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8 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Garry Tan
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00f966b3ec |
v1.30.0.0 fix wave: 21 community PRs + Windows CI extension + codex flag-semantics smoke (#1391)
* fix(codex): use resume-compatible flags * fix: V-001 security vulnerability Automated security fix generated by Orbis Security AI * docs: align prompt-injection thresholds to security.ts (v1.6.4.0 catch-up) CLAUDE.md:290 and ARCHITECTURE.md:159 were missed when WARN was bumped 0.60 → 0.75 in |
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Garry Tan
|
54d4cde773 |
security: tunnel dual-listener + SSRF + envelope + path wave (v1.6.0.0) (#1137)
* refactor(security): loosen /connect rate limit from 3/min to 300/min
Setup keys are 24 random bytes (unbruteforceable), so a tight rate limit
does not meaningfully prevent key guessing. It exists only to cap
bandwidth, CPU, and log-flood damage from someone who discovered the
ngrok URL. A legitimate pair-agent session hits /connect once; 300/min
is 60x that pattern and never hit accidentally.
3/min caused pairing to fail on any retry flow (network blip, second
paired client) with no upside. Per-IP tracking was considered and
rejected — adds a bounded Map + LRU for defense already adequate at the
global layer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(security): add tunnel-denial-log module for attack visibility
Append-only log of tunnel-surface auth denials to
~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl. Gives operators visibility into who
is probing tunneled daemons so the next security wave can be driven by
real attack data instead of speculation.
Design notes:
- Async via fs.promises.appendFile. Never appendFileSync — blocking the
event loop on every denial during a flood is what an attacker wants
(prior learning: sync-audit-log-io, 10/10 confidence).
- In-process rate cap at 60 writes/minute globally. Excess denials are
counted in memory but not written to disk — prevents disk DoS.
- Writes to the same ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl used by the
prompt-injection attempt log. File rotation is handled by the existing
security pipeline (10MB, 5 generations).
No consumers in this commit; wired up in the dual-listener refactor that
follows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(security): dual-listener tunnel architecture
The /health endpoint leaked AUTH_TOKEN to any caller that hit the ngrok
URL (spoofing chrome-extension:// origin, or catching headed mode).
Surfaced by @garagon in PR #1026; the original fix was header-inference
on the single port. Codex's outside-voice review during /plan-ceo-review
called that approach brittle (ngrok header behavior could change, local
proxies would false-positive), and pushed for the structural fix.
This is that fix. Stop making /health a root-token bootstrap endpoint on
any surface the tunnel can reach. The server now binds two HTTP
listeners when a tunnel is active. The local listener (extension, CLI,
sidebar) stays on 127.0.0.1 and is never exposed to ngrok. ngrok
forwards only to the tunnel listener, which serves only /connect
(unauth, rate-limited) and /command with a locked allowlist of
browser-driving commands. Security property comes from physical port
separation, not from header inference — a tunnel caller cannot reach
/health or /cookie-picker or /inspector because they live on a
different TCP socket.
What this commit adds to browse/src/server.ts:
* Surface type ('local' | 'tunnel') and TUNNEL_PATHS +
TUNNEL_COMMANDS allowlists near the top of the file.
* makeFetchHandler(surface) factory replacing the single fetch arrow;
closure-captures the surface so the filter that runs before route
dispatch knows which socket accepted the request.
* Tunnel filter at dispatch entry: 404s anything not on TUNNEL_PATHS,
403s root-token bearers with a clear pairing hint, 401s non-/connect
requests that lack a scoped token. Every denial is logged via
logTunnelDenial (from tunnel-denial-log).
* GET /connect alive probe (unauth on both surfaces) so /pair and
/tunnel/start can detect dead ngrok tunnels without reaching
/health — /health is no longer tunnel-reachable.
* Lazy tunnel listener lifecycle. /tunnel/start binds a dedicated
Bun.serve on an ephemeral port, points ngrok.forward at THAT port
(not the local port), hard-fails on bind error (no local fallback),
tears down cleanly on ngrok failure. BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup uses
the same pattern.
* closeTunnel() helper — single teardown path for both the ngrok
listener and the tunnel Bun.serve listener.
* resolveNgrokAuthtoken() helper — shared authtoken lookup across
/tunnel/start and BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup (was duplicated).
* TUNNEL_COMMANDS check in /command dispatch: on the tunnel surface,
commands outside the allowlist return 403 with a list of allowed
commands as a hint.
* Probe paths in /pair and /tunnel/start migrated from /health to
GET /connect — the only unauth path reachable on the tunnel surface
under the new architecture.
Test updates in browse/test/server-auth.test.ts:
* /pair liveness-verify test: assert via closeTunnel() helper instead
of the inline `tunnelActive = false; tunnelUrl = null` lines that
the helper subsumes.
* /tunnel/start cached-tunnel test: same closeTunnel() adaptation.
Credit
Derived from PR #1026 by @garagon — thanks for flagging the critical
bug that drove the architectural rewrite. The per-request
isTunneledRequest approach from #1026 is superseded by physical port
separation here; the underlying report remains the root cause for the
entire v1.6.0.0 wave.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(security): add source-level guards for dual-listener architecture
23 source-level assertions that keep future contributors from silently
widening the tunnel surface during a routine refactor. Covers:
* Surface type + tunnelServer state variable shape
* TUNNEL_PATHS is a closed set of /connect, /command, /sidebar-chat
(and NOT /health, /welcome, /cookie-picker, /inspector/*, /pair,
/token, /refs, /activity/stream, /tunnel/{start,stop})
* TUNNEL_COMMANDS includes browser-driving ops only (and NOT
launch-browser, tunnel-start, token-mint, cookie-import, etc.)
* makeFetchHandler(surface) factory exists and is wired to both
listeners with the correct surface parameter
* Tunnel filter runs BEFORE any route dispatch, with 404/403/401
responses and logged denials for each reason
* GET /connect returns {alive: true} unauth
* /command dispatch enforces TUNNEL_COMMANDS on tunnel surface
* closeTunnel() helper tears down ngrok + Bun.serve listener
* /tunnel/start binds on ephemeral port, points ngrok at TUNNEL_PORT
(not local port), hard-fails on bind error (no fallback), probes
cached tunnel via GET /connect (not /health), tears down on
ngrok.forward failure
* BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup uses the dual-listener pattern
* logTunnelDenial wired for all three denial reasons
* /connect rate limit is 300/min, not 3/min
All 23 tests pass. Behavioral integration tests (spawn subprocess, real
network) live in the E2E suite that lands later in this wave.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* security: gate download + scrape through validateNavigationUrl (SSRF)
The `goto` command was correctly wired through validateNavigationUrl,
but `download` and `scrape` called page.request.fetch(url, ...) directly.
A caller with the default write scope could hit the /command endpoint
and ask the daemon to fetch http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
(AWS IMDSv1) or the GCP/Azure/internal equivalents. The response body
comes back as base64 or lands on disk where GET /file serves it.
Fix: call validateNavigationUrl(url) immediately before each
page.request.fetch() call site in download and in the scrape loop.
Same blocklist that already protects `goto`: file://, javascript:,
data:, chrome://, cloud metadata (IPv4 all encodings, IPv6 ULA,
metadata.*.internal).
Tests: extend browse/test/url-validation.test.ts with a source-level
guard that walks every `await page.request.fetch(` call site and
asserts a validateNavigationUrl call precedes it within the same
branch. Regression trips before code review if a future refactor
drops the gate.
* security: route splitForScoped through envelope sentinel escape
The scoped-token snapshot path in snapshot.ts built its untrusted
block by pushing the raw accessibility-tree lines between the literal
`═══ BEGIN UNTRUSTED WEB CONTENT ═══` / `═══ END UNTRUSTED WEB CONTENT ═══`
sentinels. The full-page wrap path in content-security.ts already
applied a zero-width-space escape on those exact strings to prevent
sentinel injection, but the scoped path skipped it.
Net effect: a page whose rendered text contains the literal sentinel
can close the envelope early from inside untrusted content and forge
a fake "trusted" block for the LLM. That includes fabricating
interactive `@eN` references the agent will act on.
Fix:
* Extract the zero-width-space escape into a named, exported helper
`escapeEnvelopeSentinels(content)` in content-security.ts.
* Have `wrapUntrustedPageContent` call it (behavior unchanged on
that path — same bytes out).
* Import the helper in snapshot.ts and map it over `untrustedLines`
in the `splitForScoped` branch before pushing the BEGIN sentinel.
Tests: add a describe block in content-security.test.ts that covers
* `escapeEnvelopeSentinels` defuses BEGIN and END markers;
* `escapeEnvelopeSentinels` leaves normal text untouched;
* `wrapUntrustedPageContent` still emits exactly one real envelope
pair when hostile content contains forged sentinels;
* snapshot.ts imports the helper;
* the scoped-snapshot branch calls `escapeEnvelopeSentinels` before
pushing the BEGIN sentinel (source-level regression — if a future
refactor reorders this, the test trips).
* security: extend hidden-element detection to all DOM-reading channels
The Confusion Protocol envelope wrap (`wrapUntrustedPageContent`)
covers every scoped PAGE_CONTENT_COMMAND, but the hidden-element
ARIA-injection detection layer only ran for `text`. Other DOM-reading
channels (html, links, forms, accessibility, attrs, data, media,
ux-audit) returned their output through the envelope with no hidden-
content filter, so a page serving a display:none div that instructs
the agent to disregard prior system messages, or an aria-label that
claims to put the LLM in admin mode, leaked the injection payload on
any non-text channel. The envelope alone does not mitigate this, and
the page itself never rendered the hostile content to the human
operator.
Fix:
* New export `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS` in commands.ts — the subset of
PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS that derives its output from the live DOM.
Console and dialog stay out; they read separate runtime state.
* server.ts runs `markHiddenElements` + `cleanupHiddenMarkers` for
every scoped command in this set. `text` keeps its existing
`getCleanTextWithStripping` path (hidden elements physically
stripped before the read). All other channels keep their output
format but emit flagged elements as CONTENT WARNINGS on the
envelope, so the LLM sees what it would otherwise have consumed
silently.
* Hidden-element descriptions merge into `combinedWarnings`
alongside content-filter warnings before the wrap call.
Tests: new describe block in content-security.test.ts covering
* `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS` export shape and channel membership;
* dispatch gates on `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS.has(command)`, not the
literal `text` string;
* hiddenContentWarnings plumbs into `combinedWarnings` and reaches
wrapUntrustedPageContent;
* DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS is a strict subset of PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS.
Existing datamarking, envelope wrap, centralized-wrapping, and chain
security suites stay green (52 pass, 0 fail).
* security: validate --from-file payload paths for parity with direct paths
The direct `load-html <file>` path runs every caller-supplied file path
through validateReadPath() so reads stay confined to SAFE_DIRECTORIES
(cwd, TEMP_DIR). The `load-html --from-file <payload.json>` shortcut
and its sibling `pdf --from-file <payload.json>` skipped that check and
went straight to fs.readFileSync(). An MCP caller that picks the
payload path (or any caller whose payload argument is reachable from
attacker-influenced text) could use --from-file as a read-anywhere
escape hatch for the safe-dirs policy.
Fix: call validateReadPath(path.resolve(payloadPath)) before readFileSync
at both sites. Error surface mirrors the direct-path branch so ops and
agent errors stay consistent.
Test coverage in browse/test/from-file-path-validation.test.ts:
- source-level: validateReadPath precedes readFileSync in the load-html
--from-file branch (write-commands.ts) and the pdf --from-file parser
(meta-commands.ts)
- error-message parity: both sites reference SAFE_DIRECTORIES
Related security audit pattern: R3 F002 (validateNavigationUrl gap on
download/scrape) and R3 F008 (markHiddenElements gap on 10 DOM commands)
were the same shape — a defense that existed on the primary code path
but not its shortcut sibling. This PR closes the same class of gap on
the --from-file shortcuts.
* fix(design): escape url.origin when injecting into served HTML
serve.ts injected url.origin into a single-quoted JS string in
the response body. A local request with a crafted Host header
(e.g. Host: "evil'-alert(1)-'x") would break out of the string
and execute JS in the 127.0.0.1:<port> origin opened by the
design board. Low severity — bound to localhost, requires a
local attacker — but no reason not to escape.
Fix: JSON.stringify(url.origin) produces a properly quoted,
escaped JS string literal in one call.
Also includes Prettier reformatting (single→double quotes,
trailing commas, line wrapping) applied by the repo's
PostToolUse formatter hook. Security change is the one line
in the HTML injection; everything else is whitespace/style.
* fix(scripts): drop shell:true from slop-diff npx invocations
spawnSync('npx', [...], { shell: true }) invokes /bin/sh -c
with the args concatenated, subjecting them to shell parsing
(word splitting, glob expansion, metacharacter interpretation).
No user input reaches these calls today, so not exploitable —
but the posture is wrong: npx + shell args should be direct.
Fix: scope shell:true to process.platform === 'win32' where
npx is actually a .cmd requiring the shell. POSIX runs the
npx binary directly with array-form args.
Also includes Prettier reformatting (single→double quotes,
trailing commas, line wrapping) applied by the repo's
PostToolUse formatter hook. Security-relevant change is just
the two shell:true -> shell: process.platform === 'win32'
lines; everything else is whitespace/style.
* security(E3): gate GSTACK_SLUG on /welcome path traversal
The /welcome handler interpolates GSTACK_SLUG directly into the filesystem
path used to locate the project-local welcome page. Without validation, a
slug like "../../etc/passwd" would resolve to
~/.gstack/projects/../../etc/passwd/designs/welcome-page-20260331/finalized.html
— classic path traversal.
Not exploitable today: GSTACK_SLUG is set by the gstack CLI at daemon launch,
and an attacker would already need local env-var access to poison it. But
the gate is one regex (^[a-z0-9_-]+$), and a defense-in-depth pass costs us
nothing when the cost of being wrong is arbitrary file read via /welcome.
Fall back to the safe 'unknown' literal when the slug fails validation —
same fallback the code already uses when GSTACK_SLUG is unset. No behavior
change for legitimate slugs (they all match the regex).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* security(N1): replace ?token= SSE auth with HttpOnly session cookie
Activity stream and inspector events SSE endpoints accepted the root
AUTH_TOKEN via `?token=` query param (EventSource can't send Authorization
headers). URLs leak to browser history, referer headers, server logs,
crash reports, and refactoring accidents. Codex flagged this during the
/plan-ceo-review outside voice pass.
New auth model: the extension calls POST /sse-session with a Bearer token
and receives a view-only session cookie (HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, 30-min
TTL). EventSource is opened with `withCredentials: true` so the browser
sends the cookie back on the SSE connection. The ?token= query param is
GONE — no more URL-borne secrets.
Scope isolation (prior learning cookie-picker-auth-isolation, 10/10
confidence): the SSE session cookie grants access to /activity/stream and
/inspector/events ONLY. The token is never valid against /command, /token,
or any mutating endpoint. A leaked cookie can watch activity; it cannot
execute browser commands.
Components
* browse/src/sse-session-cookie.ts — registry: mint/validate/extract/
build-cookie. 256-bit tokens, 30-min TTL, lazy expiry pruning,
no imports from token-registry (scope isolation enforced by module
boundary).
* browse/src/server.ts — POST /sse-session mint endpoint (requires
Bearer). /activity/stream and /inspector/events now accept Bearer
OR the session cookie, and reject ?token= query param.
* extension/sidepanel.js — ensureSseSessionCookie() bootstrap call,
EventSource opened with withCredentials:true on both SSE endpoints.
Tested via the source guards; behavioral test is the E2E pairing
flow that lands later in the wave.
* browse/test/sse-session-cookie.test.ts — 20 unit tests covering
mint entropy, TTL enforcement, cookie flag invariants, cookie
parsing from multi-cookie headers, and scope-isolation contract
guard (module must not import token-registry).
* browse/test/server-auth.test.ts — existing /activity/stream auth
test updated to assert the new cookie-based gate and the absence
of the ?token= query param.
Cookie flag choices:
* HttpOnly: token not readable from page JS (mitigates XSS
exfiltration).
* SameSite=Strict: cookie not sent on cross-site requests (mitigates
CSRF). Fine for SSE because the extension connects to 127.0.0.1
directly.
* Path=/: cookie scoped to the whole origin.
* Max-Age=1800: 30 minutes, matches TTL. Extension re-mints on
reconnect when daemon restarts.
* Secure NOT set: daemon binds to 127.0.0.1 over plain HTTP. Adding
Secure would block the browser from ever sending the cookie back.
Add Secure when gstack ships over HTTPS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* security(N2): document Windows v20 ABE elevation path on CDP port
The existing comment around the cookie-import-browser --remote-debugging-port
launch claimed "threat model: no worse than baseline." That's wrong on
Windows with App-Bound Encryption v20. A same-user local process that
opens the cookie SQLite DB directly CANNOT decrypt v20 values (DPAPI
context is bound to the browser process). The CDP port lets them bypass
that: connect to the debug port, call Network.getAllCookies inside Chrome,
walk away with decrypted v20 cookies.
The correct fix is to switch from TCP --remote-debugging-port to
--remote-debugging-pipe so the CDP transport is a stdio pipe, not a
socket. That requires restructuring the CDP WebSocket client in this
module and Playwright doesn't expose the pipe transport out of the box.
Non-trivial, deferred from the v1.6.0.0 wave.
This commit updates the comment to correctly describe the threat and
points at the tracking issue. No code change to the launch itself.
Follow-up: #1136.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(E2): document dual-listener tunnel architecture in ARCHITECTURE.md
Adds an explicit per-endpoint disposition table to the Security model
section, covering the v1.6.0.0 dual-listener refactor. Every HTTP
endpoint now has a documented local-vs-tunnel answer. Future audits
(and future contributors wondering "is it safe to add X to the tunnel
surface?") can read this instead of reverse-engineering server.ts.
Also documents:
* Why physical port separation beats per-request header inference
(ngrok behavior drift, local proxies can forge headers, etc.)
* Tunnel surface denial logging → ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl
* SSE session cookie model (gstack_sse, 30-min TTL, stream-scope only,
module-boundary-enforced scope isolation)
* N2 non-goal for Windows v20 ABE via CDP port (tracking #1136)
No code changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(E1): end-to-end pair-agent flow against a spawned daemon
Spawns the browse daemon as a subprocess with BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP=1 so
the HTTP layer runs without a real browser. Exercises:
* GET /health — token delivery for chrome-extension origin, withheld
otherwise (the F1 + PR #1026 invariant)
* GET /connect — alive probe returns {alive:true} unauth
* POST /pair — root Bearer required (403 without), returns setup_key
* POST /connect — setup_key exchange mints a distinct scoped token
* POST /command — 401 without auth
* POST /sse-session — Bearer required, Set-Cookie has HttpOnly +
SameSite=Strict (the N1 invariant)
* GET /activity/stream — 401 without auth
* GET /activity/stream?token= — 401 (the old ?token= query param is
REJECTED, which is the whole point of N1)
* GET /welcome — serves HTML, does not leak /etc/passwd content under
the default 'unknown' slug (E3 regex gate)
12 behavioral tests, ~220ms end-to-end, no network dependencies, no
ngrok, no real browser. This is the receipt for the wave's central
'pair-agent still works + the security boundary holds' claim.
Tunnel-port binding (/tunnel/start) is deliberately NOT exercised here
— it requires an ngrok authtoken and live network. The dual-listener
route allowlist is covered by source-level guards in
dual-listener.test.ts; behavioral tunnel testing belongs in a separate
paid-evals harness.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* release(v1.6.0.0): bump VERSION + CHANGELOG for security wave
Architectural bump, not patch: dual-listener HTTP refactor changes the
daemon's tunnel-exposure model. See CHANGELOG for the full release
summary (~950 words) covering the five root causes this wave closes:
1. /health token leak over ngrok (F1 + E3 + test infra)
2. /cookie-picker + /inspector exposed over the tunnel (F1)
3. ?token=<ROOT> in SSE URLs leaking to logs/referer/history (N1)
4. /welcome GSTACK_SLUG path traversal (E3)
5. Windows v20 ABE elevation via CDP port (N2 — documented non-goal,
tracked as #1136)
Plus the base PRs: SSRF gate (#1029), envelope sentinel escape (#1031),
DOM-channel hidden-element coverage (#1032), --from-file path validation
(#1103), and 2 commits from #1073 (@theqazi).
VERSION + package.json bumped to 1.6.0.0. CHANGELOG entry covers
credits (@garagon, @Hybirdss, @HMAKT99, @theqazi), review lineage (CEO
→ Codex outside voice → Eng), and the non-goal tracking issue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: pre-landing review findings (4 auto-fixes)
Addresses 4 findings from the Claude adversarial subagent on the
v1.6.0.0 security wave diff. No user-visible behavior change; all
are defense-in-depth hardening of newly-introduced code.
1. GET /connect rate-limited (was POST-only) [HIGH conf 8/10]
Attacker discovering the ngrok URL could probe unlimited GETs for
daemon enumeration. Now shares the global /connect counter.
2. ngrok listener leak on tunnel startup failure [MEDIUM conf 8/10]
If ngrok.forward() resolved but tunnelListener.url() or the
state-file write threw, the Bun listener was torn down but the
ngrok session was leaked. Fixed in BOTH /tunnel/start and
BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup paths.
3. GSTACK_SKILL_ROOT path-traversal gate [MEDIUM conf 8/10]
Symmetric with E3's GSTACK_SLUG regex gate — reject values
containing '..' before interpolating into the welcome-page path.
4. SSE session registry pruning [LOW conf 7/10]
pruneExpired() only checked 10 entries per mint call. Now runs
on every validate too, checks 20 entries, with a hard 10k cap as
backstop. Prevents registry growth under sustained extension
reconnect pressure.
Tests remain green (56/56 in sse-session-cookie + dual-listener +
pair-agent-e2e suites).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: update project documentation for v1.6.0.0
Reflect the dual-listener tunnel architecture, SSE session cookies,
SSRF guards, and Windows v20 ABE non-goal across the three docs
users actually read for remote-agent and browser auth context:
- docs/REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md: rewrote Architecture diagram for
dual listeners, fixed /connect rate limit (3/min → 300/min),
removed stale "/health requires no auth" (now 404 on tunnel),
added SSE cookie auth, expanded Security Model with tunnel
allowlist, SSRF guards, /welcome path traversal defense, and
the Windows v20 ABE tracking note.
- BROWSER.md: added dual-listener paragraph to Authentication and
linked to ARCHITECTURE.md endpoint table. Replaced the stale
?token= SSE auth note with the HttpOnly gstack_sse cookie flow.
- CLAUDE.md: added Transport-layer security section above the
sidebar prompt-injection stack so contributors editing server.ts,
sse-session-cookie.ts, or tunnel-denial-log.ts see the load-bearing
module boundaries before touching them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(make-pdf): write --from-file payload to /tmp, not os.tmpdir()
make-pdf's browseClient wrote its --from-file payload to os.tmpdir(),
which is /var/folders/... on macOS. v1.6.0.0's PR #1103 cherry-pick
tightened browse load-html --from-file to validate against the
safe-dirs allowlist ([TEMP_DIR, cwd] where TEMP_DIR is '/tmp' on
macOS/Linux, os.tmpdir() on Windows). This closed a CLI/API parity
gap but broke make-pdf on macOS because /var/folders/... is outside
the allowlist.
Fix: mirror browse's TEMP_DIR convention — use '/tmp' on non-Windows,
os.tmpdir() on Windows. The make-pdf-gate CI failure on macOS-latest
(run 72440797490) is caused by exactly this: the payload file was
rejected by validateReadPath.
Verified locally: the combined-gate e2e test now passes after
rebuilding make-pdf/dist/pdf.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sidebar): killAgent resets per-tab state; align tests with current agent event format
Two pre-existing bugs surfaced while running the full e2e suite on the
sec-wave branch. Both pre-date v1.6.0.0 (same failures on main at
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Garry Tan
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7e96fe299b |
fix: security wave 3 — 12 fixes, 7 contributors (v0.16.4.0) (#988)
* fix(security): validateOutputPath symlink bypass — check file-level symlinks validateOutputPath() previously only resolved symlinks on the parent directory. A symlink at /tmp/evil.png → /etc/crontab passed the parent check (parent is /tmp, which is safe) but the write followed the symlink outside safe dirs. Add lstatSync() check: if the target file exists and is a symlink, resolve through it and verify the real target is within SAFE_DIRECTORIES. ENOENT (file doesn't exist yet) falls through to the existing parent-dir check. Closes #921 Co-Authored-By: Yunsu <Hybirdss@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): shell injection in bin/ scripts — use env vars instead of interpolation gstack-settings-hook interpolated $SETTINGS_FILE directly into bun -e double-quoted blocks. A path containing quotes or backticks breaks the JS string context, enabling arbitrary code execution. Replace direct interpolation with environment variables (process.env). Same fix applied to gstack-team-init which had the same pattern. Systematic audit confirmed only these two scripts were vulnerable — all other bin/ scripts already use stdin piping or env vars. Closes #858 Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): cookie-import path validation bypass + hardcoded /tmp Two fixes: 1. cookie-import relative path bypass (#707): path.isAbsolute() gated the entire validation, so relative paths like "sensitive-file.json" bypassed the safe-directory check entirely. Now always resolves to absolute path with realpathSync for symlink resolution, matching validateOutputPath(). 2. Hardcoded /tmp in cookie-import-browser (#708): openDbFromCopy used /tmp directly instead of os.tmpdir(), breaking Windows support. Also adds explicit imports for SAFE_DIRECTORIES and isPathWithin in write-commands.ts (previously resolved implicitly through bundler). Closes #852 Co-Authored-By: Toby Morning <urbantech@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): redact form fields with sensitive names, not just type=password Form redaction only applied to type="password" fields. Hidden and text fields named csrf_token, api_key, session_id, etc. were exposed unredacted in LLM context, leaking secrets. Extend redaction to check field name and id against sensitive patterns: token, secret, key, password, credential, auth, jwt, session, csrf, sid, api_key. Uses the same pattern style as SENSITIVE_COOKIE_NAME. Closes #860 Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): restrict session file permissions to owner-only Design session files written to /tmp with default umask (0644) were world-readable on shared systems. Sessions contain design prompts and feedback history. Set mode 0o600 (owner read/write only) on both create and update paths. Closes #859 Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): enforce frozen lockfile during setup bun install without --frozen-lockfile resolves ^semver ranges from npm on every run. If an attacker publishes a compromised compatible version of any dependency, the next ./setup pulls it silently. Add --frozen-lockfile with fallback to plain install (for fresh clones where bun.lock may not exist yet). Matches the pattern already used in the .agents/ generation block (line 237). Closes #614 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: remove duplicate recursive chmod on /tmp in Dockerfile.ci chmod -R 1777 /tmp recursively sets sticky bit on files (no defined behavior), not just the directory. Deduplicate to single chmod 1777 /tmp. Closes #747 Co-Authored-By: Maksim Soltan <Gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): learnings input validation + cross-project trust gate Three fixes to the learnings system: 1. Input validation in gstack-learnings-log: type must be from allowed list, key must be alphanumeric, confidence must be 1-10 integer, source must be from allowed list. Prevents injection via malformed fields. 2. Prompt injection defense: insight field checked against 10 instruction-like patterns (ignore previous, system:, override, etc.). Rejected with clear error message. 3. Cross-project trust gate in gstack-learnings-search: AI-generated learnings from other projects are filtered out. Only user-stated learnings cross project boundaries. Prevents silent prompt injection across codebases. Also adds trusted field (true for user-stated source, false for AI-generated) to enable the trust gate at read time. Closes #841 Co-Authored-By: Ziad Al Sharif <Ziadstr@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(security): track cookie-imported domains and scope cookie imports Foundation for origin-pinned JS execution (#616). Tracks which domains cookies were imported from so the JS/eval commands can verify execution stays within imported origins. Changes: - BrowserManager: new cookieImportedDomains Set with track/get/has methods - cookie-import: tracks imported cookie domains after addCookies - cookie-import-browser: tracks domains on --domain direct import - cookie-import-browser --all: new explicit opt-in for all-domain import (previously implicit behavior, now requires deliberate flag) Closes #615 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(security): pin JS/eval execution to cookie-imported origins When cookies have been imported for specific domains, block JS execution on pages whose origin doesn't match. Prevents the attack chain: 1. Agent imports cookies for github.com 2. Prompt injection navigates to attacker.com 3. Agent runs js document.cookie → exfiltrates github cookies assertJsOriginAllowed() checks the current page hostname against imported cookie domains with subdomain matching (.github.com allows api.github.com). When no cookies are imported, all origins allowed (nothing to protect). about:blank and data: URIs are allowed (no cookies at risk). Depends on #615 (cookie domain tracking). Closes #616 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(security): add persistent command audit log Append-only JSONL audit trail for all browse server commands. Unlike in-memory ring buffers, the audit log persists across restarts and is never truncated. Each entry records: timestamp, command, args (truncated to 200 chars), page origin, duration, status, error (truncated to 300 chars), hasCookies flag, connection mode. All writes are best-effort — audit failures never block command execution. Log stored at ~/.gstack/.browse/browse-audit.jsonl. Closes #617 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): block hex-encoded IPv4-mapped IPv6 metadata bypass URL constructor normalizes ::ffff:169.254.169.254 to ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe (hex form), which was not in the blocklist. Similarly, ::169.254.169.254 normalizes to ::a9fe:a9fe. Add both hex-encoded forms to BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTS so they're caught by the direct hostname check in validateNavigationUrl. Closes #739 Co-Authored-By: Osman Mehmood <mehmoodosman@users.noreply.github.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.16.4.0) Security wave 3: 12 fixes, 7 contributors. Cookie origin pinning, command audit log, domain tracking. Symlink bypass, path validation, shell injection, form redaction, learnings injection, IPv6 SSRF, session permissions, frozen lockfile. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Yunsu <Hybirdss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Toby Morning <urbantech@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Maksim Soltan <Gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ziad Al Sharif <Ziadstr@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Osman Mehmood <mehmoodosman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Garry Tan
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03973c2fab |
fix: community security wave — 8 PRs, 4 contributors (v0.15.13.0) (#847)
* fix(bin): pass search params via env vars (RCE fix) (#819) Replace shell string interpolation with process.env in gstack-learnings-search to prevent arbitrary code execution via crafted learnings entries. Also fixes the CROSS_PROJECT interpolation that the original PR missed. Adds 3 regression tests verifying no shell interpolation remains in the bun -e block. Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): add path validation to upload command (#821) Add isPathWithin() and path traversal checks to the upload command, blocking file exfiltration via crafted upload paths. Uses existing SAFE_DIRECTORIES constant instead of a local copy. Adds 3 regression tests. Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): symlink resolution in meta-commands validateOutputPath (#820) Add realpathSync to validateOutputPath in meta-commands.ts to catch symlink-based directory escapes in screenshot, pdf, and responsive commands. Resolves SAFE_DIRECTORIES through realpathSync to handle macOS /tmp -> /private/tmp symlinks. Existing path validation tests pass with the hardened implementation. Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: add uninstall instructions to README (#812) Community PR #812 by @0531Kim. Adds two uninstall paths: the gstack-uninstall script (handles everything) and manual removal steps for when the repo isn't cloned. Includes CLAUDE.md cleanup note and Playwright cache guidance. Co-Authored-By: 0531Kim <0531Kim@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): Windows launcher extraEnv + headed-mode token (#822) Community PR #822 by @pieterklue. Three fixes: 1. Windows launcher now merges extraEnv into spawned server env (was only passing BROWSE_STATE_FILE, dropping all other env vars) 2. Welcome page fallback serves inline HTML instead of about:blank redirect (avoids ERR_UNSAFE_REDIRECT on Windows) 3. /health returns auth token in headed mode even without Origin header (fixes Playwright Chromium extensions that don't send it) Also adds HOME/USERPROFILE fallback for cross-platform compatibility. Co-Authored-By: pieterklue <pieterklue@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): terminate orphan server when parent process exits (#808) Community PR #808 by @mmporong. Passes BROWSE_PARENT_PID to the spawned server process. The server polls every 15s with signal 0 and calls shutdown() if the parent is gone. Prevents orphaned chrome-headless-shell processes when Claude Code sessions exit abnormally. Co-Authored-By: mmporong <mmporong@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): IPv6 ULA blocking, cookie redaction, per-tab cancel, targeted token (#664) Community PR #664 by @mr-k-man (security audit round 1, new parts only). - IPv6 ULA prefix blocking (fc00::/7) in url-validation.ts with false-positive guard for hostnames like fd.example.com - Cookie value redaction for tokens, API keys, JWTs in browse cookies command - Per-tab cancel files in killAgent() replacing broken global kill-signal - design/serve.ts: realpathSync upgrade prevents symlink bypass in /api/reload - extension: targeted getToken handler replaces token-in-health-broadcast - Supabase migration 003: column-level GRANT restricts anon UPDATE scope - Telemetry sync: upsert error logging - 10 new tests for IPv6, cookie redaction, DNS rebinding, path traversal Co-Authored-By: mr-k-man <mr-k-man@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): CSS injection guard, timeout clamping, session validation, tests (#806) Community PR #806 by @mr-k-man (security audit round 2, new parts only). - CSS value validation (DANGEROUS_CSS) in cdp-inspector, write-commands, extension inspector - Queue file permissions (0o700/0o600) in cli, server, sidebar-agent - escapeRegExp for frame --url ReDoS fix - Responsive screenshot path validation with validateOutputPath - State load cookie filtering (reject localhost/.internal/metadata cookies) - Session ID format validation in loadSession - /health endpoint: remove currentUrl and currentMessage fields - QueueEntry interface + isValidQueueEntry validator for sidebar-agent - SIGTERM->SIGKILL escalation in timeout handler - Viewport dimension clamping (1-16384), wait timeout clamping (1s-300s) - Cookie domain validation in cookie-import and cookie-import-browser - DocumentFragment-based tab switching (XSS fix in sidepanel) - pollInProgress reentrancy guard for pollChat - toggleClass/injectCSS input validation in extension inspector - Snapshot annotated path validation with realpathSync - 714-line security-audit-r2.test.ts + 33-line learnings-injection.test.ts Co-Authored-By: mr-k-man <mr-k-man@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.13.0) Community security wave: 8 PRs from 4 contributors (@garagon, @mr-k-man, @mmporong, @0531Kim, @pieterklue). IPv6 ULA blocking, cookie redaction, per-tab cancel signaling, CSS injection guards, timeout clamping, session validation, DocumentFragment XSS fix, parent process watchdog, uninstall docs, Windows fixes, and 750+ lines of security regression tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: 0531Kim <0531Kim@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: pieterklue <pieterklue@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: mmporong <mmporong@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: mr-k-man <mr-k-man@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Garry Tan
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2b08cfe71e |
fix: close redundant PRs + friendly error on all design commands (v0.15.8.1) (#817)
* fix: friendly OpenAI org error on all design commands Previously only generate.ts showed a user-friendly message when the OpenAI org wasn't verified. Now evolve, iterate, variants, and check all detect the 403 + "organization must be verified" pattern and show a clear message with the correct verification URL. * test: regression test for >128KB Codex session_meta Documents the current 128KB buffer limitation. When Codex embeds session_meta beyond 128KB, this test will fail, signaling the need for a streaming parse or larger buffer. * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.8.1) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Matt Van Horn
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f91ad61a15 |
fix: user-friendly error when OpenAI org is not verified (#776)
Merged via PR triage plan. Friendly error for unverified OpenAI org. Follow-up: expand to evolve.ts, iterate.ts, variants.ts, check.ts. |
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Garry Tan
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115d81d792 |
fix: security wave 1 — 14 fixes for audit #783 (v0.15.7.0) (#810)
* fix: DNS rebinding protection checks AAAA (IPv6) records too Cherry-pick PR #744 by @Gonzih. Closes the IPv6-only DNS rebinding gap by checking both A and AAAA records independently. Co-Authored-By: Gonzih <gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: validateOutputPath symlink bypass — resolve real path before safe-dir check Cherry-pick PR #745 by @Gonzih. Adds a second pass using fs.realpathSync() to resolve symlinks after lexical path validation. Co-Authored-By: Gonzih <gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: validate saved URLs before navigation in restoreState Cherry-pick PR #751 by @Gonzih. Prevents navigation to cloud metadata endpoints or file:// URIs embedded in user-writable state files. Co-Authored-By: Gonzih <gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: telemetry-ingest uses anon key instead of service role key Cherry-pick PR #750 by @Gonzih. The service role key bypasses RLS and grants unrestricted database access — anon key + RLS is the right model for a public telemetry endpoint. Co-Authored-By: Gonzih <gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: killAgent() actually kills the sidebar claude subprocess Cherry-pick PR #743 by @Gonzih. Implements cross-process kill signaling via kill-file + polling pattern, tracks active processes per-tab. Co-Authored-By: Gonzih <gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(design): bind server to localhost and validate reload paths Cherry-pick PR #803 by @garagon. Adds hostname: '127.0.0.1' to Bun.serve() and validates /api/reload paths are within cwd() or tmpdir(). Closes C1+C2 from security audit #783. Co-Authored-By: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: add auth gate to /inspector/events SSE endpoint (C3) The /inspector/events endpoint had no authentication, unlike /activity/stream which validates tokens. Now requires the same Bearer header or ?token= query param check. Closes C3 from security audit #783. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: sanitize design feedback with trust boundary markers (C4+H5) Wrap user feedback in <user-feedback> XML markers with tag escaping to prevent prompt injection via malicious feedback text. Cap accumulated feedback to last 5 iterations to limit incremental poisoning. Closes C4 and H5 from security audit #783. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: harden file/directory permissions to owner-only (C5+H9+M9+M10) Add mode 0o700 to all mkdirSync calls for state/session directories. Add mode 0o600 to all writeFileSync calls for session.json, chat.jsonl, and log files. Add umask 077 to setup script. Prevents auth tokens, chat history, and browser logs from being world-readable on multi-user systems. Closes C5, H9, M9, M10 from security audit #783. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: TOCTOU race in setup symlink creation (C6) Remove the existence check before mkdir -p (it's idempotent) and validate the target isn't already a symlink before creating the link. Prevents a local attacker from racing between the check and mkdir to redirect SKILL.md writes. Closes C6 from security audit #783. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remove CORS wildcard, restrict to localhost (H1) Replace Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * with http://127.0.0.1 on sidebar tab/chat endpoints. The Chrome extension uses manifest host_permissions to bypass CORS entirely, so this only blocks malicious websites from making cross-origin requests. Closes H1 from security audit #783. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: make cookie picker auth mandatory (H2) Remove the conditional if(authToken) guard that skipped auth when authToken was undefined. Now all cookie picker data/action routes reject unauthenticated requests. Closes H2 from security audit #783. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: gate /health token on chrome-extension Origin header Only return the auth token in /health response when the request Origin starts with chrome-extension://. The Chrome extension always sends this origin via manifest host_permissions. Regular HTTP requests (including tunneled ones from ngrok/SSH) won't get the token. The extension also has a fallback path through background.js that reads the token from the state file directly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: update server-auth test for chrome-extension Origin gating The test previously checked for 'localhost-only' comment. Now checks for 'chrome-extension://' since the token is gated on Origin header. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.7.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Gonzih <gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Garry Tan
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78bc1d1968 |
feat: design binary — real UI mockup generation for gstack skills (v0.13.0.0) (#551)
* docs: design tools v1 plan — visual mockup generation for gstack skills Full design doc covering the `design` binary that wraps OpenAI's GPT Image API to generate real UI mockups from gstack's design skills. Includes comparison board UX spec, auth model, 6 CEO expansions (design memory, mockup diffing, screenshot evolution, design intent verification, responsive variants, design-to-code prompt), and 9-commit implementation plan. Reviewed: /office-hours + /plan-eng-review (CLEARED) + /plan-ceo-review (EXPANSION, 6/6 accepted) + /plan-design-review (2/10 → 8/10). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: design tools prototype validation — GPT Image API works Prototype script sends 3 design briefs to OpenAI Responses API with image_generation tool. Results: dashboard (47s, 2.1MB), landing page (42s, 1.3MB), settings page (37s, 1.3MB) all produce real, implementable UI mockups with accurate text rendering and clean layouts. Key finding: Codex OAuth tokens lack image generation scopes. Direct API key (sk-proj-*) required, stored in ~/.gstack/openai.json. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: design binary core — generate, check, compare commands Stateless CLI (design/dist/design) wrapping OpenAI Responses API for UI mockup generation. Three working commands: - generate: brief -> PNG mockup via gpt-4o + image_generation tool - check: vision-based quality gate via GPT-4o (text readability, layout completeness, visual coherence) - compare: generates self-contained HTML comparison board with star ratings, radio Pick, per-variant feedback, regenerate controls, and Submit button that writes structured JSON for agent polling Auth reads from ~/.gstack/openai.json (0600), falls back to OPENAI_API_KEY env var. Compiled separately from browse binary (openai added to devDependencies, not runtime deps). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: design binary variants + iterate commands variants: generates N style variations with staggered parallel (1.5s between launches, exponential backoff on 429). 7 built-in style variations (bold, calm, warm, corporate, dark, playful + default). Tested: 3/3 variants in 41.6s. iterate: multi-turn design iteration using previous_response_id for conversational threading. Falls back to re-generation with accumulated feedback if threading doesn't retain visual context. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: DESIGN_SETUP + DESIGN_MOCKUP template resolvers Add generateDesignSetup() and generateDesignMockup() to the existing design.ts resolver file. Add designDir to HostPaths (claude + codex). Register DESIGN_SETUP and DESIGN_MOCKUP in the resolver index. DESIGN_SETUP: $D binary discovery (mirrors $B browse setup pattern). Falls back to DESIGN_SKETCH if binary not available. DESIGN_MOCKUP: full visual exploration workflow template — construct brief from DESIGN.md context, generate 3 variants, open comparison board in Chrome, poll for user feedback, save approved mockup to docs/designs/, generate HTML wireframe for implementation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: sync package.json version with VERSION file (0.12.2.0) Pre-existing mismatch: VERSION was 0.12.2.0 but package.json was 0.12.0.0. Also adds design binary to build script and dev:design convenience command. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: /office-hours visual design exploration integration Add {{DESIGN_MOCKUP}} to office-hours template before the existing {{DESIGN_SKETCH}}. When the design binary is available, /office-hours generates 3 visual mockup variants, opens a comparison board in Chrome, and polls for user feedback. Falls back to HTML wireframes if the design binary isn't built. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: /plan-design-review visual mockup integration Add {{DESIGN_SETUP}} to pre-review audit and "show me what 10/10 looks like" mockup generation to the 0-10 rating method. When a design dimension rates below 7/10, the review can generate a mockup showing the improved version. Falls back to text descriptions if the design binary isn't available. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: design memory — extract visual language from mockups into DESIGN.md New `$D extract` command: sends approved mockup to GPT-4o vision, extracts color palette, typography, spacing, and layout patterns, writes/updates DESIGN.md with an "Extracted Design Language" section. Progressive constraint: if DESIGN.md exists, future mockup briefs include it as style context. If no DESIGN.md, explorations run wide. readDesignConstraints() reads existing DESIGN.md for brief construction. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: mockup diffing + design intent verification New commands: - $D diff --before old.png --after new.png: visual diff using GPT-4o vision. Returns differences by area with severity (high/medium/low) and a matchScore (0-100). - $D verify --mockup approved.png --screenshot live.png: compares live site screenshot against approved design mockup. Pass if matchScore >= 70 and no high-severity differences. Used by /design-review to close the design loop: design -> implement -> verify visually. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: screenshot-to-mockup evolution ($D evolve) New command: $D evolve --screenshot current.png --brief "make it calmer" Two-step process: first analyzes the screenshot via GPT-4o vision to produce a detailed description, then generates a new mockup that keeps the existing layout structure but applies the requested changes. Starts from reality, not blank canvas. Bridges the gap between /design-review critique ("the spacing is off") and a visual proposal of the fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: responsive variants + design-to-code prompt Responsive variants: $D variants --viewports desktop,tablet,mobile generates mockups at 1536x1024, 1024x1024, and 1024x1536 (portrait) with viewport-appropriate layout instructions. Design-to-code prompt: $D prompt --image approved.png extracts colors, typography, layout, and components via GPT-4o vision, producing a structured implementation prompt. Reads DESIGN.md for additional constraint context. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.13.0.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: gstack designer as first-class tool in /plan-design-review Brand the gstack designer prominently, add Step 0.5 for proactive visual mockup generation before review passes, and update priority hierarchy. When a plan describes new UI, the skill now offers to generate mockups with $D variants, run $D check for quality gating, and present a comparison board via $B goto before any review passes begin. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: integrate mockups into review passes and outputs Thread Step 0.5 mockups through the review workflow: Pass 4 (AI Slop) evaluates generated mockups visually, Pass 7 uses mockups as evidence for unresolved decisions, post-pass offers one-shot regeneration after design changes, and Approved Mockups section records chosen variants with paths for the implementer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: gstack designer target mockups in /design-review fix loop Add $D generate for target mockups in Phase 8a.5 — before fixing a design finding, generate a mockup showing what it should look like. Add $D verify in Phase 9 to compare fix results against targets. Not plan mode — goes straight to implementation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: gstack designer AI mockups in /design-consultation Phase 5 Replace HTML preview with $D variants + comparison board when designer is available (Path A). Use $D extract to derive DESIGN.md tokens from the approved mockup. Handles both plan mode (write to plan) and non-plan mode (implement immediately). Falls back to HTML preview (Path B) when designer binary is unavailable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: make gstack designer the default in /plan-design-review, not optional The transcript showed the agent writing 5 text descriptions of homepage variants instead of generating visual mockups, even when the user explicitly asked for design tools. The skill treated mockups as optional ("Want me to generate?") when they should be the default behavior. Changes: - Rename "Your Visual Design Tool" to "YOUR PRIMARY TOOL" with aggressive language: "Don't ask permission. Show it." - Step 0.5 now generates mockups automatically when DESIGN_READY, no AskUserQuestion gatekeeping the default path - Priority hierarchy: mockups are "non-negotiable" not "if available" - Step 0D tells the user mockups are coming next - DESIGN_NOT_AVAILABLE fallback now tells user what they're missing The only valid reasons to skip mockups: no UI scope, or designer not installed. Everything else generates by default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: persist design mockups to ~/.gstack/projects/$SLUG/designs/ Mockups were going to .context/mockups/ (gitignored, workspace-local). This meant designs disappeared when switching workspaces or conversations, and downstream skills couldn't reference approved mockups from earlier reviews. Now all three design skills save to persistent project-scoped dirs: - /plan-design-review: ~/.gstack/projects/$SLUG/designs/<screen>-<date>/ - /design-consultation: ~/.gstack/projects/$SLUG/designs/design-system-<date>/ - /design-review: ~/.gstack/projects/$SLUG/designs/design-audit-<date>/ Each directory gets an approved.json recording the user's pick, feedback, and branch. This lets /design-review verify against mockups that /plan-design-review approved, and design history is browsable via ls ~/.gstack/projects/$SLUG/designs/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: regenerate codex ship skill with zsh glob guards Picked up setopt +o nomatch guards from main's v0.12.8.1 merge. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add browse binary discovery to DESIGN_SETUP resolver The design setup block now discovers $B alongside $D, so skills can open comparison boards via $B goto and poll feedback via $B eval. Falls back to `open` on macOS when browse binary is unavailable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: comparison board DOM polling in plan-design-review After opening the comparison board, the agent now polls #status via $B eval instead of asking a rigid AskUserQuestion. Handles submit (read structured JSON feedback), regenerate (new variants with updated brief), and $B-unavailable fallback (free-form text response). The user interacts with the real board UI, not a constrained option picker. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: comparison board feedback loop integration test 16 tests covering the full DOM polling cycle: structure verification, submit with pick/rating/comment, regenerate flows (totally different, more like this, custom text), and the agent polling pattern (empty → submitted → read JSON). Uses real generateCompareHtml() from design/src/compare.ts, served via HTTP. Runs in <1s. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add $D serve command for HTTP-based comparison board feedback The comparison board feedback loop was fundamentally broken: browse blocks file:// URLs (url-validation.ts:71), so $B goto file://board.html always fails. The fallback open + $B eval polls a different browser instance. $D serve fixes this by serving the board over HTTP on localhost. The server is stateful: stays alive across regeneration rounds, exposes /api/progress for the board to poll, and accepts /api/reload from the agent to swap in new board HTML. Stdout carries feedback JSON only; stderr carries telemetry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: dual-mode feedback + post-submit lifecycle in comparison board When __GSTACK_SERVER_URL is set (injected by $D serve), the board POSTs feedback to the server instead of only writing to hidden DOM elements. After submit: disables all inputs, shows "Return to your coding agent." After regenerate: shows spinner, polls /api/progress, auto-refreshes on ready. On POST failure: shows copyable JSON fallback. On progress timeout (5 min): shows error with /design-shotgun prompt. DOM fallback preserved for headed browser mode and tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: HTTP serve command endpoints and regeneration lifecycle 11 tests covering: HTML serving with injected server URL, /api/progress state reporting, submit → done lifecycle, regenerate → regenerating state, remix with remixSpec, malformed JSON rejection, /api/reload HTML swapping, missing file validation, and full regenerate → reload → submit round-trip. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add DESIGN_SHOTGUN_LOOP resolver + fix design artifact paths Adds generateDesignShotgunLoop() resolver for the shared comparison board feedback loop (serve via HTTP, handle regenerate/remix, AskUserQuestion fallback, feedback confirmation). Registered as {{DESIGN_SHOTGUN_LOOP}}. Fixes generateDesignMockup() to use ~/.gstack/projects/$SLUG/designs/ instead of /tmp/ and docs/designs/. Replaces broken $B goto file:// + $B eval polling with $D compare --serve (HTTP-based, stdout feedback). Adds CRITICAL PATH RULE guardrail to DESIGN_SETUP: design artifacts must go to ~/.gstack/projects/$SLUG/designs/, never .context/ or /tmp/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add /design-shotgun standalone design exploration skill New skill for visual brainstorming: generate AI design variants, open a comparison board in the user's browser, collect structured feedback, and iterate. Features: session detection (revisit prior explorations), 5-dimension context gathering (who, job to be done, what exists, user flow, edge cases), taste memory (prior approved designs bias new generations), inline variant preview, configurable variant count, screenshot-to-variants via $D evolve. Uses {{DESIGN_SHOTGUN_LOOP}} resolver for the feedback loop. Saves all artifacts to ~/.gstack/projects/$SLUG/designs/. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: regenerate SKILL.md files for design-shotgun + resolver changes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add remix UI to comparison board Per-variant element selectors (Layout, Colors, Typography, Spacing) with radio buttons in a grid. Remix button collects selections into a remixSpec object and sends via the same HTTP POST feedback mechanism. Enabled only when at least one element is selected. Board shows regenerating spinner while agent generates the hybrid variant. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add $D gallery command for design history timeline Generates a self-contained HTML page showing all prior design explorations for a project: every variant (approved or not), feedback notes, organized by date (newest first). Images embedded as base64. Handles corrupted approved.json gracefully (skips, still shows the session). Empty state shows "No history yet" with /design-shotgun prompt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: gallery generation — sessions, dates, corruption, empty state 7 tests: empty dir, nonexistent dir, single session with approved variant, multiple sessions sorted newest-first, corrupted approved.json handled gracefully, session without approved.json, self-contained HTML (no external dependencies). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: replace broken file:// polling with {{DESIGN_SHOTGUN_LOOP}} plan-design-review and design-consultation templates previously used $B goto file:// + $B eval polling for the comparison board feedback loop. This was broken (browse blocks file:// URLs). Both templates now use {{DESIGN_SHOTGUN_LOOP}} which serves via HTTP, handles regeneration in the same browser tab, and falls back to AskUserQuestion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add design-shotgun touchfile entries and tier classifications design-shotgun-path (gate): verify artifacts go to ~/.gstack/, not .context/ design-shotgun-session (gate): verify repeat-run detection + AskUserQuestion design-shotgun-full (periodic): full round-trip with real design binary Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: regenerate SKILL.md files for template refactor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: comparison board UI improvements — option headers, pick confirmation, grid view Three changes to the design comparison board: 1. Pick confirmation: selecting "Pick" on Option A shows "We'll move forward with Option A" in green, plus a status line above the submit button repeating the choice. 2. Clear option headers: each variant now has "Option A" in bold with a subtitle above the image, instead of just the raw image. 3. View toggle: top-right Large/Grid buttons switch between single-column (default) and 3-across grid view. Also restructured the bottom section into a 2-column grid: submit/overall feedback on the left, regenerate controls on the right. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: use 127.0.0.1 instead of localhost for serve URL Avoids DNS resolution issues on some systems where localhost may resolve to IPv6 ::1 while Bun listens on IPv4 only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: write ALL feedback to disk so agent can poll in background mode The agent backgrounds $D serve (Claude Code can't block on a subprocess and do other work simultaneously). With stdout-only feedback delivery, the agent never sees regenerate/remix feedback. Fix: write feedback-pending.json (regenerate/remix) and feedback.json (submit) to disk next to the board HTML. Agent polls the filesystem instead of reading stdout. Both channels (stdout + disk) are always active so foreground mode still works. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: DESIGN_SHOTGUN_LOOP uses file polling instead of stdout reading Update the template resolver to instruct the agent to background $D serve and poll for feedback-pending.json / feedback.json on a 5-second loop. This matches the real-world pattern where Claude Code / Conductor agents can't block on subprocess stdout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: regenerate SKILL.md files for file-polling feedback loop Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: null-safe DOM selectors for post-submit and regenerating states The user's layout restructure renamed .regenerate-bar → .regen-column, .submit-bar → .submit-column, and .overall-section → .bottom-section. The JS still referenced the old class names, causing querySelector to return null and showPostSubmitState() / showRegeneratingState() to silently crash. This meant Submit and Regenerate buttons appeared to work (DOM elements updated, HTTP POST succeeded) but the visual feedback (disabled inputs, spinner, success message) never appeared. Fix: use fallback selectors that check both old and new class names, with null guards so a missing element doesn't crash the function. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: end-to-end feedback roundtrip — browser click to file on disk The test that proves "changes on the website propagate to Claude Code." Opens the comparison board in a real headless browser with __GSTACK_SERVER_URL injected, simulates user clicks (Submit, Regenerate, More Like This), and verifies that feedback.json / feedback-pending.json land on disk with the correct structured data. 6 tests covering: submit → feedback.json, post-submit UI lockdown, regenerate → feedback-pending.json, more-like-this → feedback-pending.json, regenerate spinner display, and full regen → reload → submit round-trip. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: comprehensive design doc for Design Shotgun feedback loop Documents the full browser-to-agent feedback architecture: state machine, file-based polling, port discovery, post-submit lifecycle, and every known edge case (zombie forms, dead servers, stale spinners, file:// bug, double-click races, port coordination, sequential generate rule). Includes ASCII diagrams of the data flow and state transitions, complete step-by-step walkthrough of happy path and regeneration path, test coverage map with gaps, and short/medium/long-term improvement ideas. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: plan-design-review agent guardrails for feedback loop Four fixes to prevent agents from reinventing the feedback loop badly: 1. Sequential generate rule: explicit instruction that $D generate calls must run one at a time (API rate-limits concurrent image generation). 2. No-AskUserQuestion-for-feedback rule: agent reads feedback.json instead of re-asking what the user picked. 3. Remove file:// references: $B goto file:// was always rejected by url-validation.ts. The --serve flag handles everything. 4. Remove $B eval polling reference: no longer needed with HTTP POST. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: design-shotgun Step 3 progressive reveal, silent failure detection, timing estimate Three production UX bugs fixed: 1. Dead air — now shows timing estimate before generation starts 2. Silent variant drop — replaced $D variants batch with individual $D generate calls, each verified for existence and non-zero size with retry 3. No progressive reveal — each variant shown inline via Read tool immediately after generation (~60s increments instead of all at ~180s) Also: /tmp/ then cp as default output pattern (sandbox workaround), screenshot taken once for evolve path (not per-variant). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: parallel design-shotgun with concept-first confirmation Step 3 rewritten to concept-first + parallel Agent architecture: - 3a: generate text concepts (free, instant) - 3b: AskUserQuestion to confirm/modify before spending API credits - 3c: launch N Agent subagents in parallel (~60s total regardless of count) - 3d: show all results, dynamic image list for comparison board Adds Agent to allowed-tools. Softens plan-design-review sequential warning to note design-shotgun uses parallel at Tier 2+. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: update project documentation for v0.13.0.0 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: untrack .agents/skills/ — generated at setup, already gitignored These files were committed despite .agents/ being in .gitignore. They regenerate from ./setup --host codex on any machine. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: regenerate design-shotgun SKILL.md for v0.12.12.0 preamble changes Merge from main brought updated preamble resolver (conditional telemetry, local JSONL logging) but design-shotgun/SKILL.md wasn't regenerated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |