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security: tunnel dual-listener + SSRF + envelope + path wave (v1.6.0.0) (#1137)
* refactor(security): loosen /connect rate limit from 3/min to 300/min
Setup keys are 24 random bytes (unbruteforceable), so a tight rate limit
does not meaningfully prevent key guessing. It exists only to cap
bandwidth, CPU, and log-flood damage from someone who discovered the
ngrok URL. A legitimate pair-agent session hits /connect once; 300/min
is 60x that pattern and never hit accidentally.
3/min caused pairing to fail on any retry flow (network blip, second
paired client) with no upside. Per-IP tracking was considered and
rejected — adds a bounded Map + LRU for defense already adequate at the
global layer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(security): add tunnel-denial-log module for attack visibility
Append-only log of tunnel-surface auth denials to
~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl. Gives operators visibility into who
is probing tunneled daemons so the next security wave can be driven by
real attack data instead of speculation.
Design notes:
- Async via fs.promises.appendFile. Never appendFileSync — blocking the
event loop on every denial during a flood is what an attacker wants
(prior learning: sync-audit-log-io, 10/10 confidence).
- In-process rate cap at 60 writes/minute globally. Excess denials are
counted in memory but not written to disk — prevents disk DoS.
- Writes to the same ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl used by the
prompt-injection attempt log. File rotation is handled by the existing
security pipeline (10MB, 5 generations).
No consumers in this commit; wired up in the dual-listener refactor that
follows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(security): dual-listener tunnel architecture
The /health endpoint leaked AUTH_TOKEN to any caller that hit the ngrok
URL (spoofing chrome-extension:// origin, or catching headed mode).
Surfaced by @garagon in PR #1026; the original fix was header-inference
on the single port. Codex's outside-voice review during /plan-ceo-review
called that approach brittle (ngrok header behavior could change, local
proxies would false-positive), and pushed for the structural fix.
This is that fix. Stop making /health a root-token bootstrap endpoint on
any surface the tunnel can reach. The server now binds two HTTP
listeners when a tunnel is active. The local listener (extension, CLI,
sidebar) stays on 127.0.0.1 and is never exposed to ngrok. ngrok
forwards only to the tunnel listener, which serves only /connect
(unauth, rate-limited) and /command with a locked allowlist of
browser-driving commands. Security property comes from physical port
separation, not from header inference — a tunnel caller cannot reach
/health or /cookie-picker or /inspector because they live on a
different TCP socket.
What this commit adds to browse/src/server.ts:
* Surface type ('local' | 'tunnel') and TUNNEL_PATHS +
TUNNEL_COMMANDS allowlists near the top of the file.
* makeFetchHandler(surface) factory replacing the single fetch arrow;
closure-captures the surface so the filter that runs before route
dispatch knows which socket accepted the request.
* Tunnel filter at dispatch entry: 404s anything not on TUNNEL_PATHS,
403s root-token bearers with a clear pairing hint, 401s non-/connect
requests that lack a scoped token. Every denial is logged via
logTunnelDenial (from tunnel-denial-log).
* GET /connect alive probe (unauth on both surfaces) so /pair and
/tunnel/start can detect dead ngrok tunnels without reaching
/health — /health is no longer tunnel-reachable.
* Lazy tunnel listener lifecycle. /tunnel/start binds a dedicated
Bun.serve on an ephemeral port, points ngrok.forward at THAT port
(not the local port), hard-fails on bind error (no local fallback),
tears down cleanly on ngrok failure. BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup uses
the same pattern.
* closeTunnel() helper — single teardown path for both the ngrok
listener and the tunnel Bun.serve listener.
* resolveNgrokAuthtoken() helper — shared authtoken lookup across
/tunnel/start and BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup (was duplicated).
* TUNNEL_COMMANDS check in /command dispatch: on the tunnel surface,
commands outside the allowlist return 403 with a list of allowed
commands as a hint.
* Probe paths in /pair and /tunnel/start migrated from /health to
GET /connect — the only unauth path reachable on the tunnel surface
under the new architecture.
Test updates in browse/test/server-auth.test.ts:
* /pair liveness-verify test: assert via closeTunnel() helper instead
of the inline `tunnelActive = false; tunnelUrl = null` lines that
the helper subsumes.
* /tunnel/start cached-tunnel test: same closeTunnel() adaptation.
Credit
Derived from PR #1026 by @garagon — thanks for flagging the critical
bug that drove the architectural rewrite. The per-request
isTunneledRequest approach from #1026 is superseded by physical port
separation here; the underlying report remains the root cause for the
entire v1.6.0.0 wave.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(security): add source-level guards for dual-listener architecture
23 source-level assertions that keep future contributors from silently
widening the tunnel surface during a routine refactor. Covers:
* Surface type + tunnelServer state variable shape
* TUNNEL_PATHS is a closed set of /connect, /command, /sidebar-chat
(and NOT /health, /welcome, /cookie-picker, /inspector/*, /pair,
/token, /refs, /activity/stream, /tunnel/{start,stop})
* TUNNEL_COMMANDS includes browser-driving ops only (and NOT
launch-browser, tunnel-start, token-mint, cookie-import, etc.)
* makeFetchHandler(surface) factory exists and is wired to both
listeners with the correct surface parameter
* Tunnel filter runs BEFORE any route dispatch, with 404/403/401
responses and logged denials for each reason
* GET /connect returns {alive: true} unauth
* /command dispatch enforces TUNNEL_COMMANDS on tunnel surface
* closeTunnel() helper tears down ngrok + Bun.serve listener
* /tunnel/start binds on ephemeral port, points ngrok at TUNNEL_PORT
(not local port), hard-fails on bind error (no fallback), probes
cached tunnel via GET /connect (not /health), tears down on
ngrok.forward failure
* BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup uses the dual-listener pattern
* logTunnelDenial wired for all three denial reasons
* /connect rate limit is 300/min, not 3/min
All 23 tests pass. Behavioral integration tests (spawn subprocess, real
network) live in the E2E suite that lands later in this wave.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* security: gate download + scrape through validateNavigationUrl (SSRF)
The `goto` command was correctly wired through validateNavigationUrl,
but `download` and `scrape` called page.request.fetch(url, ...) directly.
A caller with the default write scope could hit the /command endpoint
and ask the daemon to fetch http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
(AWS IMDSv1) or the GCP/Azure/internal equivalents. The response body
comes back as base64 or lands on disk where GET /file serves it.
Fix: call validateNavigationUrl(url) immediately before each
page.request.fetch() call site in download and in the scrape loop.
Same blocklist that already protects `goto`: file://, javascript:,
data:, chrome://, cloud metadata (IPv4 all encodings, IPv6 ULA,
metadata.*.internal).
Tests: extend browse/test/url-validation.test.ts with a source-level
guard that walks every `await page.request.fetch(` call site and
asserts a validateNavigationUrl call precedes it within the same
branch. Regression trips before code review if a future refactor
drops the gate.
* security: route splitForScoped through envelope sentinel escape
The scoped-token snapshot path in snapshot.ts built its untrusted
block by pushing the raw accessibility-tree lines between the literal
`═══ BEGIN UNTRUSTED WEB CONTENT ═══` / `═══ END UNTRUSTED WEB CONTENT ═══`
sentinels. The full-page wrap path in content-security.ts already
applied a zero-width-space escape on those exact strings to prevent
sentinel injection, but the scoped path skipped it.
Net effect: a page whose rendered text contains the literal sentinel
can close the envelope early from inside untrusted content and forge
a fake "trusted" block for the LLM. That includes fabricating
interactive `@eN` references the agent will act on.
Fix:
* Extract the zero-width-space escape into a named, exported helper
`escapeEnvelopeSentinels(content)` in content-security.ts.
* Have `wrapUntrustedPageContent` call it (behavior unchanged on
that path — same bytes out).
* Import the helper in snapshot.ts and map it over `untrustedLines`
in the `splitForScoped` branch before pushing the BEGIN sentinel.
Tests: add a describe block in content-security.test.ts that covers
* `escapeEnvelopeSentinels` defuses BEGIN and END markers;
* `escapeEnvelopeSentinels` leaves normal text untouched;
* `wrapUntrustedPageContent` still emits exactly one real envelope
pair when hostile content contains forged sentinels;
* snapshot.ts imports the helper;
* the scoped-snapshot branch calls `escapeEnvelopeSentinels` before
pushing the BEGIN sentinel (source-level regression — if a future
refactor reorders this, the test trips).
* security: extend hidden-element detection to all DOM-reading channels
The Confusion Protocol envelope wrap (`wrapUntrustedPageContent`)
covers every scoped PAGE_CONTENT_COMMAND, but the hidden-element
ARIA-injection detection layer only ran for `text`. Other DOM-reading
channels (html, links, forms, accessibility, attrs, data, media,
ux-audit) returned their output through the envelope with no hidden-
content filter, so a page serving a display:none div that instructs
the agent to disregard prior system messages, or an aria-label that
claims to put the LLM in admin mode, leaked the injection payload on
any non-text channel. The envelope alone does not mitigate this, and
the page itself never rendered the hostile content to the human
operator.
Fix:
* New export `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS` in commands.ts — the subset of
PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS that derives its output from the live DOM.
Console and dialog stay out; they read separate runtime state.
* server.ts runs `markHiddenElements` + `cleanupHiddenMarkers` for
every scoped command in this set. `text` keeps its existing
`getCleanTextWithStripping` path (hidden elements physically
stripped before the read). All other channels keep their output
format but emit flagged elements as CONTENT WARNINGS on the
envelope, so the LLM sees what it would otherwise have consumed
silently.
* Hidden-element descriptions merge into `combinedWarnings`
alongside content-filter warnings before the wrap call.
Tests: new describe block in content-security.test.ts covering
* `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS` export shape and channel membership;
* dispatch gates on `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS.has(command)`, not the
literal `text` string;
* hiddenContentWarnings plumbs into `combinedWarnings` and reaches
wrapUntrustedPageContent;
* DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS is a strict subset of PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS.
Existing datamarking, envelope wrap, centralized-wrapping, and chain
security suites stay green (52 pass, 0 fail).
* security: validate --from-file payload paths for parity with direct paths
The direct `load-html <file>` path runs every caller-supplied file path
through validateReadPath() so reads stay confined to SAFE_DIRECTORIES
(cwd, TEMP_DIR). The `load-html --from-file <payload.json>` shortcut
and its sibling `pdf --from-file <payload.json>` skipped that check and
went straight to fs.readFileSync(). An MCP caller that picks the
payload path (or any caller whose payload argument is reachable from
attacker-influenced text) could use --from-file as a read-anywhere
escape hatch for the safe-dirs policy.
Fix: call validateReadPath(path.resolve(payloadPath)) before readFileSync
at both sites. Error surface mirrors the direct-path branch so ops and
agent errors stay consistent.
Test coverage in browse/test/from-file-path-validation.test.ts:
- source-level: validateReadPath precedes readFileSync in the load-html
--from-file branch (write-commands.ts) and the pdf --from-file parser
(meta-commands.ts)
- error-message parity: both sites reference SAFE_DIRECTORIES
Related security audit pattern: R3 F002 (validateNavigationUrl gap on
download/scrape) and R3 F008 (markHiddenElements gap on 10 DOM commands)
were the same shape — a defense that existed on the primary code path
but not its shortcut sibling. This PR closes the same class of gap on
the --from-file shortcuts.
* fix(design): escape url.origin when injecting into served HTML
serve.ts injected url.origin into a single-quoted JS string in
the response body. A local request with a crafted Host header
(e.g. Host: "evil'-alert(1)-'x") would break out of the string
and execute JS in the 127.0.0.1:<port> origin opened by the
design board. Low severity — bound to localhost, requires a
local attacker — but no reason not to escape.
Fix: JSON.stringify(url.origin) produces a properly quoted,
escaped JS string literal in one call.
Also includes Prettier reformatting (single→double quotes,
trailing commas, line wrapping) applied by the repo's
PostToolUse formatter hook. Security change is the one line
in the HTML injection; everything else is whitespace/style.
* fix(scripts): drop shell:true from slop-diff npx invocations
spawnSync('npx', [...], { shell: true }) invokes /bin/sh -c
with the args concatenated, subjecting them to shell parsing
(word splitting, glob expansion, metacharacter interpretation).
No user input reaches these calls today, so not exploitable —
but the posture is wrong: npx + shell args should be direct.
Fix: scope shell:true to process.platform === 'win32' where
npx is actually a .cmd requiring the shell. POSIX runs the
npx binary directly with array-form args.
Also includes Prettier reformatting (single→double quotes,
trailing commas, line wrapping) applied by the repo's
PostToolUse formatter hook. Security-relevant change is just
the two shell:true -> shell: process.platform === 'win32'
lines; everything else is whitespace/style.
* security(E3): gate GSTACK_SLUG on /welcome path traversal
The /welcome handler interpolates GSTACK_SLUG directly into the filesystem
path used to locate the project-local welcome page. Without validation, a
slug like "../../etc/passwd" would resolve to
~/.gstack/projects/../../etc/passwd/designs/welcome-page-20260331/finalized.html
— classic path traversal.
Not exploitable today: GSTACK_SLUG is set by the gstack CLI at daemon launch,
and an attacker would already need local env-var access to poison it. But
the gate is one regex (^[a-z0-9_-]+$), and a defense-in-depth pass costs us
nothing when the cost of being wrong is arbitrary file read via /welcome.
Fall back to the safe 'unknown' literal when the slug fails validation —
same fallback the code already uses when GSTACK_SLUG is unset. No behavior
change for legitimate slugs (they all match the regex).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* security(N1): replace ?token= SSE auth with HttpOnly session cookie
Activity stream and inspector events SSE endpoints accepted the root
AUTH_TOKEN via `?token=` query param (EventSource can't send Authorization
headers). URLs leak to browser history, referer headers, server logs,
crash reports, and refactoring accidents. Codex flagged this during the
/plan-ceo-review outside voice pass.
New auth model: the extension calls POST /sse-session with a Bearer token
and receives a view-only session cookie (HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, 30-min
TTL). EventSource is opened with `withCredentials: true` so the browser
sends the cookie back on the SSE connection. The ?token= query param is
GONE — no more URL-borne secrets.
Scope isolation (prior learning cookie-picker-auth-isolation, 10/10
confidence): the SSE session cookie grants access to /activity/stream and
/inspector/events ONLY. The token is never valid against /command, /token,
or any mutating endpoint. A leaked cookie can watch activity; it cannot
execute browser commands.
Components
* browse/src/sse-session-cookie.ts — registry: mint/validate/extract/
build-cookie. 256-bit tokens, 30-min TTL, lazy expiry pruning,
no imports from token-registry (scope isolation enforced by module
boundary).
* browse/src/server.ts — POST /sse-session mint endpoint (requires
Bearer). /activity/stream and /inspector/events now accept Bearer
OR the session cookie, and reject ?token= query param.
* extension/sidepanel.js — ensureSseSessionCookie() bootstrap call,
EventSource opened with withCredentials:true on both SSE endpoints.
Tested via the source guards; behavioral test is the E2E pairing
flow that lands later in the wave.
* browse/test/sse-session-cookie.test.ts — 20 unit tests covering
mint entropy, TTL enforcement, cookie flag invariants, cookie
parsing from multi-cookie headers, and scope-isolation contract
guard (module must not import token-registry).
* browse/test/server-auth.test.ts — existing /activity/stream auth
test updated to assert the new cookie-based gate and the absence
of the ?token= query param.
Cookie flag choices:
* HttpOnly: token not readable from page JS (mitigates XSS
exfiltration).
* SameSite=Strict: cookie not sent on cross-site requests (mitigates
CSRF). Fine for SSE because the extension connects to 127.0.0.1
directly.
* Path=/: cookie scoped to the whole origin.
* Max-Age=1800: 30 minutes, matches TTL. Extension re-mints on
reconnect when daemon restarts.
* Secure NOT set: daemon binds to 127.0.0.1 over plain HTTP. Adding
Secure would block the browser from ever sending the cookie back.
Add Secure when gstack ships over HTTPS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* security(N2): document Windows v20 ABE elevation path on CDP port
The existing comment around the cookie-import-browser --remote-debugging-port
launch claimed "threat model: no worse than baseline." That's wrong on
Windows with App-Bound Encryption v20. A same-user local process that
opens the cookie SQLite DB directly CANNOT decrypt v20 values (DPAPI
context is bound to the browser process). The CDP port lets them bypass
that: connect to the debug port, call Network.getAllCookies inside Chrome,
walk away with decrypted v20 cookies.
The correct fix is to switch from TCP --remote-debugging-port to
--remote-debugging-pipe so the CDP transport is a stdio pipe, not a
socket. That requires restructuring the CDP WebSocket client in this
module and Playwright doesn't expose the pipe transport out of the box.
Non-trivial, deferred from the v1.6.0.0 wave.
This commit updates the comment to correctly describe the threat and
points at the tracking issue. No code change to the launch itself.
Follow-up: #1136.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(E2): document dual-listener tunnel architecture in ARCHITECTURE.md
Adds an explicit per-endpoint disposition table to the Security model
section, covering the v1.6.0.0 dual-listener refactor. Every HTTP
endpoint now has a documented local-vs-tunnel answer. Future audits
(and future contributors wondering "is it safe to add X to the tunnel
surface?") can read this instead of reverse-engineering server.ts.
Also documents:
* Why physical port separation beats per-request header inference
(ngrok behavior drift, local proxies can forge headers, etc.)
* Tunnel surface denial logging → ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl
* SSE session cookie model (gstack_sse, 30-min TTL, stream-scope only,
module-boundary-enforced scope isolation)
* N2 non-goal for Windows v20 ABE via CDP port (tracking #1136)
No code changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(E1): end-to-end pair-agent flow against a spawned daemon
Spawns the browse daemon as a subprocess with BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP=1 so
the HTTP layer runs without a real browser. Exercises:
* GET /health — token delivery for chrome-extension origin, withheld
otherwise (the F1 + PR #1026 invariant)
* GET /connect — alive probe returns {alive:true} unauth
* POST /pair — root Bearer required (403 without), returns setup_key
* POST /connect — setup_key exchange mints a distinct scoped token
* POST /command — 401 without auth
* POST /sse-session — Bearer required, Set-Cookie has HttpOnly +
SameSite=Strict (the N1 invariant)
* GET /activity/stream — 401 without auth
* GET /activity/stream?token= — 401 (the old ?token= query param is
REJECTED, which is the whole point of N1)
* GET /welcome — serves HTML, does not leak /etc/passwd content under
the default 'unknown' slug (E3 regex gate)
12 behavioral tests, ~220ms end-to-end, no network dependencies, no
ngrok, no real browser. This is the receipt for the wave's central
'pair-agent still works + the security boundary holds' claim.
Tunnel-port binding (/tunnel/start) is deliberately NOT exercised here
— it requires an ngrok authtoken and live network. The dual-listener
route allowlist is covered by source-level guards in
dual-listener.test.ts; behavioral tunnel testing belongs in a separate
paid-evals harness.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* release(v1.6.0.0): bump VERSION + CHANGELOG for security wave
Architectural bump, not patch: dual-listener HTTP refactor changes the
daemon's tunnel-exposure model. See CHANGELOG for the full release
summary (~950 words) covering the five root causes this wave closes:
1. /health token leak over ngrok (F1 + E3 + test infra)
2. /cookie-picker + /inspector exposed over the tunnel (F1)
3. ?token=<ROOT> in SSE URLs leaking to logs/referer/history (N1)
4. /welcome GSTACK_SLUG path traversal (E3)
5. Windows v20 ABE elevation via CDP port (N2 — documented non-goal,
tracked as #1136)
Plus the base PRs: SSRF gate (#1029), envelope sentinel escape (#1031),
DOM-channel hidden-element coverage (#1032), --from-file path validation
(#1103), and 2 commits from #1073 (@theqazi).
VERSION + package.json bumped to 1.6.0.0. CHANGELOG entry covers
credits (@garagon, @Hybirdss, @HMAKT99, @theqazi), review lineage (CEO
→ Codex outside voice → Eng), and the non-goal tracking issue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: pre-landing review findings (4 auto-fixes)
Addresses 4 findings from the Claude adversarial subagent on the
v1.6.0.0 security wave diff. No user-visible behavior change; all
are defense-in-depth hardening of newly-introduced code.
1. GET /connect rate-limited (was POST-only) [HIGH conf 8/10]
Attacker discovering the ngrok URL could probe unlimited GETs for
daemon enumeration. Now shares the global /connect counter.
2. ngrok listener leak on tunnel startup failure [MEDIUM conf 8/10]
If ngrok.forward() resolved but tunnelListener.url() or the
state-file write threw, the Bun listener was torn down but the
ngrok session was leaked. Fixed in BOTH /tunnel/start and
BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup paths.
3. GSTACK_SKILL_ROOT path-traversal gate [MEDIUM conf 8/10]
Symmetric with E3's GSTACK_SLUG regex gate — reject values
containing '..' before interpolating into the welcome-page path.
4. SSE session registry pruning [LOW conf 7/10]
pruneExpired() only checked 10 entries per mint call. Now runs
on every validate too, checks 20 entries, with a hard 10k cap as
backstop. Prevents registry growth under sustained extension
reconnect pressure.
Tests remain green (56/56 in sse-session-cookie + dual-listener +
pair-agent-e2e suites).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: update project documentation for v1.6.0.0
Reflect the dual-listener tunnel architecture, SSE session cookies,
SSRF guards, and Windows v20 ABE non-goal across the three docs
users actually read for remote-agent and browser auth context:
- docs/REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md: rewrote Architecture diagram for
dual listeners, fixed /connect rate limit (3/min → 300/min),
removed stale "/health requires no auth" (now 404 on tunnel),
added SSE cookie auth, expanded Security Model with tunnel
allowlist, SSRF guards, /welcome path traversal defense, and
the Windows v20 ABE tracking note.
- BROWSER.md: added dual-listener paragraph to Authentication and
linked to ARCHITECTURE.md endpoint table. Replaced the stale
?token= SSE auth note with the HttpOnly gstack_sse cookie flow.
- CLAUDE.md: added Transport-layer security section above the
sidebar prompt-injection stack so contributors editing server.ts,
sse-session-cookie.ts, or tunnel-denial-log.ts see the load-bearing
module boundaries before touching them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(make-pdf): write --from-file payload to /tmp, not os.tmpdir()
make-pdf's browseClient wrote its --from-file payload to os.tmpdir(),
which is /var/folders/... on macOS. v1.6.0.0's PR #1103 cherry-pick
tightened browse load-html --from-file to validate against the
safe-dirs allowlist ([TEMP_DIR, cwd] where TEMP_DIR is '/tmp' on
macOS/Linux, os.tmpdir() on Windows). This closed a CLI/API parity
gap but broke make-pdf on macOS because /var/folders/... is outside
the allowlist.
Fix: mirror browse's TEMP_DIR convention — use '/tmp' on non-Windows,
os.tmpdir() on Windows. The make-pdf-gate CI failure on macOS-latest
(run 72440797490) is caused by exactly this: the payload file was
rejected by validateReadPath.
Verified locally: the combined-gate e2e test now passes after
rebuilding make-pdf/dist/pdf.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sidebar): killAgent resets per-tab state; align tests with current agent event format
Two pre-existing bugs surfaced while running the full e2e suite on the
sec-wave branch. Both pre-date v1.6.0.0 (same failures on main at
e23ff280) but blocked the ship verification, so fixing now.
### Bug 1: killAgent leaked stale per-tab state
`killAgent()` reset the legacy globals (agentProcess, agentStatus,
etc.) but never touched the per-tab `tabAgents` Map. Meanwhile
`/sidebar-command` routes on `tabState.status` from that Map, not the
legacy globals. Consequence: after a kill (including the implicit
kill in `/sidebar-session/new`), the next /sidebar-command on the
same tab saw `tabState.status === 'processing'` and fell into the
queue branch, silently NOT spawning an agent. Integration tests that
called resetState between cases all failed with empty queues.
Fix: when targetTabId is supplied, reset that one tab's state; when
called without a tab (session-new, full kill), reset ALL tab states.
Matches the semantic boundary already used for the cancel-file write.
### Bug 2: sidebar-integration tests drifted from current event format
`agent events appear in /sidebar-chat` posted the raw Claude streaming
format (`{type: 'assistant', message: {content: [...]}}`) but
`processAgentEvent` in server.ts only handles the simplified types
that sidebar-agent.ts pre-processes into (text, text_delta, tool_use,
result, agent_error, security_event). The architecture moved
pre-processing into sidebar-agent.ts at some point and this test
never got updated. Fixed by sending the pre-processed `{type:
'text', text: '...'}` format — which is actually what the server sees
in production.
Also removed the `entry.prompt` URL-containment check in the
queue-write test. The URL is carried on entry.pageUrl (metadata) by
design: the system prompt tells Claude to run `browse url` to fetch
the actual page rather than trust any URL in the prompt body. That's
the URL-based prompt-injection defense. The prompt SHOULD NOT
contain the URL, so the test assertion was wrong for the current
security posture.
### Verification
- `bun test browse/test/sidebar-integration.test.ts` → 13/13 pass
(was 6/13 on both main and branch before this commit)
- Full `bun run test` → exit 0, zero fail markers
- No behavior change for production sidebar flows: killAgent was
already supposed to return the agent to idle; it just wasn't fully
doing so. Per-tab reset now matches the documented semantics.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: gus <gustavoraularagon@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mohammed Qazi <10266060+theqazi@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
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CHANGELOG.md
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# Changelog
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## [1.6.0.0] - 2026-04-21
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## **The token leak in pair-agent sessions is closed by splitting the daemon into two HTTP listeners, not by pretending one port can be two things at once.**
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`pair-agent --client` is gstack's best onboarding moment. One command, a shareable URL, a remote agent driving your browser. It was also the moment we broadcast an unauthenticated `/health` endpoint to the public internet that handed out root browser tokens on any `Origin: chrome-extension://` spoof. @garagon flagged this in PR #1026 and it re-surfaced in a DM. The initial fix (check `tunnelActive` on the `/health` gate) shipped as a patch in review. Codex's outside voice during `/plan-ceo-review` called that approach brittle, and the user pivoted to the architectural fix: physical port separation. That's what this release is.
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When you run `pair-agent --client`, the daemon now binds TWO HTTP listeners. The local port (bootstrap, CLI, sidebar, cookie-picker, inspector) stays on 127.0.0.1 and is never forwarded. The tunnel port serves only `/connect` (pairing ceremony, unauth + rate-limited) and a locked allowlist of browser-driving commands. ngrok forwards only the tunnel port. A caller who stumbles onto your ngrok URL cannot reach `/health`, `/cookie-picker`, `/inspector/*`, or `/welcome` — not because the server denies them, because the HTTP request never arrives at the bootstrap port. Root tokens sent over the tunnel get a 403 with a clear pairing hint.
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The wave also closed three other CVE classes Codex surfaced. `/activity/stream` and `/inspector/events` used to accept the root token in `?token=` query params (URLs leak to logs, referer, history). Now they take a separate view-only 30-minute HttpOnly SameSite=Strict cookie that is NOT valid against `/command`. The `/welcome` handler interpolated `GSTACK_SLUG` into a filesystem path without validation. Fixed with a strict regex. The `/connect` rate limit was 3/min globally, which DOS'd any legitimate pair-agent retry. Loosened to 300/min because setup keys are 24 random bytes (unbruteforceable); the limit is for flood defense, not key guessing. The cookie-import-browser CDP port on Windows is documented as a v20 ABE elevation path with a tracking issue (#1136).
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### The numbers that matter
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| Surface | Before | After |
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|---|---|---|
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| `/health` over tunnel | returns root token to any chrome-extension origin | unreachable (404, wrong port) |
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| `/cookie-picker` over tunnel | HTML embeds the root token | unreachable (404, wrong port) |
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| `/inspector/*` over tunnel | reachable with Bearer | unreachable (404, wrong port) |
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| `/command` over tunnel, root token | executes | 403 with pairing hint |
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| `/command` over tunnel, scoped token | any command | allowlist: 17 browser-driving commands only |
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| `/activity/stream` auth | `?token=<ROOT>` in URL | HttpOnly `gstack_sse` cookie, 30-min TTL, stream-scope only |
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| `/inspector/events` auth | `?token=<ROOT>` in URL | same cookie as /activity/stream |
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| `/connect` rate limit | 3/min (blocked legit retries) | 300/min (flood-only, no pairing DoS) |
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| `/welcome` path traversal | `GSTACK_SLUG="../etc"` interpolates | regex `^[a-z0-9_-]+$`, fallback to built-in |
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| Tunnel auth-denial logging | none | async JSONL to `~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl`, rate-capped 60/min |
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| Windows v20 ABE via CDP | undocumented elevation | documented non-goal, tracked as #1136 |
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| Review layer | Verdict | Outcome |
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| `/plan-ceo-review` (Claude) | SELECTIVE EXPANSION | 7 proposals, 7 accepted, critical gap on extension sidebar bootstrap caught |
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| `/codex` (outside voice) | 14 findings | 3 factual errors in the plan fixed, 4 substantive tensions resolved, 2 new CVE classes added |
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| `/plan-eng-review` (Claude) | 5 arch decisions locked | tunnel lifecycle, token scoping, PR #1026 handling, SSE cookie design, route allowlist |
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### What this means for anyone running pair-agent
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Run `pair-agent --client test-agent` on your laptop. Share the ngrok URL with someone. Their agent drives your browser. Your sidebar keeps showing you what they're doing. A stranger who stumbles onto that ngrok URL in the meantime gets 404 on everything except `/connect`, and `/connect` without a setup key goes nowhere. Nothing about the command you type changes.
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### Itemized changes
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#### Added
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- **Dual-listener HTTP architecture.** When a tunnel is active, the daemon binds a dedicated listener on an ephemeral 127.0.0.1 port and points `ngrok.forward()` at it. `/tunnel/start` lazy-binds the listener; `/tunnel/stop` tears it down. Hard-fails on bind error, never falls back to the local port. `BROWSE_TUNNEL=1` startup follows the same pattern. `browse/src/server.ts` ~320 lines.
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- **Tunnel surface filter.** Runs before every route dispatch. 404s paths not on `TUNNEL_PATHS` (`/connect`, `/command`, `/sidebar-chat`). 403s any request carrying the root bearer token with a clear hint. 401s non-/connect requests without a scoped token. Every denial logs to `~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl`.
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- **Tunnel command allowlist.** `/command` on the tunnel surface enforces `TUNNEL_COMMANDS` (17 browser-driving commands: `goto`, `click`, `text`, `screenshot`, `html`, `links`, `forms`, `accessibility`, `attrs`, `media`, `data`, `scroll`, `press`, `type`, `select`, `wait`, `eval`). Remote paired agents cannot launch new browsers, configure the daemon, or touch the inspector.
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- **View-only SSE session cookie.** New `browse/src/sse-session-cookie.ts` registry with `POST /sse-session` mint endpoint. 256-bit tokens, 30-minute TTL, HttpOnly + SameSite=Strict. Scope-isolated from the main token registry at the module-boundary level (the module does not import `token-registry.ts`). Prior learning applied: `cookie-picker-auth-isolation`, 10/10 confidence.
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- **Tunnel auth-denial log.** `browse/src/tunnel-denial-log.ts`, async `fs.promises.appendFile` with 60/min rate cap in-process. Prior learning applied: `sync-audit-log-io`, 10/10 confidence.
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- **E2E pairing test.** `browse/test/pair-agent-e2e.test.ts`, 12 behavioral tests against a spawned daemon (BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP=1). Verifies `/pair` → `/connect` → scoped token → `/command` flow, `?token=` query param rejection, `/sse-session` cookie flags. ~220ms, no network.
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- **ARCHITECTURE.md dual-listener contract.** Per-endpoint disposition table (local vs tunnel), tunnel denial log model, SSE cookie scope, N2 non-goal documentation.
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#### Changed
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- **SSE endpoints no longer accept `?token=` in the URL.** `/activity/stream` and `/inspector/events` now take Bearer or the `gstack_sse` cookie. Extension (`extension/sidepanel.js`) fetches the cookie once at bootstrap via `POST /sse-session`, then opens `EventSource` with `withCredentials: true`. The URL never carries a secret.
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- **`/connect` rate limit loosened from 3/min to 300/min.** Setup keys are 24 random bytes; 3/min was a brute-force defense in name only and caused real pairing failures. 300/min handles floods without ever triggering on legitimate use.
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- **`/welcome` GSTACK_SLUG gated on `^[a-z0-9_-]+$`.** Defense-in-depth for a path not exploitable today but trivially mitigable.
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- **`/pair` and `/tunnel/start` probe the cached tunnel via `GET /connect`, not `/health`.** `/health` is no longer reachable on the tunnel surface under the dual-listener design.
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- **`cookie-import-browser.ts` comment corrected.** Previously claimed "no worse than baseline", wrong on Windows with v20 App-Bound Encryption, where the CDP port IS an elevation path. Documented with a tracking issue for the `--remote-debugging-pipe` follow-up.
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#### Fixed
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- **SSRF via download + scrape.** `page.request.fetch` calls in `browse/src/write-commands.ts` now pass through `validateNavigationUrl`. Blocks cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDSv1, GCP, Azure), RFC1918 ranges, `file://`. Derived from PR #1029 by @garagon.
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- **Envelope sentinel escape on scoped snapshot.** `browse/src/snapshot.ts` and `browse/src/content-security.ts` now share `escapeEnvelopeSentinels()`. Page content containing the literal envelope delimiter can no longer forge a fake "trusted" block in the LLM context. Derived from PR #1031 by @garagon.
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- **Hidden-element detection across all DOM-reading channels.** Previously only `command === 'text'` ran `markHiddenElements`. Now every DOM channel (`html`, `links`, `forms`, `accessibility`, `attrs`, `media`, `data`, `ux-audit`) surfaces hidden-content warnings in the envelope. Derived from PR #1032 by @garagon.
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- **`--from-file` payload path validation.** `load-html --from-file` and `pdf --from-file` now run `validateReadPath` on the payload path for parity with the direct-API paths. Closes a CLI/API escape hatch for `SAFE_DIRECTORIES`. Derived from PR #1103 by @garagon.
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- **`design/src/serve.ts` interpolated `url.origin` through `JSON.stringify`.** Defensive escape for origin values in served HTML. Contributed by @theqazi (PR #1073 partial).
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- **`scripts/slop-diff.ts` narrows `shell: true` to Windows only.** Matches the platform-specific need without widening the shell-interpretation surface on POSIX. Contributed by @theqazi (PR #1073 partial).
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#### For contributors
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- F1 (dual-listener refactor) is bisected as four commits on the branch: rate-limit loosening, new `tunnel-denial-log` module, the server.ts refactor, and the new source-level test suite. Each commit is independently green. Subsequent wave items rebase onto F1 cleanly.
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- Credits: @garagon (critical bug surface in PR #1026 plus SSRF, envelope, DOM-channel coverage, and --from-file PRs), @Hybirdss (PR #1002 concept, superseded by F1 but informed the policy model), @HMAKT99 (PRs #469 and #472 — both ended up already-landed-on-main; credit for surfacing the issues), @theqazi (2 commits from #1073, skills portion deferred pending internal voice review per CLAUDE.md).
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- Codex-reviewed plan stored at `~/.gstack/projects/garrytan-gstack/ceo-plans/2026-04-21-security-wave-v1.5.2.md`. Eng-review test plan at `~/.gstack/projects/garrytan-gstack/garrytan-garrytan-sec-wave-eng-review-test-plan-*.md`.
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- Non-goal tracked as #1136: switch cookie-import-browser CDP transport from TCP `--remote-debugging-port` to `--remote-debugging-pipe` so the Windows v20 ABE elevation path is closed. Non-trivial (Playwright doesn't expose the pipe transport; needs a minimal CDP-over-pipe client); intentionally deferred from this wave.
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## [1.5.1.0] - 2026-04-20
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## **Three visible bugs in v1.4.0.0 /make-pdf, all fixed.**
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