Files
gstack/docs/designs/SIDEBAR_MESSAGE_FLOW.md
Garry Tan 0361acfb6a docs: Terminal flow + threat model + v1.1 follow-ups
SIDEBAR_MESSAGE_FLOW.md: new "Terminal flow" section. Documents the WS
upgrade path (/pty-session cookie mint → /ws Origin + cookie gate →
lazy claude spawn), the dual-token model (AUTH_TOKEN for /pty-session,
gstack_pty cookie for /ws, INTERNAL_TOKEN for server↔agent loopback),
and the threat-model boundary — the Terminal tab bypasses the entire
prompt-injection security stack on purpose; user keystrokes are the
trust source. That trust assumption is load-bearing on three transport
guarantees: local-only listener, Origin gate, cookie auth. Drop any
one of those three and the tab becomes unsafe.

CLAUDE.md: extends the "Sidebar architecture" note to include
terminal-agent.ts in the read-this-first list. Adds a "Terminal tab is
its own process" note so a future contributor doesn't bolt PTY logic
onto sidebar-agent.ts.

TODOS.md: three new follow-ups under a new "Sidebar Terminal" section:
  - v1.1: PTY session survives sidebar reload (Issue 1C deferred).
  - v1.1+: audit /health AUTH_TOKEN distribution (codex finding #2 —
    a pre-existing soft leak that cc-pty-import sidesteps but doesn't
    fix).
  - v1.1+: apply terminal-agent's process.on exception handlers to
    sidebar-agent.ts (codex finding #4 — chat path has no fatal
    handlers).
2026-04-25 12:34:43 -07:00

322 lines
16 KiB
Markdown

# Sidebar Message Flow
How the GStack Browser sidebar actually works. Read this before touching
sidepanel.js, background.js, content.js, server.ts sidebar endpoints,
or sidebar-agent.ts.
## Components
```
┌─────────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐
│ sidepanel.js │────▶│ background.js│────▶│ server.ts │────▶│sidebar-agent.ts│
│ (Chrome panel) │ │ (svc worker) │ │ (Bun HTTP) │ │ (Bun process) │
└─────────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └─────────────┘ └────────────────┘
▲ │ │
│ polls /sidebar-chat │ polls queue file │
└───────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
◀──────────────────────┘
POST /sidebar-agent/event
```
## Startup Timeline
```
T+0ms CLI runs `$B connect`
├── Server starts on port 34567
├── Writes state to .gstack/browse.json (pid, port, token)
├── Launches headed Chromium with extension
└── Clears sidebar-agent-queue.jsonl
T+500ms sidebar-agent.ts spawned by CLI
├── Reads auth token from .gstack/browse.json
├── Creates queue file if missing
├── Sets lastLine = current line count
└── Starts polling every 200ms
T+1-3s Extension loads in Chromium
├── background.js: health poll every 1s (fast startup)
│ └── GET /health → gets auth token
├── content.js: injects on welcome page
│ └── Does NOT fire gstack-extension-ready (waits for sidebar)
└── Side panel: may auto-open via chrome.sidePanel.open()
T+2-10s Side panel connects
├── tryConnect() → asks background for port/token
├── Fallback: direct GET /health for token
├── updateConnection(url, token)
│ ├── Starts chat polling (1s interval)
│ ├── Starts tab polling (2s interval)
│ ├── Connects SSE activity stream
│ └── Sends { type: 'sidebarOpened' } to background
└── background relays to content script → hides welcome arrow
T+10s+ Ready for messages
```
## Message Flow: User Types → Claude Responds
```
1. User types "go to hn" in sidebar, hits Enter
2. sidepanel.js sendMessage()
├── Renders user bubble immediately (optimistic)
├── Renders thinking dots immediately
├── Switches to fast poll (300ms)
└── chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'sidebar-command', message, tabId })
3. background.js
├── Gets active Chrome tab URL
└── POST /sidebar-command { message, activeTabUrl }
with Authorization: Bearer ${authToken}
4. server.ts /sidebar-command handler
├── validateAuth(req)
├── syncActiveTabByUrl(extensionUrl) — syncs Playwright tab to Chrome tab
├── pickSidebarModel(message) — 'sonnet' for actions, 'opus' for analysis
├── Adds user message to chat buffer
├── Builds system prompt + args
└── Appends JSON to ~/.gstack/sidebar-agent-queue.jsonl
5. sidebar-agent.ts poll() (within 200ms)
├── Reads new line from queue file
├── Parses JSON entry
├── Checks processingTabs — skips if tab already has agent running
└── askClaude(entry) — fire and forget
6. sidebar-agent.ts askClaude()
├── spawn('claude', ['-p', prompt, '--model', model, ...])
├── Streams stdout line-by-line (stream-json format)
├── For each event: POST /sidebar-agent/event { type, tool, text, tabId }
└── On close: POST /sidebar-agent/event { type: 'agent_done' }
7. server.ts processAgentEvent()
├── Adds entry to chat buffer (in-memory + disk)
├── On agent_done: sets tab status to 'idle'
└── On agent_done: processes next queued message for that tab
8. sidepanel.js pollChat() (every 300ms during fast poll)
├── GET /sidebar-chat?after=${chatLineCount}&tabId=${tabId}
├── Renders new entries (text, tool_use, agent_done)
└── On agent idle: removes thinking dots, stops fast poll
```
## Arrow Hint Hide Flow (4-step signal chain)
The welcome page shows a right-pointing arrow until the sidebar opens.
```
1. sidepanel.js updateConnection()
└── chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ type: 'sidebarOpened' })
2. background.js
└── chrome.tabs.sendMessage(activeTabId, { type: 'sidebarOpened' })
3. content.js onMessage handler
└── document.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent('gstack-extension-ready'))
4. welcome.html script
└── addEventListener('gstack-extension-ready', () => arrow.classList.add('hidden'))
```
The arrow does NOT hide when the extension loads. Only when the sidebar connects.
## Auth Token Flow
```
Server starts → AUTH_TOKEN = crypto.randomUUID()
├── GET /health (no auth) → returns { token: AUTH_TOKEN }
├── background.js checkHealth() → authToken = data.token
│ └── Refreshes on EVERY health poll (fixes stale token on restart)
├── sidepanel.js tryConnect() → serverToken from background or /health
│ └── Used for chat polling: Authorization: Bearer ${serverToken}
└── sidebar-agent.ts refreshToken() → reads from .gstack/browse.json
└── Used for event relay: Authorization: Bearer ${authToken}
```
If the server restarts, all three components get fresh tokens within 10s
(background health poll interval).
## Model Routing
`pickSidebarModel(message)` in server.ts classifies messages:
| Pattern | Model | Why |
|---------|-------|-----|
| "click @e24", "go to hn", "screenshot" | sonnet | Deterministic tool calls, no thinking needed |
| "what does this page say?", "summarize" | opus | Needs comprehension |
| "find bugs", "check for broken links" | opus | Analysis task |
| "navigate to X and fill the form" | sonnet | Action-oriented, no analysis words |
Analysis words (`what`, `why`, `how`, `summarize`, `describe`, `analyze`, `read X and Y`)
always override action verbs and force opus.
## Known Failure Modes
| Failure | Symptom | Root Cause | Fix |
|---------|---------|------------|-----|
| Stale auth token | "Unauthorized" in input | Server restarted, background had old token | background.js refreshes token on every health poll |
| Tab ID mismatch | Message sent, no response visible | Server assigned tabId 1, sidebar polling tabId 0 | switchChatTab preserves optimistic UI during switch |
| Sidebar agent not running | Messages queue forever | Agent process failed to spawn or crashed | Check `ps aux | grep sidebar-agent` |
| Agent stale token | Agent runs but no events appear in sidebar | sidebar-agent has old token from .gstack/browse.json | Agent re-reads token before each event POST |
| Queue file missing | spawnClaude fails | Race between server start and agent start | Both sides create file if missing |
| Optimistic UI blown away | User bubble + dots vanish | switchChatTab replaced DOM with welcome screen | Preserved DOM when lastOptimisticMsg is set |
## Per-Tab Concurrency
Each browser tab can run its own agent simultaneously:
- Server: `tabAgents: Map<number, TabAgentState>` with per-tab queue (max 5)
- sidebar-agent: `processingTabs: Set<number>` prevents duplicate spawns
- Two messages on same tab: queued sequentially, processed in order
- Two messages on different tabs: run concurrently
## File Locations
| Component | File | Runs in |
|-----------|------|---------|
| Sidebar UI | `extension/sidepanel.js` | Chrome side panel |
| Service worker | `extension/background.js` | Chrome background |
| Content script | `extension/content.js` | Page context |
| Welcome page | `browse/src/welcome.html` | Page context |
| HTTP server | `browse/src/server.ts` | Bun (compiled binary) |
| Agent process | `browse/src/sidebar-agent.ts` | Bun (non-compiled, can spawn) |
| CLI entry | `browse/src/cli.ts` | Bun (compiled binary) |
| Queue file | `~/.gstack/sidebar-agent-queue.jsonl` | Filesystem |
| State file | `.gstack/browse.json` | Filesystem |
| Chat log | `~/.gstack/sessions/<id>/chat.jsonl` | Filesystem |
## Terminal flow
The sidebar has a second primary tab next to Chat: **Terminal**. Where Chat
spawns one-shot `claude -p` per message, Terminal runs **interactive
`claude` in a real PTY** with xterm.js as the renderer.
### Components
```
┌─────────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐
│ sidepanel.js + │────▶│ server.ts │────▶│terminal-agent.ts │
│ -terminal.js │ │ (compiled) │ │ (non-compiled) │
│ (xterm.js) │ │ │ │ PTY listener │
└─────────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────────┘
▲ │ │
│ ws://127.0.0.1:<termPort>/ws (cookie auth) │ Bun.spawn(claude)
└───────────────────────┼──────────────────────▶│ terminal: {data}
│ ▼
│ ┌──────────────────┐
│ │ claude PTY │
│ └──────────────────┘
POST /pty-session │
(Bearer AUTH_TOKEN) │
┌──────────────────┐
│ pty-session- │
│ cookie.ts │
│ (HttpOnly cookie)│
└──────────────────┘
│ POST /internal/grant (loopback)
┌──────────────────┐
│ validTokens Set │
│ in agent memory │
└──────────────────┘
```
### Startup + first-key timeline
```
T+0ms CLI runs `$B connect`
├── Server starts (compiled)
└── Spawns terminal-agent.ts via `bun run`
T+500ms terminal-agent.ts boots
├── Bun.serve on 127.0.0.1:0 (random port)
├── Writes <stateDir>/terminal-port (server reads it for /health)
├── Writes <stateDir>/terminal-internal-token (loopback handshake)
└── Probes claude → writes claude-available.json
T+1-3s Extension loads, sidebar opens
├── Terminal tab is default-active
├── sidepanel-terminal.js: setState(IDLE), shows "Press any key"
└── No PTY spawned yet (lazy)
T+user-keys First keystroke fires onAnyKey
├── POST /pty-session (Authorization: Bearer AUTH_TOKEN)
│ └── server mints cookie, posts /internal/grant to agent
│ └── responds with Set-Cookie: gstack_pty=<HttpOnly>
│ └── responds with terminalPort
├── GET /claude-available (preflight)
├── new WebSocket(ws://127.0.0.1:<terminalPort>/ws)
│ └── Browser carries gstack_pty cookie + Origin automatically
│ └── Agent validates Origin AND cookie BEFORE upgrading
├── On upgrade success, send {type:"resize"} then a single byte
└── Agent message handler sees first byte → spawnClaude()
```
### Dual-token model
| Token | Lives in | Used for | Lifetime |
|-------|----------|----------|----------|
| `AUTH_TOKEN` | `<stateDir>/browse.json`; in-memory in server.ts | `/pty-session` POST (mint cookie) | server lifetime |
| `gstack_pty` cookie | Browser HttpOnly jar; agent `validTokens` Set | `/ws` upgrade auth | 30 min, dies on WS close |
| `INTERNAL_TOKEN` | `<stateDir>/terminal-internal-token`; in agent memory | server → agent loopback `/internal/grant` | agent lifetime |
`AUTH_TOKEN` is **never** valid for `/ws` directly. The cookie is **never**
valid for `/pty-session` or `/command`. Strict separation prevents an SSE
or sidebar-chat token leak from escalating into shell access.
### Threat model
The Terminal tab **bypasses the entire prompt-injection security stack**
(`content-security.ts` datamarking, `security-classifier.ts` ML scoring,
canary detection, ensemble verdicts). On the Terminal tab the user is
typing directly to claude — there is no untrusted page content in the
loop, so the threat model is "user trusts themselves," same as opening
a terminal locally.
That trust assumption is load-bearing on three transport-layer guarantees:
1. **Local-only listener.** `terminal-agent.ts` binds `127.0.0.1` only.
The dual-listener tunnel surface (server.ts:95 `TUNNEL_PATHS`) does
**not** include `/pty-session` or `/terminal/*`, so the tunnel returns
404 by default-deny.
2. **Origin gate.** `/ws` upgrades require
`Origin: chrome-extension://<id>`. A localhost web page cannot mount a
cross-site WebSocket hijack against the shell because its Origin is
a regular `http(s)://...`.
3. **Cookie auth.** `gstack_pty` is HttpOnly + SameSite=Strict, scoped to
the local listener, minted only by an authenticated `/pty-session`
POST. JS injected into a page can't read it; cross-site requests
can't send it.
Drop any of those three and the whole tab becomes unsafe.
### Lifecycle
- **Lazy spawn**: claude is not started until the user types a key. Idle
sidebar opens cost nothing.
- **One PTY per WS**: closing the WebSocket SIGINTs claude, then SIGKILLs
after 3s. The `gstack_pty` cookie is also revoked so a stolen cookie
can't be replayed against a new PTY.
- **No auto-reconnect**: when the WS closes the user sees "Session ended,
click to start a new session." Auto-reconnect would burn a fresh
claude session every reload. v1.1 may add session resumption keyed on
tab/session id (see TODOS).
### Files
| Component | File | Runs in |
|-----------|------|---------|
| Terminal UI | `extension/sidepanel-terminal.js` + xterm.js in `extension/lib/` | Chrome side panel |
| PTY agent | `browse/src/terminal-agent.ts` | Bun (non-compiled, can spawn) |
| Cookie store | `browse/src/pty-session-cookie.ts` | Bun (compiled, in server.ts) |
| Port file | `<stateDir>/terminal-port` | Filesystem |
| Internal token | `<stateDir>/terminal-internal-token` | Filesystem |
| Claude probe | `<stateDir>/claude-available.json` | Filesystem |
| Active tab | `<stateDir>/active-tab.json` | Filesystem (claude reads) |