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fix: chain scope bypass + /health info leak when tunneled

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1. Chain command now pre-validates ALL subcommand scopes before
   executing any. A read+meta token can no longer escalate to
   admin via chain (eval, js, cookies were dispatched without
   scope checks). tokenInfo flows through handleMetaCommand into
   the chain handler. Rejects entire chain if any subcommand fails.

2. /health strips sensitive fields (currentUrl, agent.currentMessage,
   session) when tunnel is active. Only operational metadata (status,
   mode, uptime, tabs) exposed to the internet. Previously anyone
   reaching the ngrok URL could surveil browsing activity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
2026-04-05 00:49:31 -07:00
parent a5b40045b8
commit 36a20c5d59
3 changed files with 72 additions and 21 deletions
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44
browse/test/server-auth.test.ts
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@@ -28,14 +28,19 @@ describe('Server auth security', () => {
// Token must not appear in the health response construction
expect(healthBlock).not.toContain('token: AUTH_TOKEN');
expect(healthBlock).not.toContain('token: AUTH');
// Should have a comment explaining why
expect(healthBlock).toContain('NOT served here');
// Should not expose browsing activity when tunneled
expect(healthBlock).toContain('not through tunnel');
});
// Test 1b: /health must not use chrome-extension Origin gating (spoofable)
test('/health does not use spoofable Origin header for token gating', () => {
// Test 1b: /health strips sensitive fields when tunneled
test('/health strips currentUrl, agent, session when tunnel is active', () => {
const healthBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/health'", "url.pathname === '/connect'");
expect(healthBlock).not.toContain("chrome-extension://') ? { token");
// currentUrl and agent.currentMessage must be gated on !tunnelActive
expect(healthBlock).toContain('!tunnelActive');
expect(healthBlock).toContain('currentUrl');
expect(healthBlock).toContain('currentMessage');
// Tunnel URL must NOT be exposed in health response
expect(healthBlock).not.toContain('url: tunnelUrl');
});
// Test 1c: newtab must check domain restrictions (CSO finding #5)
@@ -139,7 +144,34 @@ describe('Server auth security', () => {
expect(handleBlock).toContain('Tab not owned by your agent');
});
// Test 10b: activity attribution includes clientId
// Test 10b: chain command pre-validates subcommand scopes
test('chain handler checks scope for each subcommand before dispatch', () => {
const metaSrc = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/meta-commands.ts'), 'utf-8');
const chainBlock = metaSrc.slice(
metaSrc.indexOf("case 'chain':"),
metaSrc.indexOf("case 'diff':")
);
expect(chainBlock).toContain('checkScope');
expect(chainBlock).toContain('Chain rejected');
expect(chainBlock).toContain('tokenInfo');
});
// Test 10c: handleMetaCommand accepts tokenInfo parameter
test('handleMetaCommand accepts tokenInfo for chain scope checking', () => {
const metaSrc = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/meta-commands.ts'), 'utf-8');
const sig = metaSrc.slice(
metaSrc.indexOf('export async function handleMetaCommand'),
metaSrc.indexOf('): Promise<string>')
);
expect(sig).toContain('tokenInfo');
});
// Test 10d: server passes tokenInfo to handleMetaCommand
test('server passes tokenInfo to handleMetaCommand', () => {
expect(SERVER_SRC).toContain('handleMetaCommand(command, args, browserManager, shutdown, tokenInfo)');
});
// Test 10e: activity attribution includes clientId
test('activity events include clientId from token', () => {
const commandStartBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "Activity: emit command_start", "try {");
expect(commandStartBlock).toContain('clientId: tokenInfo?.clientId');