
proc.stdin.end();
// Poll for per-tab cancel signal from server's killAgent()
const cancelCheck = setInterval(() => {
try {
if (fs.existsSync(cancelFile)) {
console.log(`[sidebar-agent] Cancel signal received for tab ${tid} — killing claude subprocess`);
try { proc.kill('SIGTERM'); } catch {}
setTimeout(() => { try { proc.kill('SIGKILL'); } catch {} }, 3000);
fs.unlinkSync(cancelFile);
clearInterval(cancelCheck);
}
} catch {}
}, 500);
let buffer = '';
proc.stdout.on('data', (data: Buffer) => {
@@ -293,6 +349,8 @@ async function askClaude(queueEntry: any): Promise<void> {
});
proc.on('close', (code) => {
clearInterval(cancelCheck);
activeProc = null;
activeProcs.delete(tid);
if (buffer.trim()) {
try { handleStreamEvent(JSON.parse(buffer), tid); } catch (err: any) {
@@ -310,6 +368,8 @@ async function askClaude(queueEntry: any): Promise<void> {
});
proc.on('error', (err) => {
clearInterval(cancelCheck);
activeProc = null;
const errorMsg = stderrBuffer.trim()
? `${err.message}\nstderr: ${stderrBuffer.trim().slice(-500)}`
: err.message;
@@ -322,9 +382,10 @@ async function askClaude(queueEntry: any): Promise<void> {
// Timeout (default 300s / 5 min — multi-page tasks need time)
const timeoutMs = parseInt(process.env.SIDEBAR_AGENT_TIMEOUT || '300000', 10);
setTimeout(() => {
try { proc.kill(); } catch (killErr: any) {
try { proc.kill('SIGTERM'); } catch (killErr: any) {
console.warn(`[sidebar-agent] Tab ${tid}: Failed to kill timed-out process:`, killErr.message);
}
setTimeout(() => { try { proc.kill('SIGKILL'); } catch {} }, 3000);
const timeoutMsg = stderrBuffer.trim()
? `Timed out after ${timeoutMs / 1000}s\nstderr: ${stderrBuffer.trim().slice(-500)}`
: `Timed out after ${timeoutMs / 1000}s`;
@@ -366,12 +427,16 @@ async function poll() {
const line = readLine(lastLine);
if (!line) continue;
let entry: any;
try { entry = JSON.parse(line); } catch (err: any) {
let parsed: unknown;
try { parsed = JSON.parse(line); } catch (err: any) {
console.warn(`[sidebar-agent] Skipping malformed queue entry at line ${lastLine}:`, line.slice(0, 80), err.message);
continue;
}
if (!entry.message && !entry.prompt) continue;
if (!isValidQueueEntry(parsed)) {
console.warn(`[sidebar-agent] Skipping invalid queue entry at line ${lastLine}: failed schema validation`);
continue;
}
const entry = parsed;
const tid = entry.tabId ?? 0;
// Skip if this tab already has an agent running — server queues per-tab
@@ -415,6 +480,7 @@ async function main() {
const dir = path.dirname(QUEUE);
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
if (!fs.existsSync(QUEUE)) fs.writeFileSync(QUEUE, '', { mode: 0o600 });
try { fs.chmodSync(QUEUE, 0o600); } catch {}
lastLine = countLines();
await refreshToken();