fix: security audit remediation — 12 fixes, 20 tests (v0.13.1.0) (#595)

* fix: remove auth token from /health, secure extension bootstrap (CRITICAL-02 + HIGH-03)

- Remove token from /health response (was leaked to any localhost process)
- Write .auth.json to extension dir for Manifest V3 bootstrap
- sidebar-agent reads token from state file via BROWSE_STATE_FILE env var
- Remove getToken handler from extension (token via health broadcast)
- Extension loads token before first health poll to prevent race condition

* fix: require auth on cookie-picker data routes (CRITICAL-01)

- Add Bearer token auth gate on all /cookie-picker/* data/action routes
- GET /cookie-picker HTML page stays unauthenticated (UI shell)
- Token embedded in served HTML for picker's fetch calls
- CORS preflight now allows Authorization header

* fix: add state file TTL and plaintext cookie warning (HIGH-02)

- Add savedAt timestamp to state save output
- Warn on load if state file older than 7 days
- Auto-delete stale state files (>7 days) on server startup
- Warning about plaintext cookie storage in save message

* fix: innerHTML XSS in extension content script and sidepanel (MEDIUM-01)

- content.js: replace innerHTML with createElement/textContent for ref panel
- sidepanel.js: escape entry.command with escapeHtml() in activity feed
- Both found by security audit + Codex adversarial red team

* fix: symlink bypass in validateReadPath (MEDIUM-02)

- Always resolve to absolute path first (fixes relative path bypass)
- Use realpathSync to follow symlinks before boundary check
- Throw on non-ENOENT realpathSync failures (explicit over silent)
- Resolve SAFE_DIRECTORIES through realpathSync (macOS /tmp → /private/tmp)
- Resolve directory part for non-existent files (ENOENT with symlinked parent)

* fix: freeze hook symlink bypass and prefix collision (MEDIUM-03)

- Add POSIX-portable path resolution (cd + pwd -P, works on macOS)
- Fix prefix collision: /project-evil no longer matches /project freeze dir
- Use trailing slash in boundary check to require directory boundary

* fix: shell script injection in gstack-config and telemetry (MEDIUM-04)

- gstack-config: validate keys (alphanumeric+underscore only)
- gstack-config: use grep -F (fixed string) instead of -E (regex)
- gstack-config: escape sed special chars in values, drop newlines
- gstack-telemetry-log: sanitize REPO_SLUG and BRANCH via json_safe()

* test: 20 security tests for audit remediation

- server-auth: verify token removed from /health, auth on /refs, /activity/*
- cookie-picker: auth required on data routes, HTML page unauthenticated
- path-validation: symlink bypass blocked, realpathSync failure throws
- gstack-config: regex key rejected, sed special chars preserved
- state-ttl: savedAt timestamp, 7-day TTL warning
- telemetry: branch/repo with quotes don't corrupt JSON
- adversarial: sidepanel escapes entry.command, freeze prefix collision

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.13.1.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: tone down changelog — defense in depth, not catastrophic bugs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
2026-03-28 08:35:24 -06:00
committed by GitHub
parent 78bc1d1968
commit 7450b5160b
24 changed files with 489 additions and 67 deletions

View File

@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ async function start() {
if (!skipBrowser) {
const headed = process.env.BROWSE_HEADED === '1';
if (headed) {
await browserManager.launchHeaded();
await browserManager.launchHeaded(AUTH_TOKEN);
console.log(`[browse] Launched headed Chromium with extension`);
} else {
await browserManager.launch();
@@ -819,9 +819,9 @@ async function start() {
fetch: async (req) => {
const url = new URL(req.url);
// Cookie picker routes — no auth required (localhost-only)
// Cookie picker routes — HTML page unauthenticated, data/action routes require auth
if (url.pathname.startsWith('/cookie-picker')) {
return handleCookiePickerRoute(url, req, browserManager);
return handleCookiePickerRoute(url, req, browserManager, AUTH_TOKEN);
}
// Health check — no auth required, does NOT reset idle timer
@@ -833,7 +833,7 @@ async function start() {
uptime: Math.floor((Date.now() - startTime) / 1000),
tabs: browserManager.getTabCount(),
currentUrl: browserManager.getCurrentUrl(),
token: AUTH_TOKEN, // Extension uses this for Bearer auth
// token removed — see .auth.json for extension bootstrap
chatEnabled: true,
agent: {
status: agentStatus,
@@ -848,8 +848,14 @@ async function start() {
});
}
// Refs endpoint — no auth required (localhost-only), does NOT reset idle timer
// Refs endpoint — auth required, does NOT reset idle timer
if (url.pathname === '/refs') {
if (!validateAuth(req)) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Unauthorized' }), {
status: 401,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
});
}
const refs = browserManager.getRefMap();
return new Response(JSON.stringify({
refs,
@@ -857,15 +863,20 @@ async function start() {
mode: browserManager.getConnectionMode(),
}), {
status: 200,
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': '*',
},
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
});
}
// Activity stream — SSE, no auth (localhost-only), does NOT reset idle timer
// Activity stream — SSE, auth required, does NOT reset idle timer
if (url.pathname === '/activity/stream') {
// Inline auth: accept Bearer header OR ?token= query param (EventSource can't send headers)
const streamToken = url.searchParams.get('token');
if (!validateAuth(req) && streamToken !== AUTH_TOKEN) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Unauthorized' }), {
status: 401,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
});
}
const afterId = parseInt(url.searchParams.get('after') || '0', 10);
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
@@ -913,21 +924,23 @@ async function start() {
'Content-Type': 'text/event-stream',
'Cache-Control': 'no-cache',
'Connection': 'keep-alive',
'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': '*',
},
});
}
// Activity history — REST, no auth (localhost-only), does NOT reset idle timer
// Activity history — REST, auth required, does NOT reset idle timer
if (url.pathname === '/activity/history') {
if (!validateAuth(req)) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Unauthorized' }), {
status: 401,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
});
}
const limit = parseInt(url.searchParams.get('limit') || '50', 10);
const { entries, totalAdded } = getActivityHistory(limit);
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ entries, totalAdded, subscribers: getSubscriberCount() }), {
status: 200,
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Access-Control-Allow-Origin': '*',
},
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
});
}
@@ -1139,6 +1152,23 @@ async function start() {
fs.renameSync(tmpFile, config.stateFile);
browserManager.serverPort = port;
// Clean up stale state files (older than 7 days)
try {
const stateDir = path.join(config.stateDir, 'browse-states');
if (fs.existsSync(stateDir)) {
const SEVEN_DAYS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
for (const file of fs.readdirSync(stateDir)) {
const filePath = path.join(stateDir, file);
const stat = fs.statSync(filePath);
if (Date.now() - stat.mtimeMs > SEVEN_DAYS) {
fs.unlinkSync(filePath);
console.log(`[browse] Deleted stale state file: ${file}`);
}
}
}
} catch {}
console.log(`[browse] Server running on http://127.0.0.1:${port} (PID: ${process.pid})`);
console.log(`[browse] State file: ${config.stateFile}`);
console.log(`[browse] Idle timeout: ${IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS / 1000}s`);