Files
gstack/BROWSER.md
Garry Tan 443bde054c v1.28.0.0 feat: browse --headed/--proxy/--navigate + gstack/llms.txt + webdriver-only stealth (#1363)
* feat(browse): SOCKS5 bridge with auth + cred redaction helper

Adds browse/src/socks-bridge.ts: a 127.0.0.1-only SOCKS5 listener that
accepts unauthenticated connections from Chromium and relays them through
an authenticated upstream proxy. Chromium does not prompt for SOCKS5 auth
at launch, so this bridge is the workaround for using auth-required
residential SOCKS5 upstreams.

- startSocksBridge({ upstream, port: 0 }) → ephemeral 127.0.0.1 listener
- testUpstream({ upstream, retries: 3, backoffMs: 500, budgetMs: 5000 })
  pre-flight that connects to a known endpoint (default 1.1.1.1:443)
- Stream-error policy: kill affected client + upstream sockets on any
  error mid-stream; no transport retries (a transport-layer retry can
  corrupt browser traffic)

Adds browse/src/proxy-redact.ts: single source of truth for redacting
credentials in any logged proxy URL or upstream config. Every code path
that prints proxy config goes through this helper.

Adds the socks npm dep (~30KB) and 16 tests covering: 127.0.0.1-only
bind, byte-for-byte round trip through the bridge, auth rejection,
mid-stream upstream drop kills client conn, listener teardown,
testUpstream success + retry-exhaust paths, redaction of every
credential shape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(browse): --proxy and --headed flags wire bridge into daemon

Adds the global --proxy <url> and --headed flags to the browse CLI.
Resolves cred policy and routes the daemon launch through the SOCKS5
bridge (or pass-through for HTTP/HTTPS) before chromium.launch().

CLI (cli.ts):
- extractGlobalFlags() strips --proxy/--headed from argv, parses URL via
  Node URL class, validates D9 cred-mixing (env BROWSE_PROXY_USER/PASS
  + URL creds → exit 1 with hint), composes canonical proxy URL with
  resolved creds, computes a stable configHash for daemon-mismatch
- ensureServer() now reads existing daemon's configHash from state file
  and refuses (exit 1 with disconnect hint) if --proxy/--headed mismatch
  the existing daemon. No silent restart that would drop tab state.
- All proxy-related stderr lines go through redactProxyUrl

proxy-config.ts (new):
- parseProxyConfig() — URL parser + D9 cred-mixing detector + scheme allowlist
- computeConfigHash() — stable hash of (proxy URL minus creds + headed flag)
- toUpstreamConfig() — map ParsedProxyConfig → socks-bridge.UpstreamConfig

Server (server.ts):
- Reads BROWSE_PROXY_URL at startup; for SOCKS5+auth, runs testUpstream
  pre-flight (5s budget, 3 retries, 500ms backoff) and exits 1 on failure
  with redacted error
- Spawns startSocksBridge() on 127.0.0.1:<ephemeral> and points
  Chromium at it via socks5://127.0.0.1:<port>
- HTTP/HTTPS or unauth SOCKS5 → pass-through to chromium.launch
  proxy.server (with username/password if present)
- State file gains optional configHash for daemon-mismatch check
- Bridge tears down via process.on('exit')

Browser manager (browser-manager.ts):
- New setProxyConfig({ server, username, password }) called by server.ts
  before launch
- chromium.launch() and both launchPersistentContext sites pass the
  proxy config through when set

Tests: 22 new across proxy-config (parse + cred-mixing + hash stability)
and extractGlobalFlags (flag stripping + cred-mixing rejection + cred
rotation hash stability + redaction).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(browse): Xvfb auto-spawn with PID + start-time validation

Adds browse/src/xvfb.ts: a Linux-only Xvfb auto-spawn module for
running headed Chromium in containers without DISPLAY. The module
walks a display range to pick a free one (never hardcodes :99) and
validates orphan PIDs by BOTH /proc/<pid>/cmdline matching 'Xvfb' AND
start-time matching the recorded value before sending any signal.
Defends against PID reuse — refuses to kill anything that doesn't
match both checks.

- shouldSpawnXvfb(env, platform) — pure decision: skip on macOS/Windows,
  on Linux skip when DISPLAY or WAYLAND_DISPLAY is set (codex F2)
- pickFreeDisplay(99..120) — probes via xdpyinfo
- spawnXvfb(display) — returns { pid, startTime, display } handle
- isOurXvfb(pid, startTime) — both-checks validator
- cleanupXvfb(state) — best-effort, validates ownership before SIGTERM

Wired into server.ts startup: when shouldSpawnXvfb says yes, picks a
free display, spawns Xvfb, sets DISPLAY for chromium.launchHeaded, and
records xvfbPid/xvfbStartTime/xvfbDisplay in the state file. Cleanup
runs on process.on('exit'). The CLI's disconnect path also runs
cleanupXvfb() in the force-cleanup branch when the server is dead.

Disconnect now applies to any non-default daemon (headed mode OR
configHash-tagged daemon — i.e. one started with --proxy/--headed),
not just headed mode.

Adds xvfb + x11-utils to .github/docker/Dockerfile.ci so CI exercises
the Linux container --headed path on every run. Without it the most
common production path would go untested.

Tests: 17 new across decision logic, PID validation defenses
(cmdline mismatch, start-time mismatch), no-op safety on bad inputs,
and a Linux+Xvfb-installed gate for the spawn → validate → cleanup
round trip. Tests skip on macOS/Windows automatically.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(browse): webdriver-mask stealth + Chromium-through-bridge e2e

D7 (codex narrowing): mask navigator.webdriver only via addInitScript.
The wintermute approach (fake plugins=[1..5], fake languages=['en-US',
'en'], stub window.chrome) is intentionally NOT applied — modern
fingerprinters check consistency between plugins.length, languages,
userAgent, and platform, and synthesizing fixed values can flag MORE
bot-like, not less. The honest minimum is webdriver, which Chromium
exposes as a known automation tell.

Adds browse/src/stealth.ts: single source of truth for the stealth
init script and launch args. Both browser-manager.launch() (headless)
and launchHeaded() (persistent context with extension) call
applyStealth(context) and pass STEALTH_LAUNCH_ARGS into chromium.launch.

The pre-existing launchHeaded stealth that did fake plugins/languages
is removed for the same reason. The cdc_/__webdriver runtime cleanup
and Permissions API patch are kept — they remove automation-injected
artifacts, not synthesize fake natural-browser values.

Adds bridge-chromium-e2e.test.ts (codex F3): the test that proves the
FEATURE works. Real Chromium with proxy.server = 'socks5://127.0.0.1:
<bridgePort>' navigates to a local HTTP fixture; the auth upstream's
connect counter and the HTTP fixture's hit counter both increment,
proving traffic actually traversed bridge → auth-upstream → destination.
Without this test, we could ship a working byte-relay and a broken
Chromium integration and never know.

Adds bridge-port-restart.test.ts (codex F1, reframed): old test
assumed two daemons coexist, which contradicts D2 single-daemon model.
Reframed as restart-then-restart, asserting fresh ephemeral ports
(never the hardcoded 1090) on each spin-up.

Adds stealth-webdriver.test.ts: navigator.webdriver=false in both
fresh contexts and persistent contexts; navigator.plugins/languages
are NOT replaced with the wintermute fake list (D7 verification).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(gstack): generate llms.txt — single-file capability index for AI agents

Adds scripts/gen-llms-txt.ts: produces gstack/llms.txt at repo root,
indexing every skill (47), every browse command (75), and design
commands when the design CLI is present. Per the llmstxt.org
convention, agents can read one file to learn what gstack offers
instead of crawling 47 SKILL.md files.

Sources:
- skill SKILL.md.tmpl frontmatter (name + description block scalar)
- browse/src/commands.ts COMMAND_DESCRIPTIONS (sorted by category)
- design/src/commands.ts COMMAND_DESCRIPTIONS if present (best-effort)

Wired into scripts/gen-skill-docs.ts as a post-step so it regenerates
on every `bun run gen:skill-docs` (the same script that re-emits all
SKILL.md files). Failures are non-fatal warnings, not build breaks —
the generator never blocks SKILL.md regen.

Strict mode (--strict, also used by tests) throws when a skill is
missing name or description in its frontmatter, catching missing
metadata before it ships.

Tests: shape (top-level sections, sort order, single-line summary
discipline), every-skill-and-command-appears, strict-mode rejection of
incomplete frontmatter, and freshness check that the committed
gstack/llms.txt matches what the generator produces now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(browse): --navigate flag on download for browser-triggered files

Adds the --navigate strategy from community PR #1355 (originally from
@garrytan-agents). When set, download navigates to the URL with
waitUntil:'commit' and captures the resulting browser download via
page.waitForEvent('download'), then saves via download.saveAs().
Handles URLs that trigger files via Content-Disposition headers,
multi-hop CDN redirects requiring browser cookies, or anti-bot CDN
chains where page.request.fetch() can't follow the auth/redirect
chain.

Defaults still use the existing direct-fetch strategy. --navigate is
opt-in.

Goes through the same validateNavigationUrl SSRF gate as goto, so
download --navigate cannot reach IPv4 metadata endpoints (AWS IMDSv1,
GCP/Azure equivalents) or arbitrary internal hosts.

Inferred content type from suggested filename for common extensions
(epub, pdf, zip, gz, mp3/mp4, jpg/jpeg/png, txt, html, json) — falls
back to application/octet-stream. Same 200MB cap as Strategy 1.

Frames the use case generically (anti-bot CDN, Content-Disposition,
redirect chains) rather than naming any specific site, per project
voice rules.

Co-Authored-By: @garrytan-agents
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: v1.28.0.0 — browse SKILL section + VERSION + CHANGELOG

VERSION 1.27.1.0 → 1.28.0.0 (MINOR — substantial new capability:
five new flags/features, ~600 LOC added, new socks dep, multiple
new modules).

browse/SKILL.md.tmpl: new "Headed Mode + Proxy + Anti-Bot Sites"
section between User Handoff and Snapshot Flags. Documents
--headed (auto-Xvfb on Linux), --proxy (with embedded SOCKS5
bridge for auth), download --navigate, the cred-mixing policy,
daemon-discipline (refuse-on-mismatch), the narrowed
webdriver-only stealth, container support caveats, and the
fail-fast/no-retry failure modes.

CHANGELOG entry follows the release-summary format from CLAUDE.md:
two-line headline, lead paragraph, "The numbers that matter"
table tied to specific test files that prove each capability,
"What this means for AI agents" closing tied to a real workflow
shift, then itemized Added/Changed/Fixed/For-contributors
sections.

Browse SKILL.md regenerated via bun run gen:skill-docs.
gstack/llms.txt regenerated automatically from the same pipeline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(browse): integration coverage for daemon mismatch + proxy fail-fast

Adds two integration tests that exercise the full process boundary,
not just the module-level wiring.

daemon-mismatch-refuse.test.ts (D2):
- Stubs a healthy state file with a fake configHash and a fake /health
  HTTP server, runs the actual cli.ts binary with a mismatching
  --proxy, asserts exit 1 + 'different config' / 'browse disconnect'
  hint in stderr.
- Same shape with the plain-daemon-meets---headed case.
- Positive case: matching configHash → CLI does NOT emit the mismatch
  hint (regardless of whether the actual command succeeds).

server-proxy-fail-fast.test.ts:
- Starts the rejecting SOCKS5 upstream, spawns server.ts with
  BROWSE_PROXY_URL pointing at it, BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP=1 to skip
  Chromium launch.
- Asserts exit 1, 'FAIL upstream' in stderr (testUpstream pre-flight
  ran), no raw credential leakage in any output (redaction works on
  the failure path), and exit within 30s upper bound.

Both tests use the existing spawn-bun-cli pattern from
commands.test.ts so they run on the same CI infrastructure as the
rest of the bun test suite.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(gen-skill-docs): keep module sync so test require() still works

Two regressions caught by the full test suite after the v1.28.0.0
landing pass:

1) package.json version mismatch — VERSION was bumped to 1.28.0.0
   but package.json still pinned to 1.27.1.0.
   test/gen-skill-docs.test.ts asserts they match.

2) Top-level await in scripts/gen-llms-txt.ts (CLI entry block) and
   scripts/gen-skill-docs.ts (post-step) made gen-skill-docs an
   async module. test/gen-skill-docs.test.ts uses require() to pull
   extractVoiceTriggers/processVoiceTriggers from gen-skill-docs,
   which Bun rejects on async modules with:
     "TypeError: require() async module ... unsupported.
      use 'await import()' instead."

Fix: wrap the await blocks in void IIFEs so the modules remain sync
from a require() perspective.

After fix: all 379 gen-skill-docs tests pass, all 77 new feature
tests pass (3 skipped on macOS — Linux+Xvfb gates).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): apply codex adversarial findings on the new lifecycle

Codex outside-voice review caught five real production-failure modes in
the v1.28.0.0 proxy/headed lifecycle. Fixed:

1) `browse disconnect` skip-graceful for proxy-only daemons
   (browse/src/cli.ts). The graceful /command POST went out with stray
   `domains,` shorthand and (even fixed) the server's disconnect handler
   only tears down headed mode — proxy-only daemons returned 200 "Not
   in headed mode" while leaving the bridge running. Now disconnect
   short-circuits to force-cleanup for non-headed daemons, which kicks
   process.on('exit') in server.ts to close the bridge + Xvfb.

2) sendCommand crash retry preserves --proxy / --headed
   (browse/src/cli.ts). The ECONNRESET retry path called startServer()
   with no extraEnv, silently dropping the proxied flags. A daemon that
   died mid-command would silently restart in default direct/headless
   mode and bypass the SOCKS bridge. Now reapplies BROWSE_PROXY_URL,
   BROWSE_HEADED, and BROWSE_CONFIG_HASH from the resolved global flags.

3) `connect` honors --proxy (browse/src/cli.ts). The headed-mode
   `connect` command built its own serverEnv that didn't include
   BROWSE_PROXY_URL, so `browse --proxy <url> connect` launched headed
   Chromium without the proxy. Now threads proxyUrl + configHash into
   the connect serverEnv.

4) SOCKS5 bridge handles fragmented TCP frames
   (browse/src/socks-bridge.ts). Previously used once('data') and
   parsed each chunk as a complete SOCKS5 frame — TCP doesn't preserve
   message boundaries and split greetings/CONNECT requests caused
   intermittent handshake failures. Replaced with a single state
   machine that buffers chunks and uses size predicates on the SOCKS5
   header to know when a complete frame has arrived. Pauses the client
   socket during upstream connect and replays any remainder bytes
   into the upstream on success.

5) Xvfb cleanup-then-state-delete ordering
   (browse/src/server.ts). emergencyCleanup() previously deleted the
   state file BEFORE any Xvfb cleanup could read it, orphaning Xvfb
   on uncaughtException / unhandledRejection. Now reads the state
   file first, calls cleanupXvfb() (which validates cmdline +
   start-time before kill), then deletes the state file.

Adds a regression test for #4: writes the SOCKS5 greeting + CONNECT
one byte at a time with 5ms ticks, asserts a clean round trip after
the fragmented handshake.

Codex's sixth finding (bridge advertises NO_AUTH on 127.0.0.1, so any
co-located process can use the authenticated upstream) is documented
as a known limitation — gstack's threat model assumes single-user
hosts. Adding bridge-side auth is a separate change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: update BROWSER.md + TODOS.md for v1.28.0.0

BROWSER.md picks up a "Headed mode + proxy + browser-native downloads
(v1.28.0.0)" subsection inside Real-browser mode plus the new source-map
entries (socks-bridge.ts, proxy-config.ts, proxy-redact.ts, xvfb.ts,
stealth.ts). TODOS.md anti-bot-stealth item updated to reflect the v1.28
narrowing — the "fake plugins" line is no longer accurate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): include bun.lock in image build for deterministic install

CI evals all failed on PR #1363 with:
  error: Could not resolve: "smart-buffer". Maybe you need to "bun install"?
  error: Could not resolve: "ip-address". Maybe you need to "bun install"?
  at /opt/node_modules_cache/socks/build/client/socksclient.js:15

The cached node_modules layer in the pre-baked Docker image had
`socks` (the new dep) but was missing its transitive deps (smart-buffer,
ip-address). The image build copied only package.json into the build
context — without bun.lock, `bun install` resolved a different tree
than local `bun install` did, dropping required transitive deps.

Reproduces locally as 229 packages (correct) when bun.lock is present
or absent. Why CI diverged isn't fully understood — possibly Docker
layer cache reuse across image rebuilds — but the deterministic fix is
to include the lockfile in the image build context and use
`--frozen-lockfile`, matching what every CI doc recommends.

Changes:
- .github/docker/Dockerfile.ci: COPY bun.lock alongside package.json,
  switch `bun install` → `bun install --frozen-lockfile` so any future
  lockfile drift fails loudly during image build instead of producing
  a partially-installed cache that breaks downstream eval jobs.
- .github/workflows/evals.yml: include bun.lock in the image-tag hash
  so adding/removing a dep invalidates the image, AND copy bun.lock
  into the docker context alongside package.json.
- .github/workflows/evals-periodic.yml: same updates.
- .github/workflows/ci-image.yml: rebuild trigger now fires on bun.lock
  changes too; build context includes bun.lock.

Image hash changes → fresh image gets built on next CI run → install
matches the lockfile exactly → no missing transitive deps.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): use hardlink copy instead of symlink for node_modules cache

After the bun.lock fix landed, the eval matrix STILL failed identically:
  Could not resolve: "smart-buffer" / "ip-address"
  at /opt/node_modules_cache/socks/build/client/socksclient.js

But the hash-tagged image actually contains smart-buffer + ip-address +
socks all flat in /opt/node_modules_cache (verified by pulling and
inspecting the image). 207 packages, all present.

Root cause: the workflow used `ln -s /opt/node_modules_cache node_modules`
to restore deps. Bun build (and Node module resolution generally) walks
a file's realpath to find sibling deps. From the symlinked
/workspace/node_modules/socks/build/client/socksclient.js, realpath
resolves to /opt/node_modules_cache/socks/build/client/socksclient.js,
and walking up to find a node_modules/smart-buffer dir fails — there's
no `node_modules` segment in the realpath.

Switch `ln -s` → `cp -al` (hardlink-copy). Each file in the cache becomes
a hardlink at /workspace/node_modules/<pkg>, sharing inodes (no data
copy). Realpath of /workspace/node_modules/socks/.../socksclient.js
stays inside /workspace/node_modules, so sibling deps resolve correctly.

Speed is comparable to symlink — `cp -al` on ~200 packages on tmpfs is
sub-second. Same caching story preserved.

Both evals.yml and evals-periodic.yml updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): cp -r instead of cp -al — /opt and /workspace are different filesystems

The hardlink-copy fix landed and immediately broke with:
  cp: cannot create hard link 'node_modules/<file>' to
      '/opt/node_modules_cache/<file>': Invalid cross-device link

GitHub Actions runners mount the workspace volume at /workspace
(overlay-fs layered onto the runner image), and /opt is the runner
image's own filesystem. Cross-filesystem hardlinks aren't supported.

Switch `cp -al` → `cp -r`. Cost: ~5s for ~200 packages of small JS
files vs ~0s for the broken symlink. Still cheaper than the ~15s
`bun install` fallback. Realpath of /workspace/node_modules/<pkg>/...
stays inside /workspace, so bun build's sibling-dep resolution works.

Both evals.yml and evals-periodic.yml updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 20:14:59 -07:00

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# Browser — Complete Reference
gstack's browser surface in one document. Headless Chromium daemon, ~70+
commands, ref-based element selection, codifiable browser-skills, real-browser
mode with a Chrome side panel, an in-sidebar Claude PTY, an ngrok pair-agent
flow, and a layered prompt-injection defense — all behind a compiled CLI that
prints plain text to stdout. ~100-200ms per call. Zero context-token overhead.
If you've used gstack in the last release or two, the productivity loop is the
new headline: `/scrape <intent>` drives a page once, `/skillify` codifies the
flow into a deterministic Playwright script, and the next `/scrape` on the
same intent runs in ~200ms instead of ~30 seconds of agent re-exploration.
---
## Quick start
```bash
# One-time: build the binary (browse/dist/browse, ~58MB)
bun install && bun run build
# Set $B once and forget about it
B=./browse/dist/browse # or ~/.claude/skills/gstack/browse/dist/browse
# Drive a page
$B goto https://news.ycombinator.com
$B snapshot -i # @e refs you can click/fill/inspect later
$B click @e30 # click ref 30 from the snapshot
$B text # get clean page text
$B screenshot /tmp/hn.png
# Codify a repeated flow
/scrape latest hacker news stories
/skillify # writes ~/.gstack/browser-skills/hn-front/...
/scrape hacker news front page # second call: 200ms via the codified skill
# Watch Claude work in real time
$B connect # headed Chromium + Side Panel extension
```
---
## Table of contents
1. [What it is](#what-it-is)
2. [The productivity loop — `/scrape` + `/skillify`](#the-productivity-loop)
3. [Architecture](#architecture)
4. [Command reference](#command-reference)
5. [Snapshot system + ref-based selection](#snapshot-system)
6. [Browser-skills runtime](#browser-skills-runtime)
7. [Domain-skills (per-site agent notes)](#domain-skills)
8. [Real-browser mode (`$B connect`)](#real-browser-mode) — including [`--headed` + `--proxy` + `--navigate` (v1.28.0.0)](#headed-mode--proxy--browser-native-downloads-v12800)
9. [Side Panel + sidebar agent](#side-panel--sidebar-agent)
10. [Pair-agent — remote agents over an ngrok tunnel](#pair-agent)
11. [Authentication + tokens](#authentication)
12. [Prompt-injection security stack (L1L6)](#security-stack)
13. [Screenshots, PDFs, visual inspection](#screenshots-pdfs-visual)
14. [Local HTML — `goto file://` vs `load-html`](#local-html)
15. [Batch endpoint](#batch-endpoint)
16. [Console, network, dialog capture](#capture)
17. [JS execution — `js` + `eval`](#js-execution)
18. [Tabs, frames, state, watch, inbox](#tabs-frames-state)
19. [CDP escape hatch + CSS inspector](#cdp)
20. [Performance + scale](#performance)
21. [Multi-workspace isolation](#multi-workspace)
22. [Environment variables](#environment-variables)
23. [Source map](#source-map)
24. [Development + testing](#development)
25. [Cross-references](#cross-references)
26. [Acknowledgments](#acknowledgments)
---
## What it is
A compiled CLI binary that talks to a persistent local Chromium daemon over
HTTP. The CLI is a thin client — it reads a state file, sends a command,
prints the response to stdout. The daemon does the real work via
[Playwright](https://playwright.dev/).
Everything that was a Chrome MCP server in the early days now happens through
plain stdout. No JSON-schema framing, no protocol negotiation, no persistent
WebSocket — Claude's Bash tool already exists, so we use it.
Three escalating modes:
- **Headless** (default). Daemon runs Chromium with no visible window. Fastest,
cheapest, what skills like `/qa`, `/design-review`, `/benchmark` use by
default.
- **Headed via `$B connect`**. Same daemon, but Chromium is visible (rebranded
as "GStack Browser") with the Side Panel extension auto-loaded. You watch
every command tick through in real time.
- **Pair-agent over a tunnel**. Daemon binds a second listener that ngrok
forwards. A remote agent (Codex, OpenClaw, Hermes, anything that can speak
HTTP) drives your local browser through a 26-command allowlist with a
scoped, single-use token.
---
## The productivity loop
The shipped headline of v1.19.0.0. Two gstack skills wrap the browser-skills
runtime so the second time you ask Claude to scrape a page, it runs in ~200ms.
### `/scrape <intent>`
One entry point for pulling page data. Three paths under the hood:
1. **Match path (~200ms)** — agent runs `$B skill list`, semantically matches
the intent against each skill's `triggers:` array + `description` + `host`,
and runs `$B skill run <name>` if a confident match exists.
2. **Prototype path (~30s)** — no match, agent drives the page with `$B goto`,
`$B text`, `$B html`, `$B links`, etc., returns the JSON, and appends a
one-line "say `/skillify`" suggestion.
3. **Mutating-intent refusal** — verbs like *submit*, *click*, *fill* route
to `/automate` (Phase 2b, P0 in `TODOS.md`). `/scrape` is read-only by
contract.
### `/skillify`
Codifies the most recent successful `/scrape` prototype into a permanent
browser-skill on disk. Eleven steps, three locked contracts:
- **D1 — Provenance guard.** Walks back ≤10 agent turns for a clearly-bounded
`/scrape` result. Refuses with one specific message if cold. No silent
synthesis from chat fragments.
- **D2 — Synthesis input slice.** Extracts ONLY the final-attempt `$B` calls
that produced the JSON the user accepted, plus the user's intent string.
Drops failed selectors, drops chat, drops earlier-session content.
- **D3 — Atomic write.** Stages everything to `~/.gstack/.tmp/skillify-<spawnId>/`,
runs `$B skill test` against the temp dir, and only renames into the final
tier path on test pass + user approval. Test fail or rejection: `rm -rf` the
temp dir entirely. No half-written skill ever appears in `$B skill list`.
Mutating-flow sibling `/automate` is split out as P0 in `TODOS.md` and ships
on the next branch — same skillify machinery, per-mutating-step confirmation
gate when running non-codified.
See [`docs/designs/BROWSER_SKILLS_V1.md`](docs/designs/BROWSER_SKILLS_V1.md)
for the full design + decision trail.
---
## Architecture
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Claude Code │
│ │
│ $B goto https://staging.myapp.com │
│ │ │
│ ▼ │
│ ┌──────────┐ HTTP POST ┌──────────────┐ │
│ │ browse │ ──────────────── │ Bun HTTP │ │
│ │ CLI │ 127.0.0.1:rand │ daemon │ │
│ │ │ Bearer token │ │ │
│ │ compiled │ ◄────────────── │ Playwright │──── Chromium │
│ │ binary │ plain text │ API calls │ (headless │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────────┘ or headed) │
│ ~1ms startup persistent daemon │
│ auto-starts on first call │
│ auto-stops after 30 min idle │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
### Daemon lifecycle
1. **First call.** CLI checks `<project>/.gstack/browse.json` for a running
server. None found — it spawns `bun run browse/src/server.ts` in the
background. Daemon launches headless Chromium via Playwright, picks a
random port (1000060000), generates a bearer token, writes the state
file (chmod 600), starts accepting requests. ~3 seconds.
2. **Subsequent calls.** CLI reads the state file, sends an HTTP POST with
the bearer token, prints the response. ~100-200ms round trip.
3. **Idle shutdown.** After 30 minutes of no commands, daemon shuts down and
cleans up the state file. Next call restarts it.
4. **Crash recovery.** If Chromium crashes, the daemon exits immediately —
no self-healing, don't hide failure. CLI detects the dead daemon on the
next call and starts a fresh one.
### Multi-workspace isolation
Each project root (detected via `git rev-parse --show-toplevel`) gets its
own daemon, port, state file, cookies, and logs. No cross-workspace
collisions. State at `<project>/.gstack/browse.json`.
| Workspace | State file | Port |
|-----------|-----------|------|
| `/code/project-a` | `/code/project-a/.gstack/browse.json` | random (1000060000) |
| `/code/project-b` | `/code/project-b/.gstack/browse.json` | random (1000060000) |
---
## Command reference
~70 commands across read, write, and meta. Selectors accept CSS, `@e` refs
from `snapshot`, or `@c` refs from `snapshot -C`. Full table:
### Reading
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `text [sel]` | Clean page text (or scoped to a selector) |
| `html [sel]` | innerHTML, or full page HTML if no selector |
| `links` | All links as `text → href` |
| `forms` | Form fields as JSON |
| `accessibility` | Full ARIA tree |
| `media [--images\|--videos\|--audio] [sel]` | Media elements with URLs, dimensions, types |
| `data [--jsonld\|--og\|--meta\|--twitter]` | Structured data: JSON-LD, OG, Twitter Cards, meta tags |
### Inspection
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `js <expr>` | Run inline JavaScript expression in page context, return as string |
| `eval <file>` | Run JS from a file (path under /tmp or cwd; same sandbox as `js`) |
| `css <sel> <prop>` | Computed CSS value |
| `attrs <sel\|@ref>` | Element attributes as JSON |
| `is <prop> <sel\|@ref>` | State check: visible, hidden, enabled, disabled, checked, editable, focused |
| `console [--clear\|--errors]` | Captured console messages |
| `network [--clear]` | Captured network requests |
| `dialog [--clear]` | Captured dialog messages |
| `cookies` | All cookies as JSON |
| `storage` / `storage set <key> <val>` | Read both localStorage + sessionStorage; set localStorage |
| `perf` | Page load timings |
| `inspect [sel] [--all] [--history]` | Deep CSS via CDP — full rule cascade, box model, computed styles |
| `ux-audit` | Page structure for behavioral analysis: site ID, nav, headings, text blocks, interactive elements |
| `cdp <Domain.method> [json-params]` | Raw CDP method dispatch (deny-default; allowlist in `cdp-allowlist.ts`) |
### Navigation
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `goto <url>` | Navigate to URL (`http://`, `https://`, `file://`) |
| `load-html <file>` | Load local HTML in memory (no `file://` URL; survives viewport scale changes) |
| `back`, `forward`, `reload` | Standard nav |
| `url` | Current page URL |
| `wait <sel\|--networkidle\|--load>` | Wait for element, network idle, or page load (15s timeout) |
### Interaction
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `click <sel\|@ref>` | Click element |
| `fill <sel> <val>` | Fill input |
| `select <sel> <val>` | Select dropdown option (value, label, or visible text) |
| `hover <sel>` | Hover element |
| `type <text>` | Type into focused element |
| `press <key>` | Playwright keyboard key (case-sensitive: Enter, Tab, ArrowUp, Shift+Enter, Control+A, ...) |
| `scroll [sel\|@ref]` | Scroll element into view, or jump to page bottom if no selector |
| `viewport [<WxH>] [--scale <n>]` | Set viewport size + optional `deviceScaleFactor` 1-3 (retina screenshots) |
| `upload <sel> <file> [...]` | Upload file(s) |
| `dialog-accept [text]` | Auto-accept next alert/confirm/prompt; text is sent for prompts |
| `dialog-dismiss` | Auto-dismiss next dialog |
### Style + cleanup
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `style <sel> <prop> <val>` | Modify CSS property (with undo support) |
| `style --undo [N]` | Undo last N style changes |
| `cleanup [--ads\|--cookies\|--sticky\|--social\|--all]` | Remove page clutter |
| `prettyscreenshot [--scroll-to <sel\|text>] [--cleanup] [--hide <sel>...] [path]` | Clean screenshot with optional cleanup, scroll, hide |
### Visual
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `screenshot [--selector <css>] [--viewport] [--clip x,y,w,h] [--base64] [sel\|@ref] [path]` | Five modes: full page, viewport, element crop, region clip, base64 |
| `pdf [path] [--format letter\|a4\|legal] [...]` | PDF with full layout: format, width/height, margins, header/footer templates, page numbers, --tagged for accessibility, --toc waits for Paged.js |
| `responsive [prefix]` | Three screenshots: mobile (375x812), tablet (768x1024), desktop (1280x720) |
| `diff <url1> <url2>` | Text diff between two URLs |
### Cookies + headers
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `cookie <name>=<value>` | Set cookie on current page domain |
| `cookie-import <json>` | Import cookies from JSON file |
| `cookie-import-browser [browser] [--domain d]` | Import from installed Chromium browsers (interactive picker, or `--domain` for direct import) |
| `header <name>:<value>` | Set custom request header (sensitive values auto-redacted) |
| `useragent <string>` | Set user agent (triggers context recreation, invalidates refs) |
### Tabs + frames
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `tabs` | List open tabs |
| `tab <id>` | Switch to tab |
| `newtab [url] [--json]` | Open new tab; `--json` returns `{tabId, url}` for programmatic use |
| `closetab [id]` | Close tab |
| `tab-each <command> [args...]` | Fan out a command across every open tab; returns JSON |
| `frame <sel\|@ref\|--name n\|--url pattern\|main>` | Switch to iframe context (or back to main); clears refs |
### Extraction
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `download <url\|@ref> [path] [--base64]` | Download URL or media element using browser cookies |
| `scrape <images\|videos\|media> [--selector] [--dir] [--limit]` | Bulk download all media from page; writes `manifest.json` |
| `archive [path]` | Save complete page as MHTML via CDP |
### Snapshot
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `snapshot [-i] [-c] [-d N] [-s sel] [-D] [-a] [-o path] [-C]` | Accessibility tree with `@e` refs; `-i` interactive only, `-c` compact, `-d N` depth, `-s` scope, `-D` diff vs previous, `-a` annotated screenshot, `-C` cursor-interactive `@c` refs |
### Server lifecycle
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `status` | Daemon health + mode (headless / headed / cdp) |
| `stop` | Shut down daemon |
| `restart` | Restart daemon |
| `connect` | Launch headed GStack Browser with Side Panel extension |
| `disconnect` | Close headed Chrome, return to headless |
| `focus [@ref]` | Bring headed Chrome to foreground (macOS); `@ref` also scrolls into view |
| `state save\|load <name>` | Save or load browser state (cookies + URLs) |
### Handoff
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `handoff [reason]` | Open visible Chrome at current page for user takeover (CAPTCHA, MFA, complex auth) |
| `resume` | Re-snapshot after user takeover, return control to AI |
### Meta + chains
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `chain` (JSON via stdin) | Run a sequence of commands. Pipe `[["cmd","arg1",...],...]` to `$B chain`. Stops at first error. |
| `inbox [--clear]` | List messages from sidebar scout inbox |
| `watch [stop]` | Passive observation — periodic snapshots while user browses; `stop` returns summary |
### Browser-skills runtime
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `skill list` | List all browser-skills with resolved tier (project > global > bundled) |
| `skill show <name>` | Print SKILL.md |
| `skill run <name> [--arg k=v...] [--timeout=Ns]` | Spawn the skill script with a per-spawn scoped token |
| `skill test <name>` | Run the skill's `script.test.ts` against bundled fixtures |
| `skill rm <name> [--global]` | Tombstone a user-tier skill |
### Domain-skills
| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `domain-skill save\|list\|show\|edit\|promote-to-global\|rollback\|rm <host?>` | Per-site agent notes (host derived from active tab). Lifecycle: quarantined → active (after N=3 successful uses without classifier flag) → global (explicit promote) |
Aliases: `setcontent`, `set-content`, `setContent``load-html` (canonicalized
before scope checks, so a read-scoped token can't use the alias to run a
write command).
---
## Snapshot system
The browser's key innovation is **ref-based element selection** built on
Playwright's accessibility tree API. No DOM mutation. No injected scripts.
Just Playwright's native AX API.
### How `@ref` works
1. `page.locator(scope).ariaSnapshot()` returns a YAML-like accessibility tree.
2. The snapshot parser assigns refs (`@e1`, `@e2`, ...) to each element.
3. For each ref, it builds a Playwright `Locator` (using `getByRole` + nth-child).
4. The ref→Locator map is stored on `BrowserManager`.
5. Later commands like `click @e3` look up the Locator and call `locator.click()`.
### Ref staleness detection
SPAs can mutate the DOM without navigation (React router, tab switches,
modals). When this happens, refs collected from a previous `snapshot` may
point to elements that no longer exist. `resolveRef()` runs an async
`count()` check before using any ref — if the element count is 0, it throws
immediately with a message telling the agent to re-run `snapshot`. Fails fast
(~5ms) instead of waiting for Playwright's 30-second action timeout.
### Extended snapshot features
- **`--diff` (`-D`).** Stores each snapshot as a baseline. On the next `-D`
call, returns a unified diff showing what changed. Use this to verify that
an action (click, fill, etc.) actually worked.
- **`--annotate` (`-a`).** Injects temporary overlay divs at each ref's
bounding box, takes a screenshot with ref labels visible, then removes the
overlays. Use `-o <path>` to control the output.
- **`--cursor-interactive` (`-C`).** Scans for non-ARIA interactive elements
(divs with `cursor:pointer`, `onclick`, `tabindex>=0`) using `page.evaluate`.
Assigns `@c1`, `@c2`... refs with deterministic `nth-child` CSS selectors.
These are elements the ARIA tree misses but users can still click.
---
## Browser-skills runtime
Per-task directories that codify a repeated browser flow into a deterministic
Playwright script. The compounding layer.
### Anatomy of a browser-skill
```
browser-skills/<name>/
├── SKILL.md # frontmatter + prose contract
├── script.ts # deterministic Playwright-via-browse-client logic
├── _lib/browse-client.ts # vendored copy of the SDK (~3KB, byte-identical to canonical)
├── fixtures/<host>-<date>.html # captured page for fixture-replay tests
└── script.test.ts # parser tests against the fixture (no daemon required)
```
The bundled reference is `browser-skills/hackernews-frontpage/`: scrapes the
HN front page, returns 30 stories as JSON. Try it:
```bash
$B skill list # shows hackernews-frontpage (bundled)
$B skill show hackernews-frontpage
$B skill run hackernews-frontpage # JSON of 30 stories in ~200ms
$B skill test hackernews-frontpage # runs script.test.ts against fixture
```
### Three-tier storage
`$B skill list` walks all three in priority order; first hit wins. Resolved
tier is printed inline next to each skill name:
| Tier | Path | When |
|------|------|------|
| **Project** | `<project>/.gstack/browser-skills/<name>/` | Project-specific skills (committed or gitignored) |
| **Global** | `~/.gstack/browser-skills/<name>/` | Per-user skills, all projects |
| **Bundled** | `<gstack-install>/browser-skills/<name>/` | Ships with gstack, read-only |
### Trust model
Two orthogonal axes — daemon-side capability and process-side env — independently
configured.
| Axis | Mechanism | Default |
|------|-----------|---------|
| **Daemon-side capability** | Per-spawn scoped token bound to read+write scope (browser-driving commands minus admin: `eval`, `js`, `cookies`, `storage`). Single-use clientId encodes skill name + spawn id. Revoked when spawn exits. | Always scoped — never the daemon root token |
| **Process-side env** | `trusted: true` frontmatter passes `process.env` minus `GSTACK_TOKEN`. `trusted: false` (default) drops everything except a minimal allowlist (LANG, LC_ALL, TERM, TZ) and pattern-strips secrets (TOKEN/KEY/SECRET/PASSWORD, AWS_*, ANTHROPIC_*, OPENAI_*, GITHUB_*, etc.) | Untrusted (must opt in) |
`GSTACK_PORT` and `GSTACK_SKILL_TOKEN` are injected last, so a parent process
can't override them.
### Output protocol
stdout = JSON. stderr = streaming logs. Exit 0 / non-zero. Default 60s
timeout, override via `--timeout=Ns`. Max stdout 1MB (truncate + non-zero
exit if exceeded). Matches `gh` / `kubectl` / `docker` conventions.
### How the SDK distribution works
Each skill ships its own copy of `browse-client.ts` at `_lib/browse-client.ts`,
byte-identical to the canonical `browse/src/browse-client.ts`. `/skillify`
copies the canonical SDK alongside every generated script. Each skill is
fully self-contained: copy the directory anywhere, it runs. Version drift
impossible — the SDK is frozen at the version the skill was authored against.
### Atomic write discipline (`/skillify` D3)
`browse/src/browser-skill-write.ts` provides three primitives:
- `stageSkill(opts)` — writes files to `~/.gstack/.tmp/skillify-<spawnId>/<name>/`
with restrictive perms.
- `commitSkill(opts)` — atomic `fs.renameSync` into the final tier path.
Refuses to follow symlinked staging dirs (`lstat` check), refuses to
clobber existing skills, runs `realpath` discipline on the tier root.
- `discardStaged(stagedDir)``rm -rf` the staged dir + per-spawn wrapper.
Idempotent. Called on test failure or approval rejection.
There is no "almost shipped" state. Tests pass + user approves = atomic
rename. Tests fail or user rejects = staging vanishes.
See [`docs/designs/BROWSER_SKILLS_V1.md`](docs/designs/BROWSER_SKILLS_V1.md)
for the full design rationale.
---
## Domain-skills
Different mental model from browser-skills: agent-authored *notes* about a
site (not deterministic scripts). One per hostname. Lifecycle:
1. `domain-skill save <host>` — agent writes a note about the site (e.g.,
"GitHub: PR creation needs `--draft` flag for non-staff", "X.com: timeline
uses cursor pagination, not page numbers"). Default state: **quarantined**.
2. After **N=3** successful uses without the L4 prompt-injection classifier
flagging the note, it auto-promotes to **active**.
3. `domain-skill promote-to-global <host>` lifts it to the global tier
(machine-wide, all projects).
4. `domain-skill rollback <host>` demotes; `domain-skill rm <host>` tombstones.
The classifier flag is set automatically by the L4 prompt-injection scan;
agents do not set it manually.
Storage:
- Per-project: `<project>/.gstack/domain-skills/<host>.md`
- Global: `~/.gstack/domain-skills/<host>.md`
Source: `browse/src/domain-skills.ts`, `domain-skill-commands.ts`.
---
## Real-browser mode
`$B connect` launches **GStack Browser** — a rebranded Chromium controlled by
Playwright with the Side Panel extension auto-loaded and anti-bot stealth
patches applied. You watch every command tick through a visible window in
real time.
```bash
$B connect # launches GStack Browser, headed
$B goto https://app.com # navigates in the visible window
$B snapshot -i # refs from the real page
$B click @e3 # clicks in the real window
$B focus # bring window to foreground (macOS)
$B status # shows Mode: cdp
$B disconnect # back to headless mode
```
The window has a subtle golden shimmer line at the top and a floating
"gstack" pill in the bottom-right corner so you always know which Chrome
window is being controlled.
### What "GStack Browser" means
Not your daily Chrome — a Playwright-managed Chromium with custom branding
in the Dock and menu bar, anti-bot stealth (sites like Google and NYTimes
work without captchas), a custom user agent, and the gstack extension
pre-loaded via `launchPersistentContext`. Your regular Chrome with your tabs
and bookmarks stays untouched.
### When to use headed mode
- **QA testing** where you want to watch Claude click through your app
- **Design review** where you need to see exactly what Claude sees
- **Debugging** where headless behavior differs from real Chrome
- **Demos** where you're sharing your screen
- **Pair-agent** sessions (the remote agent drives your local browser)
### CDP-aware skills
When in real-browser mode, `/qa` and `/design-review` automatically skip
cookie import prompts and headless workarounds — the headed browser already
has whatever session you logged into.
### Headed mode + proxy + browser-native downloads (v1.28.0.0)
Three coordinated flags for sites that block headless browsers, fingerprint
Playwright defaults, or sit behind authenticated upstream proxies:
```bash
# Visible Chromium. Auto-spawns Xvfb on Linux containers without DISPLAY.
$B --headed goto https://example.com
# SOCKS5 with auth — Chromium can't prompt for SOCKS5 creds, so $B runs a
# local 127.0.0.1 bridge that handles the auth handshake.
$B --proxy socks5://user:pass@residential.proxy.host:1080 goto https://example.com
# HTTP/HTTPS proxy passes through to Chromium directly.
$B --proxy http://corp-proxy:3128 goto https://example.com
# Browser-native download for Content-Disposition, redirect chains, anti-bot
# CDNs where page.request.fetch() falls over.
$B download "https://protected.example.com/file" /tmp/file.bin --navigate
# Combined.
$B --headed --proxy socks5://user:pass@host:1080 \
download "https://protected.example.com/file" /tmp/file.bin --navigate
```
**Credential policy.** Pass creds via the URL (`socks5://user:pass@host`) OR
the env vars `BROWSE_PROXY_USER` / `BROWSE_PROXY_PASS` — never both. `$B`
refuses with a clear hint when both are set; silent override created
"works on my machine" debugging traps.
**Daemon discipline.** `--proxy` and `--headed` are daemon-startup config.
A running daemon with config A meeting a new invocation with config B exits
1 with a `browse disconnect` hint instead of silently restarting and dropping
tab state, cookies, or sessions.
**Stealth scope.** When `--headed` or `--proxy` are set, `$B` masks
`navigator.webdriver` only — via Chromium's
`--disable-blink-features=AutomationControlled` plus a small init script.
We do NOT fake `navigator.plugins`, `navigator.languages`, or `window.chrome`
— modern fingerprinters check those for consistency, and synthesizing fixed
values can flag MORE bot-like, not less. ChromeDriver's `cdc_` runtime
artifacts and the Permissions API patch are still cleaned up.
**Container support.** `--headed` on Linux without `DISPLAY` walks the
display range (`:99`, `:100`, ...) until `xdpyinfo` reports a free slot,
then spawns Xvfb. Cleanup-on-disconnect validates the recorded PID's
`/proc/<pid>/cmdline` matches `Xvfb` AND start-time matches before sending
any signal — no PID-reuse footguns. Skips spawn entirely when
`WAYLAND_DISPLAY` is set (Chromium uses Wayland natively). Standard
Debian/Ubuntu containers work out of the box; minimal images (alpine,
distroless) may need fonts/dbus/gtk libs for headed Chromium to render.
**Failure modes.** SOCKS5 upstream rejected or unreachable — fail-fast at
startup with a redacted error after 3 retries (5s budget). Mid-stream
upstream drop — bridge kills the affected client connection only; no
transport retries that could corrupt browser traffic.
---
## Side Panel + sidebar agent
The Chrome extension that ships baked into GStack Browser shows a live
activity feed of every browse command in a Side Panel, plus `@ref` overlays
on the page, plus an interactive Claude PTY inside the sidebar.
### The Terminal pane (the headline)
The Side Panel's primary surface is the **Terminal pane** — a live `claude -p`
PTY you can type into directly from the sidebar. Activity / Refs / Inspector
are debug overlays behind the footer's `debug` toggle. WebSocket auth uses
`Sec-WebSocket-Protocol` (browsers can't set `Authorization` on a WebSocket
upgrade), and the PTY session token is a 30-minute HttpOnly cookie minted
via `POST /pty-session`.
The toolbar's Cleanup button and the Inspector's "Send to Code" action both
pipe text into the live Claude PTY via `window.gstackInjectToTerminal(text)`,
exposed by `sidepanel-terminal.js`. There's no separate `/sidebar-command`
POST — the live REPL is the only execution surface.
### Activity feed
A scrolling feed of every browse command — name, args, duration, status,
errors. Shows up in real time as Claude works. Backed by SSE (`/activity/stream`)
that accepts the Bearer token OR the HttpOnly `gstack_sse` session cookie
(30-minute stream-scope cookie minted via `POST /sse-session`).
### Refs tab
After `$B snapshot`, shows the current `@ref` list (role + name) so you can
see what Claude is targeting.
### CSS Inspector
Powered by `$B inspect` (CDP-based). Click any element on the page to see the
full CSS rule cascade, computed styles, box model, and modification history.
The "Send to Code" button injects a description into the Claude PTY.
### Sidebar architecture
| Component | Where it lives | Notes |
|-----------|----------------|-------|
| Side Panel UI | `extension/sidepanel.js`, `sidepanel-terminal.js` | Chrome extension surface |
| Background SW | `extension/background.js` | Manages tab events, port management |
| Content script | `extension/content.js` | Page overlays, `gstack` pill |
| Terminal agent | `browse/src/terminal-agent.ts` | PTY spawn, lifecycle, auth |
| Sidebar utilities | `browse/src/sidebar-utils.ts` | URL sanitization, helpers |
Before modifying any of these, read the comment block in `CLAUDE.md` under
"Sidebar architecture" — silent failures here usually trace to not understanding
the cross-component flow.
### Manual install (for your regular Chrome)
If you want the extension in your everyday Chrome (not the Playwright-controlled
one):
```bash
bin/gstack-extension # opens chrome://extensions, copies path to clipboard
```
Or do it manually: `chrome://extensions` → toggle Developer mode → Load
unpacked → navigate to `~/.claude/skills/gstack/extension` → pin the
extension → enter the port from `$B status`.
---
## Pair-agent
Remote AI agents (Codex, OpenClaw, Hermes, anything that speaks HTTP) can
drive your local browser through an ngrok tunnel. The whole flow is gated
by a 26-command allowlist, scoped tokens, and a denial log.
### How it works
```bash
/pair-agent # generates a setup key, prints connection instructions
# Copy the instructions to the remote agent
# Remote agent runs:
# POST <tunnel-url>/connect with setup key → gets a scoped token (24h, single client)
# POST <tunnel-url>/command with token → runs allowed commands
```
### Dual-listener architecture (v1.6.0.0+)
When `pair-agent` activates, the daemon binds **two HTTP listeners**:
- **Local listener** (`127.0.0.1:LOCAL_PORT`). Full command surface. Never
forwarded by ngrok. Used by your Claude Code, the Side Panel, anything
on your machine.
- **Tunnel listener** (`127.0.0.1:TUNNEL_PORT`). Locked allowlist —
`/connect`, `/command` (scoped tokens + 26-command browser-driving
allowlist), `/sidebar-chat`. ngrok forwards only this port.
Root tokens sent over the tunnel return 403. SSE endpoints use a 30-minute
HttpOnly `gstack_sse` cookie (never valid against `/command`).
### The 26-command tunnel allowlist
Defined in `browse/src/server.ts` as `TUNNEL_COMMANDS`. Pure gate function
`canDispatchOverTunnel(command)` is exported for unit testing. Set:
```
goto, click, text, screenshot, html, links, forms, accessibility,
attrs, media, data, scroll, press, type, select, wait, eval,
newtab, tabs, back, forward, reload, snapshot, fill, url, closetab
```
Notably absent: `pair`, `unpair`, `cookies`, `setup`, `launch`, `restart`,
`stop`, `tunnel-start`, `token-mint`, `state`, `connect`, `disconnect`. A
remote agent that tries them gets a 403 plus a fresh entry in the denial log.
### Tunnel denial log
`~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl` — append-only, salted SHA-256 of source
+ domain only (no raw IP, no full request body), rotates at 10MB with 5
generations. Per-device salt at `~/.gstack/security/device-salt` (mode 0600).
See [`docs/REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md`](docs/REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md) for the
full operator guide.
### Tab ownership
Scoped tokens default to `tabPolicy: 'own-only'`. A paired agent can `newtab`
to create its own tab and drive that tab freely, but it can't `goto`, `fill`,
or `click` on tabs another caller owns. `tabs` lists ALL tab metadata (an
accepted tradeoff — see ARCHITECTURE.md), but `text`/`html`/`snapshot` content
of unowned tabs is blocked by ownership checks.
---
## Authentication
Three token types, three lifetimes, three scopes.
| Token | Generated by | Lifetime | Scope |
|-------|--------------|----------|-------|
| **Root token** | Daemon startup (random UUID) | Daemon process lifetime | Full command surface, local listener only — 403 over tunnel |
| **Setup key** | `POST /pair` | 5 minutes, one-time use | Single redemption: present at `/connect`, get a scoped token |
| **Scoped token** | `POST /connect` (with setup key) | 24 hours | Per-client, allowlist-bound, optionally tab-scoped |
The root token is written to `<project>/.gstack/browse.json` with chmod 600.
Every command that mutates browser state must include
`Authorization: Bearer <token>`.
### SSE session cookie (v1.6.0.0+)
SSE endpoints (`/activity/stream`, `/inspector/events`) accept the Bearer
token OR a 30-minute HttpOnly `gstack_sse` cookie minted via
`POST /sse-session`. The `?token=<ROOT>` query-param auth is no longer
supported. This is what lets the Chrome extension subscribe to the activity
feed without putting the root token in extension storage.
### PTY session cookie
The Terminal pane uses a separate session cookie, `gstack_pty`, minted via
`POST /pty-session`. Different scope — can spawn / drive the live `claude`
PTY, can't dispatch arbitrary `/command` calls. `/health` endpoint MUST NOT
surface this token.
### Token registry
`browse/src/token-registry.ts` handles mint/validate/revoke for all three
types, plus per-token rate limiting. Setup keys are single-use; scoped
tokens have a sliding 24h window; the root token is rotated on each daemon
startup.
---
## Security stack
Layered defense against prompt injection. Every layer runs synchronously on
every user message and every tool output that could carry untrusted content
(Read, Glob, Grep, WebFetch, page text from `$B`).
| Layer | Module | Lives in |
|-------|--------|----------|
| **L1** Datamarking | `content-security.ts` | both server + sidebar agent |
| **L2** Hidden-element strip | `content-security.ts` | both |
| **L3** ARIA + URL blocklist + envelope wrapping | `content-security.ts` | both |
| **L4** TestSavantAI ML classifier (22MB ONNX) | `security-classifier.ts` | sidebar-agent only* |
| **L4b** Claude Haiku transcript check | `security-classifier.ts` | sidebar-agent only |
| **L5** Canary token (session-exfil detection) | `security.ts` | both — inject in compiled, check in agent |
| **L6** `combineVerdict` ensemble | `security.ts` | both |
\* `security-classifier.ts` cannot be imported from the compiled browse
binary — `@huggingface/transformers` v4 requires `onnxruntime-node` which
fails to `dlopen` from Bun compile's temp extract dir. The compiled binary
runs L1L3, L5, L6 only.
### Thresholds
- `BLOCK: 0.85` — single-layer score that would cause BLOCK if cross-confirmed
- `WARN: 0.75` — cross-confirm threshold. When L4 AND L4b both >= 0.75 → BLOCK
- `LOG_ONLY: 0.40` — gates transcript classifier (skip Haiku when all layers < 0.40)
- `SOLO_CONTENT_BLOCK: 0.92` — single-layer threshold for label-less content classifiers
### Ensemble rule
BLOCK only when the ML content classifier AND the transcript classifier both
report >= WARN. Single-layer high confidence degrades to WARN — this is the
Stack Overflow instruction-writing FP mitigation. **Canary leak always
BLOCKs (deterministic).**
### Env knobs
- `GSTACK_SECURITY_OFF=1` — emergency kill switch. Classifier stays off
even if warmed. Canary is still injected; just the ML scan is skipped.
- `GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE=deberta` — opt-in DeBERTa-v3 ensemble. Adds
ProtectAI DeBERTa-v3-base-injection-onnx as L4c classifier. 721MB
first-run download. With ensemble enabled, BLOCK requires 2-of-3 ML
classifiers agreeing at >= WARN.
- Classifier model cache: `~/.gstack/models/testsavant-small/` (112MB, first
run only) plus `~/.gstack/models/deberta-v3-injection/` (721MB, only when
ensemble enabled).
- Attack log: `~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl` (salted SHA-256 + domain
only, rotates at 10MB, 5 generations).
- Per-device salt: `~/.gstack/security/device-salt` (0600).
- Session state: `~/.gstack/security/session-state.json` (cross-process,
atomic).
A shield icon in the sidebar header shows the live status. See
ARCHITECTURE.md § "Prompt injection defense" for the full threat model.
---
## Screenshots, PDFs, visual
### Screenshot modes
| Mode | Syntax | Playwright API |
|------|--------|----------------|
| Full page (default) | `screenshot [path]` | `page.screenshot({ fullPage: true })` |
| Viewport only | `screenshot --viewport [path]` | `page.screenshot({ fullPage: false })` |
| Element crop (flag) | `screenshot --selector <css> [path]` | `locator.screenshot()` |
| Element crop (positional) | `screenshot "#sel" [path]` or `screenshot @e3 [path]` | `locator.screenshot()` |
| Region clip | `screenshot --clip x,y,w,h [path]` | `page.screenshot({ clip })` |
Element crop accepts CSS selectors (`.class`, `#id`, `[attr]`) or `@e`/`@c`
refs. **Tag selectors like `button` aren't caught by the positional
heuristic** — use the `--selector` flag form.
`--base64` returns `data:image/png;base64,...` instead of writing to disk —
composes with `--selector`, `--clip`, `--viewport`.
Mutual exclusion: `--clip` + selector, `--viewport` + `--clip`, and
`--selector` + positional selector all throw.
### Retina screenshots — `viewport --scale`
`viewport --scale <n>` sets Playwright's `deviceScaleFactor` (context-level,
13 cap):
```bash
$B viewport 480x600 --scale 2
$B load-html /tmp/card.html
$B screenshot /tmp/card.png --selector .card
# .card at 400x200 CSS pixels → card.png is 800x400 pixels
```
`--scale N` alone (no `WxH`) keeps the current viewport size. Scale changes
trigger a context recreation, which invalidates `@e`/`@c` refs — rerun
`snapshot` after. HTML loaded via `load-html` survives the recreation via
in-memory replay. Rejected in headed mode (real browser controls scale).
### PDF generation
`pdf` accepts the full Playwright surface plus a few additions:
- **Layout:** `--format letter|a4|legal`, `--width <dim>`, `--height <dim>`,
`--margins <dim>`, `--margin-top/right/bottom/left <dim>`
- **Structure:** `--toc` (waits for Paged.js if loaded), `--outline`,
`--tagged` (PDF/A accessibility), `--print-background`,
`--prefer-css-page-size`
- **Branding:** `--header-template <html>`, `--footer-template <html>`,
`--page-numbers`
- **Tabs:** `--tab-id <N>` to render a specific tab
- **Large payloads:** `--from-file <payload.json>` (avoids shell argv limits)
### Responsive screenshots
`responsive [prefix]` — three screenshots in one call: mobile (375x812),
tablet (768x1024), desktop (1280x720). Saves as `{prefix}-mobile.png` etc.
### `prettyscreenshot`
Combines cleanup + scroll + element hide in one call:
```bash
$B prettyscreenshot --cleanup --scroll-to "hero section" --hide ".cookie-banner" /tmp/clean.png
```
---
## Local HTML
Two ways to render HTML that isn't on a web server:
| Approach | When | URL after | Relative assets |
|----------|------|-----------|-----------------|
| `goto file://<abs-path>` | File already on disk | `file:///...` | Resolve against file's directory |
| `goto file://./<rel>`, `goto file://~/<rel>` | Smart-parsed to absolute | `file:///...` | Same |
| `load-html <file>` | HTML generated in memory, no parent-dir context needed | `about:blank` | Broken (self-contained HTML only) |
Both are scoped to files under cwd or `$TMPDIR` via the same safe-dirs
policy as `eval`. `file://` URLs preserve query strings and fragments (SPA
routes work).
`load-html` has an extension allowlist (`.html`, `.htm`, `.xhtml`, `.svg`) and
a magic-byte sniff to reject binary files mis-renamed as HTML. 50MB size cap
(override via `GSTACK_BROWSE_MAX_HTML_BYTES`).
`load-html` content survives later `viewport --scale` calls via in-memory
replay (TabSession tracks the loaded HTML + waitUntil). The replay is
purely in-memory — HTML is never persisted to disk via `state save` to
avoid leaking secrets or customer data.
---
## Batch endpoint
`POST /batch` sends multiple commands in a single HTTP request. Eliminates
per-command round-trip latency — critical for remote agents over ngrok where
each HTTP call costs 2-5s.
```json
POST /batch
Authorization: Bearer <token>
{
"commands": [
{"command": "text", "tabId": 1},
{"command": "text", "tabId": 2},
{"command": "snapshot", "args": ["-i"], "tabId": 3},
{"command": "click", "args": ["@e5"], "tabId": 4}
]
}
```
Each command routes through `handleCommandInternal` — full security pipeline
(scope checks, domain validation, tab ownership, content wrapping) enforced
per command. Per-command error isolation: one failure doesn't abort the
batch. Max 50 commands per batch. Nested batches rejected. Rate limiting:
1 batch = 1 request against the per-agent limit.
Pattern: agent crawling 20 pages opens 20 tabs (individual `newtab` or
batch), then `POST /batch` with 20 `text` commands → 20 page contents in
~2-3 seconds total vs ~40-100 seconds serial.
---
## Capture
Console, network, and dialog events flow into O(1) circular buffers (50,000
capacity each), flushed to disk asynchronously via `Bun.write()`:
- Console: `.gstack/browse-console.log`
- Network: `.gstack/browse-network.log`
- Dialog: `.gstack/browse-dialog.log`
The `console`, `network`, and `dialog` commands read from the in-memory
buffers (not disk) so capture is real-time even when disk is slow.
Dialogs (alert, confirm, prompt) are auto-accepted by default to prevent
browser lockup. `dialog-accept <text>` controls prompt response text.
---
## JS execution
`js` runs an inline expression. `eval` runs a JS file. Both run in the
**same JS sandbox** — the only difference is inline-vs-file. Both support
`await` — expressions containing `await` are auto-wrapped in an async
context:
```bash
$B js "await fetch('/api/data').then(r => r.json())" # auto-wrapped
$B js "document.title" # no wrap needed
$B eval my-script.js # file with await
```
For `eval` files, single-line files return the expression value directly.
Multi-line files need explicit `return` when using `await`. Comments
containing the literal token "await" don't trigger wrapping.
Path safety: `eval` rejects paths outside cwd or `/tmp`. `js` doesn't read
files at all.
---
## Tabs, frames, state
### Tabs
```bash
$B tabs # list all open tabs
$B tab 3 # switch to tab 3
$B newtab https://example.com # open new tab, switch to it
$B newtab --json # programmatic: returns {"tabId":N,"url":...}
$B closetab # close current
$B closetab 2 # close tab 2
$B tab-each "text" # run "text" on every tab, return JSON
```
`tab-each <command>` fans out a command across every open tab and returns a
JSON array — handy for "give me the text of every tab I have open."
### Frames
```bash
$B frame "#stripe-iframe" # switch to iframe by selector
$B frame @e7 # by ref
$B frame --name "checkout" # by name attribute
$B frame --url "stripe.com" # by URL pattern match
$B frame main # back to top frame
```
Refs are cleared on switch (the iframe has its own AX tree).
### State save/load
```bash
$B state save my-session # save cookies + URLs to .gstack/browse-state-my-session.json
$B state load my-session # restore
```
In-memory `load-html` content is intentionally NOT persisted (avoid leaking
secrets to disk).
### Watch
```bash
$B watch # passive observation: snapshot every 5s while user browses
$B watch stop # return summary of what changed
```
Useful when you're driving the browser manually and want Claude to see what
you did at the end without spamming `snapshot` calls.
### Inbox
```bash
$B inbox # list messages from sidebar scout
$B inbox --clear # clear after reading
```
The sidebar scout (a background process the Chrome extension can spawn) drops
notes for Claude when the user surfaces something they want noticed. Stored
in `.gstack/browser-scout.jsonl`.
---
## CDP
### `$B cdp` — raw Chrome DevTools Protocol dispatch
Deny-default. Only methods enumerated in `browse/src/cdp-allowlist.ts`
(`CDP_ALLOWLIST` const) are reachable; any other method returns 403. Each
allowlist entry declares scope (tab vs browser) and output (trusted vs
untrusted). Untrusted methods (data-exfil-shaped, e.g.
`Network.getResponseBody`) get UNTRUSTED-envelope wrapped output.
```bash
$B cdp Page.getLayoutMetrics
$B cdp Network.enable
$B cdp Accessibility.getFullAXTree --json '{"max_depth":5}'
```
To discover allowed methods: read `browse/src/cdp-allowlist.ts`.
### `$B inspect` — CDP-based CSS inspector
```bash
$B inspect ".header" # full rule cascade for the header
$B inspect ".header" --all # include user-agent rules
$B inspect ".header" --history # show modification history
```
Returns the matched rule cascade with specificity, computed styles, the box
model, and (with `--history`) every CSS modification made via `$B style` since
the page loaded. Powered by a persistent CDP session per page in
`browse/src/cdp-inspector.ts`.
### `$B ux-audit`
```bash
$B ux-audit
```
Returns JSON with site identity, navigation, headings (capped 50), text
blocks, interactive elements (capped 200) — page structure for behavioral
analysis without dumping the full HTML. Used by `/qa` and `/design-review`
for cheap coverage maps.
---
## Performance
| Tool | First call | Subsequent calls | Context overhead per call |
|------|-----------|------------------|---------------------------|
| Chrome MCP | ~5s | ~2-5s | ~2000 tokens (schema + protocol) |
| Playwright MCP | ~3s | ~1-3s | ~1500 tokens (schema + protocol) |
| **gstack browse** | **~3s** | **~100-200ms** | **0 tokens** (plain text stdout) |
| **gstack browse + codified skill** | **~3s** | **~200ms** | **0 tokens** (single skill invocation) |
In a 20-command browser session, MCP tools burn 30,00040,000 tokens on
protocol framing alone. gstack burns zero. The codified-skill path takes a
20-command session down to a single `$B skill run` call.
### Why CLI over MCP
MCP works well for remote services. For local browser automation it adds
pure overhead:
- **Context bloat** — every MCP call includes full JSON schemas. A simple
"get the page text" costs 10x more context tokens than it should.
- **Connection fragility** — persistent WebSocket/stdio connections drop
and fail to reconnect.
- **Unnecessary abstraction** — Claude already has a Bash tool. A CLI that
prints to stdout is the simplest possible interface.
gstack skips all of this. Compiled binary. Plain text in, plain text out.
No protocol. No schema. No connection management.
---
## Multi-workspace
Each project root (detected via `git rev-parse --show-toplevel`) gets its
own daemon, port, state file, cookies, and logs. No cross-workspace
collisions.
| Workspace | State file | Port |
|-----------|-----------|------|
| `/code/project-a` | `/code/project-a/.gstack/browse.json` | random (1000060000) |
| `/code/project-b` | `/code/project-b/.gstack/browse.json` | random (1000060000) |
Browser-skills three-tier lookup walks project → global → bundled, so a
project-tier skill at `/code/project-a/.gstack/browser-skills/foo/` shadows
the global `~/.gstack/browser-skills/foo/` only inside project-a.
---
## Environment variables
| Variable | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `BROWSE_PORT` | 0 (random 1000060000) | Fixed port for the HTTP server (debug override) |
| `BROWSE_IDLE_TIMEOUT` | 1800000 (30 min) | Idle shutdown timeout in ms |
| `BROWSE_STATE_FILE` | `.gstack/browse.json` | Path to state file |
| `BROWSE_SERVER_SCRIPT` | auto-detected | Path to `server.ts` |
| `BROWSE_CDP_URL` | (none) | Set to `channel:chrome` for real-browser mode |
| `BROWSE_CDP_PORT` | 0 | CDP port (used internally) |
| `BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP` | 0 | Skip Chromium launch entirely (test harness only) |
| `BROWSE_TUNNEL` | 0 | Activate the dual-listener tunnel architecture (requires `NGROK_AUTHTOKEN`) |
| `BROWSE_TUNNEL_LOCAL_ONLY` | 0 | Test-only — bind both listeners locally without ngrok |
| `GSTACK_BROWSE_MAX_HTML_BYTES` | 52428800 (50MB) | `load-html` size cap |
| `GSTACK_SECURITY_OFF` | unset | Emergency kill switch — disable ML classifier |
| `GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE` | unset | Set to `deberta` for 3-classifier ensemble (721MB download) |
---
## Source map
```
browse/
├── src/
│ ├── cli.ts # Thin client — reads state, sends HTTP, prints
│ ├── server.ts # Bun HTTP daemon — routes commands, dual-listener
│ ├── browser-manager.ts # Chromium lifecycle, tabs, ref map, crash detection
│ ├── socks-bridge.ts # Local 127.0.0.1 SOCKS5 bridge that handles auth handshakes Chromium can't speak
│ ├── proxy-config.ts # --proxy URL parsing + cred resolution (URL vs env, fail-fast on both)
│ ├── proxy-redact.ts # Cred-redaction helper for any proxy URL surfaced to logs/errors
│ ├── xvfb.ts # Xvfb auto-spawn + orphan cleanup with PID + start-time validation
│ ├── stealth.ts # navigator.webdriver mask + cdc_ cleanup + Permissions API patch
│ ├── browse-client.ts # Canonical SDK — what skills import as _lib/browse-client.ts
│ ├── snapshot.ts # AX tree → @e/@c refs → Locator map; -D/-a/-C handling
│ ├── read-commands.ts # Non-mutating: text, html, links, js, css, is, dialog, ...
│ ├── write-commands.ts # Mutating: goto, click, fill, upload, dialog-accept, ...
│ ├── meta-commands.ts # state, watch, inbox, frame, ux-audit, chain, diff, ...
│ ├── browser-skills.ts # 3-tier walk + frontmatter parser + tombstones
│ ├── browser-skill-commands.ts # $B skill list/show/run/test/rm + spawnSkill
│ ├── browser-skill-write.ts # D3 atomic stage/commit/discard helper for /skillify
│ ├── skill-token.ts # mintSkillToken / revokeSkillToken (per-spawn, scoped)
│ ├── domain-skills.ts # Per-site agent notes (state machine: quarantined→active→global)
│ ├── domain-skill-commands.ts # $B domain-skill save/list/show/edit/promote/rollback/rm
│ ├── cdp-allowlist.ts # Deny-default CDP method allowlist
│ ├── cdp-bridge.ts # CDP session lifecycle bridge
│ ├── cdp-commands.ts # $B cdp dispatcher
│ ├── cdp-inspector.ts # $B inspect — persistent CDP session per page
│ ├── activity.ts # ActivityEntry, CircularBuffer, SSE subscribers, privacy filtering
│ ├── buffers.ts # Console/network/dialog circular buffers (O(1) ring)
│ ├── tab-session.ts # Per-tab session state (load-html replay, ref map scope)
│ ├── token-registry.ts # Mint/validate/revoke for root + setup keys + scoped tokens
│ ├── sse-session-cookie.ts # 30-min HttpOnly cookie for /activity/stream + /inspector/events
│ ├── pty-session-cookie.ts # Separate scope: live Claude PTY auth
│ ├── tunnel-denial-log.ts # ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl writer (salted)
│ ├── path-security.ts # validateOutputPath / validateReadPath / validateTempPath
│ ├── url-validation.ts # URL safety checks for goto
│ ├── content-security.ts # L1-L3: datamarking, hidden strip, ARIA, URL blocklist, envelopes
│ ├── security.ts # L5 canary + L6 verdict combiner + thresholds
│ ├── security-classifier.ts # L4 ML classifier (TestSavant + optional DeBERTa ensemble)
│ ├── terminal-agent.ts # Side Panel Claude PTY manager (auth + lifecycle)
│ ├── sidebar-utils.ts # Sidebar URL sanitization + helpers
│ ├── cookie-import-browser.ts # Decrypt + import cookies from real Chromium browsers
│ ├── cookie-picker-routes.ts # HTTP routes for /cookie-picker/*
│ ├── cookie-picker-ui.ts # Self-contained HTML/CSS/JS for cookie picker
│ ├── network-capture.ts # Network request capture for $B network
│ ├── media-extract.ts # Media element extraction for $B media
│ ├── project-slug.ts # Project slug derivation for state paths
│ ├── error-handling.ts # safeUnlink / safeKill / isProcessAlive
│ ├── platform.ts # OS detection (macOS, Linux, Windows)
│ ├── telemetry.ts # Anonymous opt-in usage telemetry
│ ├── find-browse.ts # Locate running daemon or bootstrap
│ └── config.ts # Config resolution (env / files)
├── test/ # Integration tests + HTML fixtures
└── dist/
└── browse # Compiled binary (~58MB, Bun --compile)
browser-skills/
└── hackernews-frontpage/ # Bundled reference skill
├── SKILL.md
├── script.ts
├── _lib/browse-client.ts
├── fixtures/hn-2026-04-26.html
└── script.test.ts
scrape/SKILL.md.tmpl # /scrape gstack skill — match-or-prototype entry point
skillify/SKILL.md.tmpl # /skillify gstack skill — codify last /scrape into permanent skill
```
---
## Development
### Prerequisites
- [Bun](https://bun.sh/) v1.0+
- Playwright's Chromium (installed automatically by `bun install`)
### Quick start
```bash
bun install # install deps + Playwright Chromium
bun test # all integration tests (~3s for browse-only)
bun run dev <cmd> # run CLI from source (no compile)
bun run build # compile to browse/dist/browse
```
### Dev mode vs compiled binary
During development, use `bun run dev` instead of the compiled binary. It runs
`browse/src/cli.ts` directly with Bun, so you get instant feedback:
```bash
bun run dev goto https://example.com
bun run dev text
bun run dev snapshot -i
bun run dev click @e3
```
The compiled binary (`bun run build`) is only needed for distribution. It
produces a single ~58MB executable at `browse/dist/browse` using Bun's
`--compile` flag.
### Running tests
```bash
bun test # all tests
bun test browse/test/commands # command integration tests
bun test browse/test/snapshot # snapshot tests
bun test browse/test/cookie-import-browser # cookie import unit tests
bun test browse/test/browser-skill-write # D3 atomic-write helper tests
bun test browse/test/tunnel-gate-unit # canDispatchOverTunnel pure tests
```
Tests spin up a local HTTP server (`browse/test/test-server.ts`) serving HTML
fixtures from `browse/test/fixtures/`, then exercise the CLI against those
pages.
### Adding a new command
1. Add the handler in `read-commands.ts` (non-mutating) or `write-commands.ts`
(mutating), or `meta-commands.ts` (server / lifecycle).
2. Register the route in `server.ts`.
3. Add the entry to `COMMAND_DESCRIPTIONS` in `browse/src/commands.ts` (with
a clear `description` and `usage` — the `gen-skill-docs` validation
suite enforces no `|` characters in `description`).
4. Add a test case in `browse/test/commands.test.ts` with an HTML fixture
if needed.
5. Run `bun test` to verify.
6. Run `bun run build` to compile.
7. Run `bun run gen:skill-docs` to regenerate SKILL.md (the command appears
in the command-reference table downstream).
### Adding a new browser-skill
For a hand-written skill: copy `browser-skills/hackernews-frontpage/`,
update SKILL.md frontmatter, rewrite `script.ts` against your target site,
re-capture the fixture, update the parser test. `bun test` validates the
SKILL.md contract (sibling SDK byte-identity, frontmatter schema).
For an agent-written skill: drive the page once with `/scrape <intent>`,
say `/skillify`, accept the proposed name in the approval gate. The skill
lands at `~/.gstack/browser-skills/<name>/` after the test passes.
### Deploying to the active skill
The active skill lives at `~/.claude/skills/gstack/`. After making changes:
```bash
cd ~/.claude/skills/gstack
git fetch origin && git reset --hard origin/main
bun run build
```
Or copy the binary directly:
```bash
cp browse/dist/browse ~/.claude/skills/gstack/browse/dist/browse
```
---
## Cross-references
- [`ARCHITECTURE.md`](ARCHITECTURE.md) — system-level architecture, dual-listener tunnel design, prompt-injection defense threat model
- [`CLAUDE.md`](CLAUDE.md) — project-level instructions, sidebar architecture notes, security-stack constraints
- [`docs/REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md`](docs/REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md) — operator guide for `/pair-agent` (setup keys, scoped tokens, denial log)
- [`docs/designs/BROWSER_SKILLS_V1.md`](docs/designs/BROWSER_SKILLS_V1.md) — design doc for browser-skills runtime (Phase 1 + 2a + roadmap)
- [`scrape/SKILL.md`](scrape/SKILL.md) — `/scrape` skill: match-or-prototype data extraction
- [`skillify/SKILL.md`](skillify/SKILL.md) — `/skillify` skill: codify last `/scrape` into permanent skill
- [`TODOS.md`](TODOS.md) — `/automate` (Phase 2b P0), Phase 3 resolver injection, Phase 4 eval + sandbox
---
## Acknowledgments
The browser automation layer is built on [Playwright](https://playwright.dev/)
by Microsoft. Playwright's accessibility tree API, locator system, and
headless Chromium management are what make ref-based interaction possible.
The snapshot system — assigning `@ref` labels to AX tree nodes and mapping
them back to Playwright Locators — is built entirely on top of Playwright's
primitives. Thank you to the Playwright team for building such a solid
foundation.
The prompt-injection L4 layer uses
[TestSavantAI/distilbert-v1.1-32](https://huggingface.co/TestSavantAI/distilbert-v1.1-32)
(112MB ONNX), and the optional ensemble layer uses
[ProtectAI/deberta-v3-base-prompt-injection-v2](https://huggingface.co/protectai/deberta-v3-base-prompt-injection-v2)
(721MB ONNX) — both run locally via `@huggingface/transformers`.
The CDP escape hatch is gated by an allowlist directly inspired by Codex's
T2 outside-voice review during the v1.4 design pass: deny-default with an
explicit allowlist, not allow-default with a denylist.