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fix: sidebar prompt injection defense (v0.13.4.0) (#611)

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* fix: sidebar prompt injection defense — XML framing, command allowlist, arg plumbing

Three security fixes for the Chrome sidebar:

1. XML-framed prompts with trust boundaries and escape of < > & in user
   messages to prevent tag injection attacks.

2. Bash command allowlist in system prompt — only browse binary commands
   ($B goto, $B click, etc.) allowed. All other bash commands forbidden.

3. Fix sidebar-agent.ts ignoring queued args — server-side --model and
   --allowedTools changes were silently dropped because the agent rebuilt
   args from scratch instead of using the queue entry.

Also defaults sidebar to Opus (harder to manipulate).

12 new tests covering XML escaping, command allowlist, Opus default,
trust boundary instructions, and arg plumbing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.13.4.0)

ML prompt injection defense design doc + P0 TODO for follow-up PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: clear stale worktree and claude session on sidebar reconnect

loadSession() was restoring worktreePath and claudeSessionId from prior
crashes. The worktree directory no longer existed (deleted on cleanup)
and --resume with a dead session ID caused claude to fail silently.

Now validates worktree exists on load and clears stale claude session
IDs on every server restart.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Garry Tan
2026-03-28 22:10:35 -06:00
committed by GitHub
parent cd66fc2f89
commit ea7dbc9a39
7 changed files with 637 additions and 5 deletions
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CHANGELOG.md
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@@ -1,5 +1,20 @@
# Changelog
## [0.13.4.0] - 2026-03-29 — Sidebar Defense
The Chrome sidebar now defends against prompt injection attacks. Three layers: XML-framed prompts with trust boundaries, a command allowlist that restricts bash to browse commands only, and Opus as the default model (harder to manipulate).
### Fixed
- **Sidebar agent now respects server-side args.** The sidebar-agent process was silently rebuilding its own Claude args from scratch, ignoring `--model`, `--allowedTools`, and other flags set by the server. Every server-side configuration change was silently dropped. Now uses the queued args.
### Added
- **XML prompt framing with trust boundaries.** User messages are wrapped in `<user-message>` tags with explicit instructions to treat content as data, not instructions. XML special characters (`< > &`) are escaped to prevent tag injection attacks.
- **Bash command allowlist.** The sidebar's system prompt now restricts Claude to browse binary commands only (`$B goto`, `$B click`, `$B snapshot`, etc.). All other bash commands (`curl`, `rm`, `cat`, etc.) are forbidden. This prevents prompt injection from escalating to arbitrary code execution.
- **Opus default for sidebar.** The sidebar now uses Opus (the most injection-resistant model) by default, instead of whatever model Claude Code happens to be running.
- **ML prompt injection defense design doc.** Full design doc at `docs/designs/ML_PROMPT_INJECTION_KILLER.md` covering the follow-up ML classifier (DeBERTa, BrowseSafe-bench, Bun-native 5ms vision). P0 TODO for the next PR.
## [0.13.3.0] - 2026-03-28 — Lock It Down
Six fixes from community PRs and bug reports. The big one: your dependency tree is now pinned. Every `bun install` resolves the exact same versions, every time. No more floating ranges pulling fresh packages from npm on every setup.